ARMENIAN OPINION LEADERS DEBATE TURKEY-ARMENIA TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000319 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL TU AJ AM SUBJECT: ARMENIAN OPINION LEADERS DEBATE TURKEY-ARMENIA TIES YEREVAN 00000319 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMB Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador hosted five prominent television and political personalities April 22 for a lively discussion of Armenia-Turkey relations. The Armenian guests remained convinced that the Turks are unscrupulously exploiting Armenia's diplomatic initiatives in order to prevent "genocide" recognition by the United States, and that the Turks will once again impose preconditions for normalized relations in the form of Armenian concessions in the NK conflict. Our guests differed on tactics and other issues such as compensation for Armenian losses of property and life that occurred in 1915. They also fretted over the idea that -- with dual citizenship now possible -- Diaspora Armenians might gain unwarranted political power in Armenian affairs. END SUMMARY. -------------- -- DIFFERING VIEWS ON TURKEY-ARMENIA RAPPROCHEMENT -------------- -- ¶2. (C) On April 22, the Ambassador hosted a dinner with five public figures in Armenian television and politics in order to gauge -- and attempt to influence -- elites' current thinking on recent Armenia-Turkey developments. The guests included Armen Arzumanian, the Executive Director of Armenia's Public Television network (channel H1); Petros Ghazarian, Commentator on "Kentron" TV; Artyom Yerkanian, Commentator-Analyst on "Shant" TV; Samvel Nikoyan, Secretary of the ruling Republican Party faction in Parliament; and Arman Melikian, an ex-"Foreign Minister" of the self-proclaimed "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic," currently an NGO leader, and a former candidate in Armenia's 2008 presidential election. All five are essentially pro-governmental in their loyalties. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the United States believes an historic opportunity now exists for normalizing ties, and that it should be exploited. Acknowledging that recent contradictory rhetoric from Turkey had raised doubts in Armenians' minds about the Turks' commitment to the normalization process, the Ambassador stressed the U.S. view that Turkey truly wants to move forward on normalization and opening the border without preconditions. The Ambassador said it was clear that Turkish authorities were under intense pressure from Azerbaijan as well as from certain groups in Turkey. The Ambassador stressed that if Azerbaijan saw progress in NK discussions from the Armenian side, it would be more inclined to accept Turkey-Armenia rapprochement which in turn would make normalization less of a risk for Turkey. The Ambassador said the two processes are separate, but obviously rub off on each other, adding that the United States is trying to facilitate progress on both fronts. ¶4. (C) The five guests were cynical about Turkish intentions in responding to President Sargsian's diplomatic initiatives launched in the second half of 2008 to normalize relations. Arzumanian declared that the recent statements by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan showed that Turkey had returned to step one -- putting as a pre-condition for normalized ties Armenian concessions in the NK conflict. He argued that the Turks had only temporarily dropped the pre-condition in order to impress President Obama and persuade the United States not to use the word genocide on April 24 (Armenian Remembrance Day). "Now we're back to the start, and we do not see any hope." Ghazarian dryly mused that "the only person who now who thinks the Turks wants to open the border with Armenia is Foreign Minister Nalbandian." ¶5. (C) Nikoyan said he supports President Sargsian's initiatives toward Turkey, but some Armenians think he is being too optimistic, and "they might unfortunately be right." He added that "if rapprochement doesn't work this time, all hope will be lost, and it will be that much harder in the future to rally public support." ¶6. (C) When the Ambassador asked about the importance of the border opening for normalized ties, our guests disagreed with one another. Melikian said that "whether one is for or against the border opening depends on the conditions. If it means concessions on NK, we are against it." He added that "an open border will not automatically equal new relations," and that "it is in Armenia's current interests to keep the border closed, in order to make Turkey deal." Arzumanian said Armenians remain in the dark about whether the current negotiations formally link normalization with settlement of YEREVAN 00000319 002.2 OF 003 the NK conflict. ¶7. (C) Nikoyan commented that "even if Turkey wanted to open the border, there will always be opposition in Armenia." Arzumanian was aghast by a recent survey indicating that 91 percent of Armenian respondents oppose the border opening, saying the survey was "absurd" and not reflective of reality, but would still be used as a powerful tool by opponents of the opening. Ghazarian reiterated that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's statements do not help convince Armenian public opinion. Arzumanian declared that "if the border opening goes nowhere, Armenian elites will look elsewhere for relations, to Iran, for example, or with Russia. But if it does materialize, "we will have a different Armenia," because "our elites want new paths to the outside world." Nikoyan said that "we need the border opening -- it would be a positive gesture that would help normalize relations." The Ambassador cautioned Arzumanian about Armenia playing its neighbors and regional powers off one another regarding the border opening issue. She stressed that it was in Armenia's national security interests to have every one of its borders open, so that Armenia has not just one path to the outside world, but multiple paths. -------------- -------------- PROBLEM: TURKS AND ARMENIANS DON'T KNOW EACH OTHER -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) One major obstacle to normalized ties, some felt, was the lack of knowledge of the other side. Melikian