COTE d'IVOIRE: FACTORS AFFECTING FORMATION OF A NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000073

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID IV
SUBJECT: COTE d'IVOIRE: FACTORS AFFECTING FORMATION OF A NEW
GOVERNMENT

REF: OUAGADOUGOU 118; ABIDJAN 71

CLASSIFIED BY: Wanda Nesbitt, Ambassador, State, Embassy Abidjan;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: President Gbagbo's decision to dissolve the
government and the independent electoral commission (CEI) has
bought him time to improve his standing with the Ivorian electorate
but undermined his credibility with the opposition. This has
hampered PM Soro's ability to form a new government and electoral
commission as quickly as hoped; a cabinet is unlikely to be
announced before next week. President Compaore's apparent success
in securing a commitment from Gbagbo to respect the OPA and prior
accords will help, but the opposition still wants assurances that
the independence of the electoral commission will be respected.
Sporadic demonstrations and outbreaks of violence can be expected
until the latest crisis is settled. End Summary



ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE KEY ISSUE

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2. (C) There is a consensus among the international community in
Abidjan that with the dissolution of the government and CEI, Gbagbo
has succeeded in: 1) buying time to change the electoral dynamic
in his favor; 2) ridding himself of a dysfunctional government,
several of whose members were channeling government funds to the
opposition; and 3) sending a signal that he will not allow the OPA
process to completely escape his control. There is also general
agreement that the current situation could have been avoided had
the opposition encouraged CEI President Mambe to resign, rather
than dig in his heels, once it was clear that he had made mistakes,
if not fraud. Unfortunately, Gbagbo's action has also solidified
the opposition's belief that he will never permit a fair election
to take place and hardened their willingness to negotiate. RDR
President Ouattara told Emboffs on Feb. 16 that Gbagbo's action was
illegal and thoroughly unjustified; the president must be brought
to understand that he cannot control the electoral commission. The
commission is the key issue for the opposition, he said, a new
government is secondary; the opposition is not interested in
negotiating a new government until the issue of the commission is
resolved. As of Feb. 18, PDCI president Bedie (according to SRSG
Choi) continued to insist that Gbagbo reverse his decision and
reinstate the CEI - a position no one finds realistic. Close aides
to PM Soro, who is continuing negotiations with the opposition,
believe that both Ouattara and Bedie will eventually agree to new
leadership at the CEI as long as the existing structure is
maintained.



COMPAORE LETTER RAISES HOPE

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3. (C) The broad outline of a letter sent to Pres. Gbagbo by Pres.
Compaore has been reported in the local media and has raised hopes
that the Facilitator's insistence on respect for all prior
agreements, and ECOWAS' statement of support for Compaore's
mediation will be heeded by Gbagbo. So far, however, the presidency
has made no statement or comment. The letter, a copy of which was
given to Embassy, asks Gbagbo to respect the Linas Marcoussis and
Pretoria accords in forming a new government and CEI; to give the
new government a clear roadmap to elections; to preserve the
provisional electoral list which confirmed 5.3 million individuals
as Ivorians; and to resolve contested cases within established
guidelines. SRSG Choi and the PM's office are hopeful that Gbagbo
will accept the Facilitator's guidance and will communicate his
acceptance of the approach outlined by Compaore in a way that will
reassure the opposition and permit an inclusive government to be
formed.





BUT OPPOSITION STILL TEMPTED TO HIT BACK

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ABIDJAN 00000073 002 OF 002



4. (C) The need for a positive signal to be given to the RHDP
(opposition party coalition) is important given their strong belief
that Gbagbo's February 12 action was "unconstitutional and
undemocratic". Although Gbagbo's decision was triggered by Mambe's
refusal to resign when he met with Blaise Compaore on Feb. 11, many
question that such a radical step was needed to resolve the issue.
Alassane Ouattara told emboffs that Gbagbo did not seek his or
Bedie's help to persuade Mambe to resign, clearly implying that
they could have done so to avert a new crisis. Amb. Badini also
insisted during the Feb 17 meeting that Mambe would have agreed to
resign had the facilitation been given more time to reason with
him. According to Badini, Gbagbo told Compaore of his intent to
invoke article 48 of the constitution when the latter called to
report that Mambe had not resigned as anticipated. The
facilitation believes Gbagbo had already decided that he needed to
reshape the political landscape and wanted to do so before the
contestation process officially ended on February 15. Had he
allowed the contestation period to end, Gbagbo would have found it
more difficult to prevent a final electoral list from being drawn
up. PDCI and RDR reps who met with emboffs this week were still
very angry about Gbagbo's "coup" and inclined to tolerate - if not
precisely encourage - demonstrations by the RHDP's youth wing to
show the president that his action was not without consequences.




5. (C) Comment: The impact on the relative standing of the key
players is an important, if less visible aspect of this latest
"crisis". Badini agreed with Ambassador's assessment that Gbagbo
chose the use of article 48 to reassert his primacy in the crisis
resolution process and to demonstrate that the electoral commission
is not beyond his reach. Compaore's letter is a firm response,
clearly signalling that the Facilitator does not intend to
relinquish control of the OPA process. Interestingly, the Prime
Minister's office has been far more sympathetic to Gbagbo than the
opposition, noting that Mambe's intransigence had stymied the
electoral process and that his removal will, at a minimum, force
the parties to discuss how they can move forward. The Forces
Nouvelles has formally endorsed the PM's efforts to form a new
government and we understand from a close Soro associate that the
PM is actively seeking a neutral candidate to replace Mambe. The
prospect that the Forces Nouvelles may be seen as the party that
can be most trusted to operate the independent electoral commission
in a neutral manner is a formidable indication of how much clout
Soro has acquired, despite the ongoing stalemate over the
elections.
NESBITT