OPPOSITION GRUMBLES OVER KOSOR'S HANDLING OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000577 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV HR SI SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GRUMBLES OVER KOSOR'S HANDLING OF BORDER DISPUTE REF: A. LJUBLJANA 275 ¶B. ZAGREB 552 ¶C. ZAGREB 559 ¶D. LJUBLJANA 286 Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Croatia's main opposition parties -- headed by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) -- have signaled their dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Kosor's handling of the longstanding border dispute with Slovenia. Their criticism, thus far, has focused more on Kosor's style and an alleged lack of parliamentary consultation than on the substance of what Kosor has agreed. However, despite a public pledge by the SDP not to play a spoiler on a key foreign policy issue, the looming presidential election may entice the opposition to intensify its criticism. Kosor is likely to continue "quiet diplomacy" with the Slovenes, but the opposition's criticism underscores that she will need an agreement that she is confident she will be able to sell to both the public and the parliament. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) The SDP's frustration with Kosor's close hold over the details of the border talks with Slovenia originally came out on September 10, 2009, the eve of the formal announcement of the deal between Croatian and Slovenia on the way forward (REFs A and B). On that date, Kosor had called a meeting of all parliamentary party chiefs to provide a general description of what would transpire in Ljubljana the following day. Zoran Milanovic, president of the SDP, refused to attend the meeting, saying two hours notice was insufficient, and in protest of Kosor's decision not to include the parliament in the process in August and early September, providing neither details nor any opportunity for consultations. After the agreement was announced on Sept. 11 (REFs C and D),Milanovic made a public statement that while the deal was "acceptable" to the SDP, it was reserving full judgment until more details were disclosed. ¶3. (U) On September 16, in the aftermath of the Slovenian parliamentary committee debate on the deal, Milanovic gave a press conference where he further questioned the candor of the Kosor-led government regarding the details of what actually had been agreed to by the GoC. In this press conference, Milanovic was particularly critical of Kosor's September 14 statement that everything that had been agreed to with the Slovene Government was contained in the letter she sent to the EU Presidency. He noted that the Croatian MFA on September 15 then issued a press release saying that Croatia and Slovenia would resume talks on an "Arbitration Agreement" based upon a draft proposed by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn in June, 2009. The SPD and other opposition parties in parliament were all critical of this move, in part, because no details of Rehn's proposal from June have ever been shared with the parliament or the general public. ¶4. (U) Both Milanovic, and Vesna Pusic -- head of the National Committee for EU Affairs, and the opposition Croatian People's Party (HNS) candidate for president -- have argued that using the June 15 Rehn proposal as the basis for talks was contrary to the position of parliament, which had given former Prime Minister Sanader a green light to agree only to the April version of the Arbitration Agreement proposed by Rehn. The SDP and the HNS are calling for a full parliamentary debate on Kosor's agreement with Pahor, and are calling for her to reveal all the details of what was agreed to in Ljubljana. For her part, Kosor dismissed the opposition's criticism, saying they merely want to diminish her achievement. Furthermore, she noted that any understanding to begin negotiations where Croatia and Slovenia left off in June, 2009 is not an agreement to accept Slovenia's full position on a potential Arbitration Agreement. ¶5. (C) In his introductory meeting with Kosor on September 18, the Ambassador asked whether she was concerned by the opposition criticism, and whether it would be helpful for us to note our support for a "win-win" deal in our contacts with the SDP. Kosor replied that she thought this would be helpful. She said she understood, and it was normal, for the opposition to challenge her handling of the matter. But the opposition also needed to understand that making progress on this issue was an over-riding national interest. She noted that Milanovic had refused her last offer to discuss the deal on Sept. 10, but said she planned to meet soon with Milanovic, HNS party president Radimir Cacic, and Ivan Jakovcic of the Istrian Democratic Party to discuss more details of the process with them. ¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: Much of the blowback from Milanovic and other opposition parties can be attributed to the "quiet diplomacy" engaged in by Kosor's staff for the past six weeks. Despite its effectiveness in achieving a breakthrough ZAGREB 00000577 002 OF 002 with the Slovenes, it has left the Croatian parliament and public in the dark about the direction and the details of the way forward. Nonetheless, Milanovic was careful on each occasion to stress that he was criticizing Kosor's approach, but that the SDP is not a "destructive" party and has not made a decision to oppose the substance of what Kosor agreed with Pahor. Furthermore, the opposition has not announced an alternative strategy or new initiative to resolve the dispute. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: The opposition's criticism is manageable, but it does underscore that Kosor's room for maneuver is not unlimited. She will need to find ways of consulting with the opposition without undercutting the "quiet diplomacy" which both sides have practiced successfully in order to reach this hopeful point. She will also need to be able to demonstrate that any eventual Arbitration Agreement does not concede the border issue to Slovenia but rather allows each party potentially to prevail. With Croatia's presidential elections looming -- the vote is likely to occur in January 2010 -- there is a risk that the opposition could shift their criticism from Kosor's style to the actual substance of what she negotiates. Her ability to involve them more in the process and call their bluff on being a responsible opposition will be key to maintaining broad parliamentary support for her top foreign policy priority. END COMMENT FOLEY