ZAGREB'S EFFORTS TO ENGAGE BOSNIAN CROAT PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000691 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV HR BK SUBJECT: ZAGREB'S EFFORTS TO ENGAGE BOSNIAN CROAT PARTIES TO SUPPORT BUTMIR PROCESS REF: A. ZAGREB 00653 ¶B. SARAJEVO 01300 Classified By: Peter D'Amico, Pol Officer, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. MFA State Secretary Davor Bozinovic told post that he was in Sarajevo on November 16 and 17 following up on PM Kosor's engagement with HDZ-1990 Party President Bozo Ljubic and HDZ-BiH Party President Dragan Covic on the Butmir process. Bozinovic believed that both leaders were looking for more guarantees for the status of Croatians as a constituent people in BiH as well as a greater voice in the affairs of the Federation. Bozinovic said that the key for moving forward would be for the two parties to work with the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and its leader Sulejman Tihic. In a separate conversation, Davor Stier, the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor, echoed Bozinovic's comments and described Republik of Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik's efforts to cast himself as the defender of the Bosnian Croat community to be manipulative and disingenuous since Dodik was encouraging them to seek concessions from the Federation and not the RS. Bozinovic said that PM Kosor had invited Covic and Ljubic to visit Croatia soon and that the GoC was also interested in meeting with Tihic in Zagreb. Both Bozinovic and Stier believed that Serbian President Tadic could play a greater role in encouraging Dodik to constructively engage in the Butmir process. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On November 20 MFA State Secretary Davor Bozinovic briefed post on his November 16-17 visit to Sarajevo, following up on PM Kosor's engagement with the main Bosnian Croat parties (ref A). Bozinovic noted that he was now Kosor's Special Envoy to the parties. He noted that it was better for Zagreb to not use envoys from the Croatian HDZ party, since Covic and Ljubic felt that Croatia's HDZ was mostly interested in getting votes from BiH rather than looking out for the long-term interests of the Croat community in BiH. Bozinovic felt that he had been successful in persuading Ljubic and Covic to engage more constructively with the Butmir process. Ljubic and Covic originally saw Butmir as a sort of "Dayton 2", and Bozinovic said he tried to explain to them that this was not the case. What HDZ-BIH and HDZ-1990 Want ¶3. (C) Fundamentally, Bozinovic believed that both leaders were looking for more guarantees for the status of Croatians as a constituent people in BiH. In particular, Covic wanted the operational part of the Constitution to be changed to make reference to there being three constituent peoples in BiH. According to Bozinovic, Ljubic was looking for a mechanism to defend the vital interests of the Bosnian Croats (ref A). Bozinovic believed that, in order to support the reform package, both leaders needed to be able to point to a specific gain to their supporters in that package. In a separate conversation on November 19, Davor Stier, the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff, told post that Bosnian Croats were frustrated by the feeling that they had more power in national level institutions through the Council of Ministers, than they did in the Federation. In the end, Ljubic and Covic wanted a greater say in how the Federation was run. Cooperation with Tihic and SDA Key to Moving Forward; Concerns About Dodik ¶4. (C) Bozinovic stated that the key for moving forward would be to work with partners in the Federation, particularly the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and its leader Sulejman Tihic. Bozinovic believed that Tihic was reasonable and could convince the Bosniaks that the Croatian community in the Federation needed more guarantees of its status in exchange for compromises from the Croatian side. Stier also saw Tihic as the linchpin for any future compromise. Stier thought the Federation should "get back to basics" by having an alliance between the moderate Bosniak and Croatian parties to counter Dodik's efforts to block reform. ¶5. (C) Stier said Republika Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik's efforts to cast himself as the defender of the Bosnain Croat community were manipulative and disingenuous, since Dodik was encouraging the Croats to seek concessions from the Federation which would come at no cost to the RS. Both Bozinovic and Stier stated that the GoC felt Serbian President Tadic could and should do more to encourage Dodik to constructively engage in the Butmir process. Next Steps For Zagreb ¶6. (C) Bozinovic said that PM Kosor had invited Covic and ZAGREB 00000691 002 OF 002 Ljubic to visit Zagreb in the near future to continue to urge constructive engagement with the Butmir process. (NOTE: As of November 25, the GoC was still working to schedule these meetings. END NOTE.) Bozinovic said that one meeting with Ljubic and Covic every few months was not enough. The GoC would try to see them more frequently. Stier noted that there was disagreement within the GoC and the Croatian HDZ on whether or not to press HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990 to re-unite. Some key figures within the HDZ wanted to push for re-unificiation. Based on his own direct experience, however, Stier said that once this issue was raised with Covic and Ljubic it became very difficult to make headway on any other topic. ¶7. (C) The GoC is also interested in meeting with Tihic to discuss the way ahead (ref B). Bozinovic noted that Tihic had already approached the Croatian Ambassador to Sarajevo about a visit to Zagreb. FOLEY