THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BOSNIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000484 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV HR BK SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BOSNIAN POLITICAL LEADERS Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolEcon Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a private meeting with Deputy Secretary Steinberg, Sulejman Tihic of the SDA argued that constitutional reform had to come before the closure of the Office of the High Rep (OHR) in Bosnia. He also expressed skepticism of the value of continuing the "Prud 3" process, unless it was to agree on constitutional reform proposals. In the subsequent larger meeting with the Prud 3, Swedish FM/EU Presidency rep Carl Bildt outlined several key goals for Bosnia, including reference that beginning discussions on constitutional reform could be "useful", but emphasizing the importance of meeting the EU's visa liberalization requirements as an immediate step. Remarks by the three participants underlined their separate perspectives. Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska argued progress was being made on property issues, and within the RS on meeting IMF conditions. Tihic again stressed the need for constitutional reform. And Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Covic focused on how to schedule and structure further meetings among the three leaders. In that regard, Tihic pushed for broadening participation to include other Bosnian political leaders, but Dodik and Covic raised concerns about including SBiH's Haris Silajdzic. Tihic expressed reluctance about continuing the Prud 3 process unless other Bosniak politicians were invited. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) In Dubrovnik on July 10, Deputy Secretary James Steinberg met first with Sulejman Tihic, president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA),and then subsequently with Tihic, Milorad Dodik as president of the Bosnian Serb Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD),and Dragan Covic as president of the Croatian Democratic Union of B-H (HDZ-BiH). At both sessions, the Deputy Secretary was accompanied by EUR Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon, and U.S. Ambassador to B-H, Charles English. TIHIC MEETING -------------- ¶3. (C) In the initial meeting, Tihic thanked the U.S. for its continuing engagement in sorting out Bosnia's political difficulties, and said he understood the need for domestic politicians to make the necessary compromises. But he also stressed that he felt the planned transition of the Office of the High Rep (OHR) to an EU office (EUSR) was coming too soon, and that the 5 2 conditions for transfer were insufficient. The existing institutions in Bosnia cannot function without OHR's oversight, as it was only OHR that could break the blockages caused by minority vetoes over decisions under Dayton. However, Tihic noted, Republika Srpska prefers the current situation and was not ready to discuss constitutional reform. Tihic stressed that he and most of the Bosniak majority were not disputing the existence of the RS, but the competencies and decision-making procedures needed to be adapted to enable the central state institutions to function. The only way out of the stalemate, Tihic said, would be with US help, since the EU's stance was always undefined. ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary said the US shared the view of the importance of constitutional reform as part of the way forward, but there was also a risk that over-reliance on OHR would give Dodik an excuse for poor behavior. All needed to accept that the transition would come, but only if certain conditions would be met. We also needed to find incentives that would provide for progress even after the OHR transition. Thus, it would be important for a process of constitutional reform to begin while OHR was still present, even if the process did not finish before OHR ends. ¶5. (C) Tihic responded that he felt constitutional reform needed to be complete before the end of 2009, otherwise with elections in 2010 and the pending departure of OHR, there would be political collapse. The current constitution, Annex Four of the Dayton Accords, depends on the presence and powers of the High Representative to function properly; the High Rep,s Bonn Powers are the only "de-blocking" mechanism available for controversial decisions, and the High Rep under Dayton is the ultimate arbiter of Dayton, including of its constitution. OHR's competencies and authorities needed to be transferred in some way to allow the Dayton accords to continue to function. ¶6. (C) Tihic said he was uncertain what progress could be made in the following "Prud 3" meeting with Dodik and Covic, but it would be helpful if all three could agree that constitutional reform is needed and that the April package that all three had supported should be the basis for these ZAGREB 00000484 002 OF 003 discussions. The Deputy said he looked forward to talking about the subject, but that even well-designed institutions would not help if the politics were bad. No solution could simply be imposed, it needed to have the political support that would see it implemented. PRUD 3 - SWEDISH EU PRESIDENCY - OHR MEETING -------------- ¶7. (SBU) At the meeting with the Prud 3, the Deputy Secretary was also joined by Swedish FM Carl Bildt, representing the EU Presidency; Valentin Inzko, High Representative and EU Special Representative for Bosnia; and Robert Cooper, Director General for External Affairs of the Council of the EU. FM Bildt opened the session by stressing the EU and transatlantic commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the