ARMENIAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY HAMPERED BY STRUCTURAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000653 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD AM SUBJECT: ARMENIAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY HAMPERED BY STRUCTURAL FLAWS Classified By: DCM Joseph Pennington. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Recent meetings with an IMF economist and an opposition Armenian businessman about Armenia's macroeconomic situation indicate that while there are hints of an eventual recovery from the economic crisis, structural problems remain that undermine Armenia's economic growth prospects. The Central Bank (CBA) is challenged with maintaining liquidity in a banking sector that has been significantly dollarized over the past year, and where lending has largely ceased. While inflation has been low, monopolist control of certain key sectors has kept the cost of living artificially high. Both interlocutors agree that opening the border with Turkey would be a positive development for the Armenian economy (to be reported septel). End Summary. STATUS OF IMF LOAN PROGRAM -------------- ¶2. (C) Econoff met September 14 with Carlo Sdralevich, Senior IMF Economist, and on September 15 with Khachatur Kokobelian, a prominent businessman and member of the opposition ANC, to discuss the economic situation in Armenia in the face of the ongoing economic crisis. Sdradelevich visited Yerevan as a member of the IMF team visiting Yerevan to evaluateing the GOAM's management of the economic crisis and the USD 800 million the IMF is lending the GOAM through 2011. The IMF is not currently considering a new loan package; the original USD 500 million loan was increased in June 2009 to USD 800 million, and is being allocated in tranches thru 2011. At the end of October the IMF board will likely approve issuing the loan tranches for June and September -- about USD 25 million for each. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS UNDERMINE RECOVERY -------------- ¶3. (C) While the IMF is concerned about the large GDP decline in 2009 -- 18 percent through July -- they see some prospects for improvement in the coming months, and at this point project a 15 percent decrease for 2009. The major driver of Armenia's GDP decline has been a collapse of the construction sector. Construction relies heavily on remittances from Russia -- which have fallen approximately 30 percent during the crisis -- and has little inertia; it is largely self-financed and therefore shuts down relatively quickly when a builder encounters financial problems. The recession ;has been somewhat obscured for the same reason; while economic activity continues to appear robust, construction activity, much of it occurring on private homes on a small-scale basis -- stops with little visibility. ¶4. (C) Kokobelian, who is active in the construction industry, indicated that while official statistics indicate remittances to Armenia have fallen by 30 percent compared to last year, this figure may be understated, as a sizeable percentage of transfers goes unrecorded. With regard to the impact of the crisis on businesses, he asserted that one needs to examine businesses run by opposition supporters -- who need to keep more transparent financial records as a defense against politically-motivated tax inspections -- to get an accurate assessment of how they are faring. He noted that one of his friends who owns a cafe near the Opera -- a central, highly-trafficked location -- has seen turnover fall 40 percent from last year, despite appearances that street-level economic activity has remained fairly stable. ¶5. (C) Sdralevich claimed that risk of inflation remains relatively low for the moment, and even that the 20 percent devaluation of the Armenian Dram (AMD) in March did not have a large overall inflationary impact. Kokobelian asserted that due largely to monopoly positions, prices in Armenia have not fallen as much as they should have, and Sdralevich noted that potential sources of inflation include the high level of dollar liquidity in the banking system (see below) and the likelihood that with monopolies, import prices for commodities tend to rise much more readily than they fall. ¶6. (C) In the construction sector, much of the activity and property in Yerevan is controlled by a small group of wealthy insiders, who have colluded to restrain supply while demand continues to increase. Construction of elite-class buildings has slowed down or been downsized, and while prices worldwide of construction materials have fallen about 40 percent in the past year, they have remained constant in Armenia. ¶7. (C) Kokobelian claimed that a building project he is curently undertaking in Poland will cost 20-25 percent less YEREVAN 00000653 002 OF 003 than it would have two years ago, and that he is importing cement from Pakistan for the project for less than it costs in Armenia (he indicated that if the border with Turkey would open, he would import cement from Turkey for projects in Armenia