DASHNAK LEADERS EXPLAIN DECISION TO EXIT COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000335 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL TU AJ AM SUBJECT: DASHNAK LEADERS EXPLAIN DECISION TO EXIT COALITION REF: YEREVAN 278 YEREVAN 00000335 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMB Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Leaders of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation - Dashnaktsutiun (Dashnaks) told the Ambassador that they exited the coalition in response to the April 22 Turkish-Armenia joint statement to normalize relations. They said that Armenia had gotten nothing out of it, while Turkey had successfully imposed preconditions for normalization, including the insertion of Turkey as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process. They said Turkish intentions to keep Armenia a weak state are clear, and wondered why the international community was blind to Turkey's tactics. The Ambassador disagreed with their assessment of the joint statement and its implications, said that no preconditions had been made on Armenia, and stated that the only thing holding up rapprochement was a lack of trust and the ability of Turkey's and Armenia's leaders to bring along their publics. END SUMMARY -------------- APRIL 22 JOINT STATEMENT TO BLAME -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 6 the Ambassador met with five leaders of the Dashnak party to learn more about their decision to bolt the ruling coalition and how they were preparing for the upcoming Yerevan municipal election on May 31 (septel). The leaders included Vahan Hovhannisian, the party's faction leader in parliament; Armen Rustamian, an MP and the head of the Dashnaks' "Supreme Council" in Armenia; Artsvik Minasian, an MP and member of the parliament's Ad Hoc Committee on the March 1 events; Lilit Galstian, an MP and member of the Dashnaks' Supreme Council; and Ara Nranian, a young MP. ¶3. (C) Vahan Hovhannisian said the Dashnaks had always favored normalization of ties with Turkey, and that the only thing that had kept the Dashnaks in the ruling coalition for so long was its agreement with Armenia's authorities on their foreign policy approaches vis-a-vis Turkey and NK. But "when we saw deviation" from this foreign policy direction in the form of the April 22 joint statement, "there was nothing left" to unite the Dashnaks with the authorities. ¶4. (C) Hovhannisian said the joint statement amounted to Armenia falling into a "trap." Hovhannisian said the joint statement, agreed to on the eve of Armenia's Remembrance Day, which he termed "suspicious timing," got Armenia neither a border opening nor diplomatic relations in return. Rustamian fumed, "what can be more of a diplomatic failure than when a country makes concessions for nothing?" ¶5. (C) The Ambassador strongly disagreed with Rustamian, stating that the United States had issued its own statement on April 22 that specifically cited there were no preconditions. She also said Turkey and Armenia received the same benefit: both countries had announced a framework and road map for normalizing ties had been identified. The Ambassador said that while it was normal for each government to present the joint statement to their publics in the most favorable light possible, it does not mean that Armenia now possesses less maneuvering room than Turkey. -------------- TURKEY'S TRUE INTENTIONS ARE CLEAR -------------- ¶6. (C) All five leaders agreed that Turkey was playing a game with Armenia, using rapprochement to improve Turkey's leverage at Armenia's expense. Commenting on the joint statement, Hovhannisian stated that "the linking of the resolution of the NK conflict with Armenia's relations with a third country (Turkey),just when normalization with that country is about to start," was unacceptable to the Dashnaks. Galstian cited an April 27 Turkish Security Council meeting that allegedly recommended that no efforts should be spared to defeat Armenian lobbying efforts around the world on "genocide" recognition. Nranian concluded that it was clear Turkish policy is premised on "keeping Armenia a weak state." ¶7. (C) Hovhannisian said Turkey's true intentions of imposing conditions on Armenia remained clearer than ever. He referred to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's repeated YEREVAN 00000335 002.2 OF 003 comments -- after the joint statement -- that a border opening and diplomatic relations depended on Armenian concessions in settling the NK conflict. He interpreted the recent sacking of Turkish FM Ali Babacan as another sign of a toughened approach by Ankara, saying "Babacan had had a softer approach." He then cited recent comments by the Turkish military's Chief of the General Staff that normalization could occur only after Armenians are removed from NK, the 1921 Kars Treaty is made a basis of negotiations, and the "genocide" forgotten by Armenia. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador disagreed with the leaders' views of Turkey's motives. While recognizing that some of the statements coming out of Turkey were not helpful, she said it was the understanding at the highest level of the U.S. and Turkish governments that Turkey is truly committed to normalization of ties. The Ambassador added that one of the most difficult things for any government, including the U.S. Government, was to keep a unified message when there was internal dissent on an issue. Clearly, there are definite views in Turkey regarding normalization and what should be a private debate has gone public. The Ambassador reminded the leaders that Turkey had come a long way in recent years in openly discussing its relationship with Armenia, citing the public outpouring of sympathy after Hrant Dink's murder and the recent "I apologize" campaign by Turkish intellectuals. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador also disagreed that Turkey is using rapprochement with Armenia to extract concessions on the settlement of the NK conflict. She reiterated that there were no preconditions for normalization on either side, and said that each process was separate and moved at its own speed. The Ambassador nonetheless stated that it is clear that progress on either issue would facilitate progress on the other, and in this sense they could be considered as moving in parallel. -------------- IS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BLIND? -------------- ¶10. (C) Rustamian griped he could not understand why "the rest of the world" cannot see what Turkey is up to in its maneuvering, and why Turkey cannot just sign "a simple agreement" to open the border, establish diplomatic relations, and defer discussion of more complex issues to later. Rustamian asserted that with the joint statement in Turkey's possession, "the Turks will exploit it" in their bilateral relations with countries, and in international fora. He argued that the Turks will now talk freely and positively about Armenia's views on rapprochement, pointing to Armenia's signing of the joint statement, and saying it means Turkey has already begun discussing the "genocide" with Armenia when in fact they haven't. -------------- RAPPROCHEMENT SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN 3 STAGES -------------- ¶11. (C) Hovhannisian gave his prescription for normalization of ties, stating that it should take place in three stages. The first stage should include a border opening and establishment of diplomatic relations without preconditions. The second should include a discussion of the major bilateral issues -- "the historical issues" such as the "genocide" and international agreements (Kars Treaty, Treaty of Sevres, Moscow Treaty). The third stage should be devoted to establishing "good neighborly relations." Hovhannisian warned that if Turkey tries to discuss "the historical issues" at the first stage, as it appears to be doing, a "deadlock" will result. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador replied that the U.S. Government view is that Turkey and Armenia are close to signing an agreement to normalize ties, after the recent intensification of diplomacy on both sides. The two things holding the countries back were a) the internal situation in Turkey and Armenia, and whether Erdogan and Sargsian can bring along their publics; and b) whether Erdogan and Sargsian can trust each other. Rustamian agreed with the Ambassador on the importance of trust between the two countries, but grumbled that while Turkey's leaders took actions that reflected the mood of their society, Armenia's leaders did not. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Over 100 years old and Armenia's oldest political YEREVAN 00000335 003.2 OF 003 party, the Dashnaks' raison d'etre has always been recognition of the "genocide" and compensation for the loss of Armenian life and property that they allege the Ottoman Empire orchestrated in the early 20th century. It is not surprising they bolted the coalition after they believed President Sargsian had transgressed their most basic principles. What is more concerning is that the Dashnaks' thinking on Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is now shared by other opposition groups and large swathes of the Armenian elite. President Sargsian faces a difficult challenge to maintain his current, constructive approach as skepticism builds among Armenian opinion-makers. It now remains to be seen whether the Dashnaks will be able to join with other like-minded elites in successfully thwarting the president's rapprochement initiative. YOVANOVITCH