CROATIAN-SLOVENIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THE VIEW FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000118 "NOTE: BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE." SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO HR SUBJECT: CROATIAN-SLOVENIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THE VIEW FROM ZAGREB REF: LJUBLJANA 43 (NOTAL) Classified By: Poloff Daniel Meges for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT We see little prospect that significant progress can be made in resolving the longstanding border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia before Croatia formally joins the NATO Alliance. Assuming Croatia achieves NATO membership in time for the April 3 Summit there may be an opening to move the dispute to mediation or arbitration for final resolution. However, such a scenario would require flexibility and political courage in both capitals. Croatia's redlines vis-vis the border dispute involve the utilization of an established international legal forum or process to resolve the dispute. The GoC will also seek a mechanism that guarantees the implementation of the resolution in the event that the judgment does not fully satisfy Slovenia so that the GoS would then not be able to block Croatia's EU bid in an attempt to wrestle further concessions. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT. Our European partners should take a leading role on this issue, and there is a need to consult with high-level officials in Brussels in order to better guide the parties toward ending the impasse. We expect the EU will press the GoC and the GoS in the coming weeks to accept a deal to allow for mediation of the dispute, but we are pessimistic that Brussels can bridge the differences between the two sides. Unfortunately, should a formula for resolving this issue not be found in next several months, the dispute could derail Croatia's entry into the EU for at least several years. Ultimately, entrenched positions in both capitals that preclude compromise over the maritime border could deliver a body blow to the EU's enlargement policy and the stabilizing force it brings to the Balkans. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT ¶3. (C) Until Croatia formally joins NATO, it is unlikely that we will see a breakthrough that could lead to a solution to the 17 year long border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. Tackling the border dispute will take creative thinking, and we appreciate recent reporting from Embassy Ljubljana laying out Slovenia's redlines vis-Q-vis the border dispute (reftel). Embassy Zagreb's assessment is that it is difficult for the Croatian leadership to envision a face-saving compromise from the GoC's perspective while its NATO bid is held hostage. As long as the GoC sees Slovenia as holding up Croatia's two main foreign policy priorities of joining the NATO and the EU, the political price is likely too high for Zagreb to make any deal with the GoS vis-Q-vis the border. The recent decision by the GoS to block the closing of Croatia's EU chapter 6 on corporate law because it prejudged the border was viewed in Zagreb as another sign that it would be extremely difficult to reach a mutually agreeable solution with Slovenia at the moment. ¶4. (C) Slovenia's redlines are seen by the Croatians as an ultimatum: cede a maritime corridor without the cover of an internationally recognized legal process or forgo EU membership. Because of its recent wartime legacy, Croatia--its public, politicians, and media--are quite sensitive to potential losses of territory. Furthermore, the prospect of returning to the bargaining table to hammer out a bilateral deal, at least with the Pahor government, is very likely a non-starter in Zagreb. A previous bilateral attempt to resolve the dispute, the so called Racan-Drnovsek deal which included Croatian concessions on the maritime border, was torpedoed in Croatian parliament in 2001, and the resulting public outcry nearly toppled the government. ¶5. (C) The meeting on March 2 between the Prime Minister, President, and the heads of all the parties in Parliament underscored the unanimous support the GoC has for its position that Croatia shouldn't be forced to trade its territory for its EU bid absent a dictate from an international legal body. The GoC will formally respond to the EU mediation proposal next week, and will describe its answer as a "yes" but with conditions. All Croatian parties have signaled they will endorse the views of President Mesic and Prime Minister Sanader that an Athisaari-style mediation would be acceptable only if it facilitated the dispute being placed before an international legal body for final resolution. The Croatian response will also insist that all their EU negotiating chapters that are currently blocked by the GoS be allowed to progress once any deal on a mediation is agreed, without having to wait for a judgment to be delivered. ¶6. (C) Efforts to get the GoC to abandon its desire to have the case heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are further handicapped by the common presumption that should a mediation or arbitration body apply UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to the dispute, Slovenia would be highly unlikely to gain direct access to international waters. In the same light, Slovenia's economic case that its maritime claims are crucial to the port of Koper rings hollow to Croatian ears, as for the past 17 years boats heading to the port have enjoyed unfettered free passage, and both sides agree that maritime borders within the EU community are, practically speaking, irrelevant. Frank discussions with senior Croatian officials, however, have indicated that GoC may consider moving off their entrenched position of the ICJ in favor of another "established" international legal forum or mechanism to arbitrate or mediate the dispute. However, any chance for the GoC to make such a concession would likely have to wait until Croatia was a member of NATO. ¶7. (C) Additionally, the GoC worries that if prior to its EU entry a deal emerges to seek mediation or arbitration to resolve the dispute and if the subsequent judgment is unsatisfactory to Slovenia, then Croatia would still see its EU bid put on hold pending further concessions regarding the maritime border through a referendum process. The recent experience regarding Croatia's NATO bid makes the GoC view this as a very likely scenario. ¶8. (C) Because this dispute has halted Croatia's EU negotiations, our European partners over the past several months have put forth a few proposals to end the impasse between the two parties. On March 2 European Commission Ambassador to Croatia Vincent Degert said that EU is aggressively seeking a deal to unblock Croatia's EU bid before the European Council meeting set for March 19 and 20. (Note: The EU intergovernmental accession conference with Croatia is scheduled for March 27. End Note) However, Degert acknowledges the two parties are still far apart regarding the potential mandate for the EU mediation. Furthermore, there is still no agreement between the EU Commission and the GoS that should Croatia and Slovenia both accept the mediation proposal that the GoS would then necessarily unblock Croatia's negotiating chapters. Given these obstacles, it appears unlikely that the EU will meet its timeline for getting a deal on resolving the dispute. ¶9. (C) Our efforts to be helpful in this process are hamstrung by insufficient detail and coordination on the EU's strategy for resolving this dispute. While it is natural that Europeans should take the lead when dealing with matters involving EU membership, discussions with senior members of EU's Enlargement and Foreign Policy teams might facilitate our ability to positively influence the process. Should the current EU plan fail, it still may be possible to revive the French proposal, particularly if it had the active support of either the current or a future EU presidency, to put the border issue on ice and allow Croatia's EU bid to progress. Although it is a long shot, there may exist satisfactory legal wording that would stipulate that no material submitted during Croatia's EU negotiation process was intended to prejudge the border and that Croatia's negotiating material would have no bearing on any subsequent mediation or arbitration regarding the border. ¶10. (C) It is clear that both Zagreb and Ljubljana need to abandon entrenched positions. Should no formula be found to break the impasse in the coming months, then the derailment of Croatia's EU bid may well follow. Unfortunately, our sense in Zagreb is that the GoC is reconciling itself to the notion that the impasse will continue and its entry to the EU in late 2010 or early 2011 is all but lost. Ultimately, this disagreement over a maritime border could cause the entire region--chock full of contentious bilateral disputes--to re-think its prospects for integration into NATO and the European Union. Sadly, without a credible Euro-Atlantic path for the region, the costs and effort to maintain stability in the Balkans go up immeasurably. BRADTKE