DAS KAIDANOW DISCUSSES REGIONAL INTEGRATION,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 000759 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TU AJ AM SUBJECT: DAS KAIDANOW DISCUSSES REGIONAL INTEGRATION, SECURITY WITH SENIOR ARMENIAN OFFICIALS Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b,d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) During meetings October 20 and 21, senior GOAM officials told EUR DAS Tina Kaidanow that Turkey will need to be the first to ratify the protocols signed October 10. President Sargsian told Kaidanow that there has never been any question that Armenia would ratify, but that Armenia ratifying first would be "a major tactical mistake for us." He indicated that Armenia cannot wait indefinitely for Turkish ratification. In separate meetings, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian and Speaker Hovik Abrahamian shared those views, citing continued unhelpful Turkish Statements linking normalization with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. While Kaidanow noted that the USG would not pressure Armenia to make "one-sided concessions," as the Armenians termed them, to facilitate normalization of relations with Turkey, she underscored the deep importance of visible progress on the Minsk Group negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh in order to encourage Turkish parliamentary ratification. Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian expressed interest in continued U.S.-Armenia defense cooperation, calling it essential to his efforts to reform the armed forces. Kaidanow replied that it would be critical for the USG to see continued progress from the GOAM in strengthening its export control regime. She pressed her interlocutors for progress on democracy and human rights (septel). END SUMMARY. NORMALIZATION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIMEFRAME -------------- ¶2. (C) During an October 20 meeting, President Sargsian told DAS Kaidanow Armenia had done its part to make Turkey-Armenia normalization possible; now Turkey would determine where the process leads. He noted that the Turks had four choices: the Turkish Parliament could ratify the protocols to establish diplomatic relations and open the Turkish-Armenian border; it could ratify with reservations; it could reject ratification; or it could prolong the process indefinitely without taking action. On the latter option, Sargsian said he made clear to Turkish President Gul that the more protracted the process, the less chance there would be for normalization. The Armenians could not wait forever, he said. The President's critics in Armenia have argued that the Turks only want to drag the process out to get them past next April 24 (Armenia's Day of Remembrance of the events of 1915). But waiting that long would be unacceptable to Armenia. ¶3. (C) DAS Kaidanow agreed that with the passage of months, ratification becomes more challenging. On the Turkish side, she noted complex political considerations that will come into play, but said that at the highest levels, the U.S. will make the case to the Turks that normalization is of critical importance to both sides and to the region. WITHOUT LINKAGES -------------- ¶4. (C) Kaidanow said that there would be no pressure from the U.S. for any "one-sided concessions," as Sargsian termed them, on Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for progress on normalization. However, she noted, it would be very important to show continued momentum within the Minsk Group process to improve the prospects for ratification of the protocols in the Turkish Parliament. President Sargsian's trip to Chisinau and his engagement in a discussion of the Madrid Principles text at that meeting was a wise step in this regard, she said, and further engagement in the form of additional meetings over the next weeks would also be critical. Conversely, any perception that the Minsk Group process is backsliding or losing steam would play into the hands of those in Turkey who oppose normalization and who will be looking for any excuse to kill ratification. ¶5. (C) Given the process that lies ahead, the problem, Sargsian said, would not be with the Turks, but with Azerbaijani President Aliyev. "Obviously he will do what he can to show that the NK process is slowing, and that Armenia is not being constructive." Sargsian warned that we should expect a new wave of unhappiness from Aliyev with the Minsk Group format, followed by demands for new conditions "just like Aliyev did two to three years ago" to good effect, the President said. The whole logic of the Madrid Principles was based upon the notion of achieving a balanced agreement. Any attempt to change this logic at this point would only bring the situation closer to military conflict, he warned. YEREVAN 00000759 002 OF 004 Sargsian suggested that dealing with Heydar Aliyev had been more productive than now dealing with his son Ilham, because the father "understood that Karabakh was lost; the son doesn't see it." ¶6. (C) Kaidanow suggested the Armenian Parliament ratify quickly to demonstrate it had fulfilled its commitment and put the onus on the Turkish side to do the same. Sargsian called the approach "impossible." If Armenia ratifies first, it would "end the whole process." Sargsian went on to say that there has never been any question that Armenia would ratify, and that now was the time to put pressure on the Turks. He said Armenia ratifying first would be "a major tactical mistake for us," implying that early ratification, followed by an interminable wait for Turkish reciprocation, would be a humiliation Sargsian would pay for politically. NEED FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS ON EXPORT CONTROLS -------------- - ¶7. (S/NF) Kaidanow stressed that one bilateral issue above all others could affect the U.S.-Armenia relationship: reform of the Armenian export control regime. While the GOAM had made important progress in strengthening its munitions export controls over the past six months, it would be critical for the U.S. to see continued progress in strengthening export control for dual use items and in implementation of the various new laws and decrees adopted. Success would open up new opportunities for bilateral engagement, whereas a lack of progress could bring bilateral cooperation to a halt. Sargsian said there should be no question of failure, that he did not see any challenges, and that he too saw the issue as critically important. Kaidanow noted that USG dual use experts would be coming to Yerevan in November for what she hoped would be very productive consultations. FOREIGN MINISTER NALBANDIAN ON RAPPROCHEMENT AND NK -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Kaidanow congratulated Foreign Minister Nalbandian, in a separate meeting, for reaching a significant milestone with the signing of the Protocols in Zurich. Nalbandian noted that the successful signing would not have happened without the intervention of Secretary Clinton, and the Foreign Minister passed a letter thanking the