rather than purchase it domestically). For a hydroelectric plant in Armenia that he has built and will soon open, none of the input prices have fallen from pre-recession levels. Only in the automobile market -- due to falling prices in the U.S., western Europe and Dubai -- have prices recently declined in Armenia. IMF SUPPORTS GOAM FISCAL POLICY -------------- ¶8. (C) Sdralevich indicated that the IMF is supporting the GOAM's expansionary fiscal policy, providing USD 800 million in loans not only to bolster CBA reserves but also for budget support, which has allowed the GOAM to avoid excessively drastic budget cuts for 2009. The GOAM will have a 2009 deficit of about AMD 230 billion (about USD 610 million). This will be covered by about AMD 25 billion (about USD 66 million) in debt issuance, the rest through external financing (from the World Bank, IMF and Russia). The GOAM amended the law earlier this year to permit a deficit of up to 7.5 percent of GDP, which the IMF supports as a means by which to provide needed economic stimulus. ¶9. (C) For 2010, the GOAM projects a deficit of about 5.5 percent of GDP (IMF projects a higher deficit, but Sdralevich did not indicate how much). The IMF is concerned, though, that the GOAM will attempt to reduce deficits by cutting capital expenditures, which the IMF believes would harm the country's recovery given Armenia's infrastructure needs. At the same time, the GOAM is pursuing financing from the EU and the ADB; on September 29 the ADB board will vote on providing USD 500 million toward construction of a north-south road corridor that will link Armenia to Georgia, ultimately creating a much more direct route to Georgian ports. MONETARY POLICY -------------- ¶10. (C) Sdralevich indicated the IMF is generally pleased by how the GOAM has allowed the AMD to float; the CBA's policy is to intervene only to prevent excessive volatility, and it has procedures in place defining those parameters. On September 4 and 7 the CBA sold a combined USD 55 million in the forex markets - comparable to the amounts it was selling before it allowed the AMD to float again. Sdralevich said it was not necessarily an intervention to stabilize the Dram. Although he is not certain of the CBA's motivation, the loans from the IFIs and Russia have left the CBA with a large amount of foreign exchange (which it lends out in AMD) and he indicated that it may be prudent for the CBA to sell some of it, as long as they it avoids the impression of trying to fix the exchange rate or keep it within a certain band. BANKING SECTOR STILL NOT LENDING -------------- ¶11. (C) The banking sector is currently doing very little lending, in part because of tighter credit requirements but also due to a serious currency mismatch; in the run-up to the March AMD devaluation, many bank deposits were dollarized and are now approximately 70 percent denominated in foreign currencies. Consequently banks have a surplus of USD to lend while borrowers seek AMD as they are unwilling to accept the foreign exchange risk. In addition, with interest rates on AMD loans running at 18 percent or higher (Note: With inflation currently at an annual rate of about four percent, the real interest rate is approximately 14 percent. End Note),the cost of capital is simply too high for most businesses to borrow; only those requiring very short-term financing (e.g. traders or other transactions involving short-term leverage) can afford such rates. ¶12. (C) According to Kokobelian, there is still movement toward consolidation in the banking sector (which the CBA has encouraged, as there are more than 20 banks serving a population of just three million). He indicated that ArdshinvestBank (mostly Russian-owned) is buying U.S.-owned Cascade Bank, which he considers a discouraging development, as Cascade (along with HSBC) is one of the few banks in Armenia where one could take out loans without having to pay bribes to bank officials. (Note: Cascade Chairman Jonathan Stark told Econoff on September 15 that while ArdshinvestBank has made an offer for Cascade, there is not yet an agreement in place to sell it. End Note). COMMENT YEREVAN 00000653 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶13. (C) Over the past year the IMF, World Bank and even the GOAM have been required to make multiple downward revisions of Armenia's GDP decline, so at this point it is difficult to judge how realistic the IMF's estimate for 2009 is. Armenia's economic recovery is constrained by many factors outside its control, principally the economic situation in Russia and its impact on remittances, as well as the state of the mining sector, which accounts for approximately 40 percent of its exports under normal conditions. We agree with the IMF that the GOAM has done a good job of managing the crisis with relatively few tools at its disposal. However, real, sustainable economic growth is unlikely until the GOAM is willing to address the structural problems -- most related to corruption -- that constrain its development. END COMMENT. YOVANOVITCH