CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000739 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND PRM; BELGRADE FOR REFCOORD; GENEVA FOR MULREAN AND PITOTTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 TAGS: PREF PREL UNHCR HR SR SUBJECT: CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON THE AGENDA FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE REF: ZAGREB 728 Classified By: Ambassador James Foley for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The expert-level meeting between Croatia and Serbia in early December aimed at defining an agenda for a Belgrade-sponsored conference to address the lingering refugee issues in the region did not go well, according to contacts in Zagreb. The only agreement the parties reached was to meet in mid-January to try again on setting an agenda for the conference, which is tentatively scheduled for late win$GQ4nding for such an effort is unlikely.) END COMMENT. A DIFFERENT APPROACH -------------- ¶8. (C) The linkages among these issues argue for a comprehensive package between Croatia and Serbia (that would also potentially include B-H and Montenegro). The election of a new Croatian president in mid-February could be an opportunity to move the Croatian-Serbian relationship forward; but an inadequately prepared conference around the time of the inauguration could instead prove a setback both to bilateral relations and to resolving the refugee issue. A better course of action would be a well-calibrated effort to construct a broader strategic deal that provides closure to a number of the issues that stem from the war in 1990s, potentially including refugees, genocide claims and reparations. Such a comprehensive agreement would take time and need to be guided in part by the US and key European capitals. But success would pay long-term dividends, as it would remove much of the burden of the past from the region's quest for normalization and Euro-Atlantic integration. FOLEY ZAGREB 00000739 002 OF 002 during the war (and were stripped of tenancy rights) and do not want to return to Croatia. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The deep sensitivity of this issue is further reflected in the arguments over the pending Croatian genocide suit and Serbian counter-suit at the ICJ. This underscores the risk to U.S. objectives in the region of bringing the issue of refugees who have chosen to settle in Serbia under the penumbra of EU accession. Not only could it delay Croatia's EU accession, it could end up complicating and delaying Serbia's own EU bid itself. ¶7. (C) Who bears responsibility for the ethnic Serbs who fled Croatia during the war is the central irritant in Croatia-Serbia relations (reftel). In that sense, the initiative to find a resolution to the remaining refugee issues is welcome on more than one account. However, it is unlikely to succeed if it aims to compel Croatia to compensate refugees who refuse to return, in isolation from a discussion of Serbia's own responsibility for the damage and disruption caused by the war. The budgetary implications for Croatia alone would make this a tough sell and the politics of paying people who do not want to return to Croatia are even tougher: Croatian politicians and public would immediately object that Serbia has never paid any damages to Croatia for the war. The GoC would likely insist additional funds be spent on housing and re-integration of those who have returned or are still willing to return. (An international fund to provide compensation to both refugees in Serbia and to victims of the war in Croatia might provide a way out of this impasse, but our understanding is that external donor funding for such an effort is unlikely.) END COMMENT. A DIFFERENT APPROACH -------------- ¶8. (C) The linkages among these issues argue for a comprehensive package between Croatia and Serbia (that would also potentially include B-H and Montenegro). The election of a new Croatian president in mid-February could be an opportunity to move the Croatian-Serbian relationship forward; but an inadequately prepared conference around the time of the inauguration could instead prove a setback both to bilateral relations and to resolving the refugee issue. A better course of action would be a well-calibrated effort to construct a broader strategic deal that provides closure to a number of the issues that stem from the war in 1990s, potentially including refugees, genocide claims and reparations. Such a comprehensive agreement would take time and need to be guided in part by the US and key European capitals. But success would pay long-term dividends, as it would remove much of the burden of the past from the region's quest for normalization and Euro-Atlantic integration. FOLEY