whole region of SE Europe, but noting that important work remained to be done. In particular in Bosnia, Bildt observed, several major issues were outstanding, and that given next year's elections, progress needed to be made in 2009. Key goals included doing the "painful things" needed on the fiscal side; resolving the state property issue and the other aspects of 5 2; and "it would be useful" to initiate discussions on constitutional reform, which would be the beginning of a process that would be required and inevitable for EU accession. The most immediate issue, though, concerned B-H,s failure to have met the EU,s requirements for Schengen visa liberalization; such liberalization was about to be announced for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, leaving only Bosnia and Albania out of the process. Bildt wondered whether a political dialogue might start with a commitment to meet the visa regime requirements, an achievement seen as crucial by all groups across the B-H political spectrum. ¶8. (C) Dodik spoke first in response. He said that all Bosnian leaders remained committed to the goals of the EU and NATO, and that he was ready to do anything to speed up the process. Regarding the economic situation, he said that the RS would meet the conditions for the IMF Stand-By Agreement, which are due only in September, as early as next week. As for the political decisions needed to move forward, Dodik urged continuation of the Prud process, with a focus on the three (Tihic, Dodik and Covic) who initiated it. He did not object in principle to others joining, but feared the only practical format was to continue with three participants. He said the process was near to resolving the state property questions, and some positive developments could be seen in the identification of 69 properties belonging to the military, the large majority of which were in the RS. They were now working on how to register those sites. There was also agreement that all consular and diplomatic property would belong to the central state. Finally, he noted three properties in the Dubrovnik area, of which the RS would like only the smallest one. If these issues can be resolved, he saw no other property issues for the RS. Therefore, there was no reason to prolong the existence of OHR. ¶9. (C) Tihic, in his remarks, again stressed that reform of the constitutional system was the key to speedier progress. He argued that no one wanted to have the majority simply outvote the minority, but if that principle applied at the state level, then it should apply at the entity level, and that is not the case in the RS. Tihic also noted that he was the person made most vulnerable politically as a result of the Prud process. Tihic also said that each participant spoke differently about the negotiations and agreements reached in public than they did in private. The April 2006 agreement had cost him the election later that year. Dodik acknowledged this point, praising Tihic for initiating the process to reach an agreement, and admitting that all three had then failed to sell the deal to their publics. Tihic said he was willing to continue the discussions, but given the attacks on the April agreement, he would like broader participation. Asserting that Dodik walked away from key agreements on the basis of alleged "misunderstandings" over what was agreed, he also insisted he needed a "witness" in the process to enforce agreements, and that it should be OHR. ¶10. (C) Covic, speaking last focused his remarks on the need to reach agreement on how to continue the discussions. It would be irresponsible to give up, but time was short given the elections. He pushed for scheduling another meeting of the three with OHR as soon as possible. He felt that if the three met seriously together with OHR, then they could solve all the remaining issues, other than the constitutional issues, before the next PIC meeting. Compromise could be a victory for all three parties, otherwise he feared Tihic was right and politics could become more radicalized. Both Bildt and the Deputy Secretary noted that the views of the three were not identical, but that there was some degree of ZAGREB 00000484 003 OF 003 consensus, and urged the three to continue the process with High Rep Inzko. ¶11. (C) The rest of the meeting consisted of a discussion of whether the process should continue with just the three party leaders, or whether others should be invited to participate. Tihic pushed strongly for all members of the coalition majority to be offered a space, meaning inclusion of Haris Silajdzic of the SBiH. Both Dodik and Covic said they understood Tihic's political problems, and they would be willing to include Zlatko Lagumdzija of the Social Democratic Party (SDP),but both raised concerns about involving Silajdzic. Covic said that if Silajdzic participated then there was simply no chance of agreement. The Deputy Secretary said it was clear that to reach agreement the key players would be the three of them in the room. While broader participation would be nice, more important was to have a process that could reach agreement. It was better to get an agreement that would then need to be sold to others, than to have a process that protected everyone politically but failed to reach any agreement. ¶12. (C) Robert Cooper of the EU added that the EU, and he presumed the US, would give strong political backing to any agreement reached. The meeting ended with two of the three (Dodik and Covic) agreeing to continue the discussions later that day with High Rep Inzko and others. Tihic refused, citing his increased political vulnerability if seen as continuing a process without other Bosniak participation. WALKER