Secretary. He noted that the process with Turkey had passed through six or seven stages, each more difficult and complicated. Nevertheless, the Protocols were signed, President Sargsian had a "very very positive and productive" discussion with Turkish President Gul during half-time of the soccer match in Bursa, and now the Armenians were ready to fulfill their commitments. ¶9. (C) Unfortunately, Turkish statements about linkages to resolution of NK complicated matters, Nalbandian said. According to Nalbandian, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu said he understood from the U.S. there would be "big progress" on NK in the coming days. "But in Chisinau we were talking about two of the fourteen Madrid Principles, and we are not very close on those two," Nalbandian said. It is not realistic to talk about a breakthrough, he stressed. In trying to link the two processes, the Turks damage both. "Opening the border isn't a favor which we need to reciprocate." ¶10. (C) Nalbandian claimed that much of the problem stemmed from the fact that Aliyev had not properly informed by the Turks of progress on the normalization effort between Turkey and Armenia, and he was shocked to learn that there were protocols ready to be signed. At Chisinau, according to Nalbandian, Aliyev tried to show there was no progress or worse. His strategy will be "to ask for more, more, more until the process collapses," the Foreign Minister claimed. Still, both sides are talking about an eighth meeting for Sargsian and Aliyev in a few weeks, and needed to continue with a step-by-step approach to making progress. Perhaps at the December 1 OSCE Ministerial, Nalbandian suggested, they could take steps to consolidate the cease fire by agreeing to withdraw snipers from the line of contact. While it was an old suggestion that has failed once, he said, Minsk Group Co-chairs should push for the measure. Nalbandian also worried that the UN resolution the Azerbaijanis want to table regarding Nagorno-Karabakh Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was "absolutely dangerous" and could stop all progress on NK. SPEAKER - BALL IN TURKEY'S COURT -------------- YEREVAN 00000759 003 OF 004 ¶11. (C) Parliament Speaker Hovik Abrahamian told Kaidanow that he strongly favors establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey, and that prompt Turkish ratification of the protocols is critical. He outlined the costs Armenia pays for the closed border, made readily apparent by the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, which disrupted food and fuel imports from Georgia and forced Armenia to turn to Iran to ensure minimal supplies of these critical items. He further noted that because Georgia knows Armenia has no alternative transit corridor, it is able to charge monopoly-level tariffs on freight transit. However, he said, Turkey also stands to benefit from an open border, primarily with respect to its EU aspirations. ¶12. (C) Benefits of an open border notwithstanding, Abrahamian insisted that Turkey must be the first to ratify the protocols. He asserted that President Sargsian has taken most of the risk to this point, acting in the face of both domestic and diaspora opposition. Parliamentary members would not vote to ratify first, as many do not believe Turkey will ratify the protocols. He insisted that Armenia is a more reliable partner, and could be counted on to ratify the protocols if Turkey does so first. Turkey is an unpredictable partner, he asserted, noting that shortly after signing the protocols, Turkish Foreign Minister Davotoglu turned around and made completely different public statements about linkage to the NK process. ¶13. (C) Kaidanow expressed concern that the process will become hostage to both sides saying the other must ratify first. Ultimately, the USG wants President Sargsian to be successful in this effort, and for the process to end up in the right place. The USG understands Sargsian's domestic position, but Armenia should consider what actions would best lend themselves to the success of the entire normalization project. MIN DEF ON EXPORT CONTROL ISSUE, SECURITY DIALOGUE -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian told Kaidanow that Armenia highly values its military relationship with the U.S., and said the security cooperation that the U.S. is providing is "pivotal" in helping him reform the Armenian military. He identified military education, E-meds training, capacity-building in demining and peacekeeping, and U.S. assistance with Armenia's Strategic Defense Review as vital areas of cooperation with Armenia's military. ¶15. (S/NF) Ohanian then raised the export control issue related to the lethal arms sale to Iran. He assured Kaidanow that the MoD was doing all it could to fulfill its commitments under the Joint Action Plan, and stated that the four munitions control-related laws recently amended and passed by parliament in late September would be implemented as soon as the Cabinet enacted the accompanying government decrees. Ohanian admitted that the challenge ahead would be to effectively implement the new laws after the decrees' passage, stating to Kaidanow that he would continue to work closely with the USG to ensure "strict" implementation and verification. ¶16. (C) Ohanian also asked Kaidanow to share with Washington his request for assistance to develop Armenia's peacekeeping brigade further, noting that such assistance was finally allowing Armenia to become a genuine "security provider" rather than a "security consumer." Ohanian said he would travel to Bratislava on October 23 to sign an agreement with Germany's Defense Minister finalizing Armenia's contribution of personnel to ISAF in Afghanistan (as part of the German contingent). Ohanian then told Kaidanow that Armenia would like to renew the high-level security dialogue that it once had with the U.S., saying it would give a new "impulse" to security cooperation and raise the level of U.S.-Armenia relations to a higher level. ¶17. (S/NF) Kaidanow thanked Ohanian for the hard work and critical role that the Ministry of Defense has played to date in strengthening export controls, but cautioned that Armenia still had a lot of work to do to meet its obligations under the Plan, specifically its implementation of the amended munitions controls and strengthening dual-use controls. She urged Ohanian to do what he could to help and impress upon other colleagues of his in the Cabinet the importance of quickly addressing dual use. Kaidanow said it was critical that political leaders "at the top" continue to push the appropriate personnel involved in exports control--MoD, MFA, MoE, Customs, etc--in order for Armenia to meet its YEREVAN 00000759 004 OF 004 commitments under the Plan. On Ohanian's request for resuming a security dialogue, Kaidanow cautioned that the answer to such a request depended on the resolution of the export control issue, and that is why it was so critical for Armenia to fulfill its commitments under the Plan. ¶18. (U) EUR DAS Kaidanow has cleared this cable. YOVANOVITCH