stated that Turks and Armenians do not know each other, and refer to each other only as states, not as peoples. Arzumanian offered that Turks are active in broadcasting on Armenia-Turkey issues, and that he tried to explain to Turkish colleagues that their opposition to border opening was misguided. He said he tried to convince them that by supporting it, a) Armenia would no longer be an enemy; b) Armenians would be less psychologically opposed to Turkey on issues such as genocide recognition; and c) Armenia would be freer to settle the NK conflict. The Ambassador agreed that a lack of knowledge of each other created a dangerous vacuum of speculation about the motivations of the other side, and for this reason it was important for both sides to engage each other and build trust. -------------- DIFFERENCES ON GENOCIDE RECOGNTION -------------- ¶9. (C) Some said genocide recognition was important to normalization of ties, while others argued against it. Nikoyan was adamant that "genocide" recognition by third countries was helpful to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, commenting that "our relations with Turkey would not have gone as far as they have" without this pressure. Yerkanian said that he was encouraged by positive comments he had heard from retired Turkish diplomats on the issue in 2008. He said they showed that Turkish officials are cognizant that they will eventually have to recognize the genocide, with the caveat that Armenians will be unable to request compensation for their losses. The Ambassador strongly disagreed with Nikoyan that other countries' recognition of the "genocide" helped Armenia's bargaining position with Turkey. She noted that other countries could derail talks with ill-timed statements or resolutions and that at the end of the day what counts is Armenia's and Turkey's relationship with one another, and not the views of third countries. ¶10. (C) Ghazarian sounded a positive note, commenting that he had seen more Turkish reporters in Yerevan in the last five days than he had seen in his entire life, and these reporters openly spoke about the "genocide." He said their openness led him to believe that "the barrier to recognition is thereby official" only. (Note: The Turkish reporters were in town covering the visit to Yerevan by Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Summit. Melikian said that Armenia will not raise the "genocide" issue in normalization of ties, and that the Armenian government and citizenry can be reserved on the issue because "it is not our issue, it is the Diaspora's." Nikoyan differed with the others, maintaining that "recognition is important to Armenia's national security and consciousness." (Comment: Nikoyan's view is frequently asserted here, most often by the Dashnaktsutiun and Heritage parties. The argument suggests that failing to own up to past "genocide" guilt means that Turks still harbor aggression and animosity towards Armenians. Many Armenians -- elites and general public alike -- still believe that Turkey might even today wish to invade and obliterate Armenia. End Comment) YEREVAN 00000319 003.2 OF 003 -------------- RESISTANCE TO INFLUENCE OF DUAL CITIZENS -------------- ¶11. (C) When discussing "genocide" recognition, our guests fretted over the specter of future dual citizens from the Diaspora exerting too much influence over the political life of Armenia. (Note: A constitutional referendum in 2005 established dual citizenship for Armenian citizens. It was not until 2007, however, that amendments to the Law on Citizenship and the Electoral Code gave dual citizens who return to Armenia and register as residents the right to vote. The law stipulates that for local elections, such as Yerevan's, residents must be physically present in Armenia a year prior to the vote. No such stipulation exists for presidential or parliamentary elections. End Note) Melikian said that Armenia will ultimately have to address this issue, "as at some point millions of dual citizens will raise it." ¶12. (C) Nikoyan noted that Armenia's national interest in "genocide" recognition must be respected, but if it is to affect the security of Armenians in Armenia proper, "we do not have the luxury" of going along with the opinions of dual citizens securely residing abroad. In commenting on whether compensation claims will affect Armenia's security with Turkey, Ghazarian added that "an Armenian in Los Angeles cannot take responsibility for my child's fate in Armenia -- I will oppose his participation in my political life." Yerkanian described his astonishment that a Russian-Armenian citizen recently appearing on his show from Moscow had tried to force the Russian MFA to pressure Armenian government not to be part of NATO. In raising the issue of Armenia's military contributions in Iraq, Nikoyan referred to the lobbying efforts in Parliament of Iraqi-Armenians against Armenia's contributions to the U.S.-led coalition, and said "while I understand my ethnic kin's concerns, I don't want overseas Armenians deciding my fate." -------------- -- COMMENT: HOT BUTTONS STIR DEEP-SEATED ANXIETIES -------------- -- ¶13. (C) As one can tell from the viewpoints of even these pro-governmental Armenian elites, there is ample spade work to be done by the authorities to prepare public opinion for the compromises necessary for normalized ties with Turkey. What is most apparent is the lack of trust that the elites have in Turkish officialdom, and the fear that Armenia could be exploited for short-term political gain by Ankara. ¶14. (C) The prospect of vast numbers of Armenian Diasporans obtaining Armenian citizenship, registering and voting in Armenia, and thereby taking control of Armenian politics, seems to us remote. Current residency and registration requirements for political activity seem sufficient to screen out Diaspora Armenians who do not legitimately re-settle in Armenia. This issue is best understood as a symptom of deep-seated national anxieties that still grip many local Armenians twenty years on from national independence: that their small country and political system remain fragile and -- surrounded by adversaries -- vulnerable to external shocks, great power maneuvering, and other pressures. YOVANOVITCH