BSEC ENERGY MINISTERS SEEK COOPERATION WITH EU,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 000235 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019 TAGS: ECON ENRG ETRD EAID ZS ZJ ZL RU MD UP AM SUBJECT: BSEC ENERGY MINISTERS SEEK COOPERATION WITH EU, FIND RUSSIAN RESISTANCE Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) A meeting of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization energy ministers in Yerevan March 20 underscored the desire for stronger energy cooperation with the EU, but also showed that Russia remains intent on impeding such an initiative. In working group meetings Russia successfully blocked attempts to move toward a more substantive plan of action. The US, Georgian and Armenian delegations met to discuss the idea of an Armenia-Georgia Electricity Interconnection Working Group, which would help move the Georgia and Armenia power systems to synchronous operation and help improve regional energy cooperation and security. Azerbaijan did not participate in the event. End Summary. BSEC MEETS IN YEREVAN -------------- ¶2. (C) Energy ministers from the member states of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) met in Yerevan on March 20. In attendance at the meeting were delegations from Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as observer delegations from the Czech Republic, the United States, the Energy Charter Secretariat, the Black Sea Economic Commission, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss proposals for a joint BSEC-EU Plan of Action in Energy and to adopt a Yerevan Declaration on Energy Cooperation. RUSSIAN OBSTRUCTION -------------- ¶3. (C) The March 20 meeting of ministers followed two days of often explosive and contentious meetings of the BSEC Working Group on Energy. Delegations worked long into the night to produce a proposal for a joint BSEC-EU Action Plan on Energy as well as on the text of a Yerevan Declaration on Energy Cooperation in the BSEC Region. Tensions filled the room as the Russian delegation fought each statement and quibbled about the motives of the Europeans and other delegations. Their lobbying succeeded in producing a watered-down Action Plan and Declaration that offered little in terms of real substance or practical solutions. ¶4. (C) It was clear in the Working Group meetings that most states wanted to proceed with EU initiatives and to strengthen the partnership between BSEC and the EU. The Russians continued to be contentious throughout the meeting, saying that the Europeans did not want partnership, but domination; that the Action Plan was not about agreement; that it was too early to discuss an Action Plan; that the EU proposals demonstrated their ambitions and were too political in nature; and that there was too much emphasis on EU standards. The Russian delegation was even opposed to the term "Action Plan," favoring a change of the name of the document to a more muted "Suggestions about an Action Plan." ¶5. (C) Many of the Russian comments were not accepted by other participants. The Russian representative complained that cooperation seemed to be more about following EU political approaches and standards rather than cooperation of two organizations. Ultimately the participants agreed with the Greek proposal for a "Proposal for BSEC-EU Action Plan." Russia also didn't see the reason for taking stock of ongoing regional initiatives like the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). However, all other delegations and the EU Ambassador insisted that taking stock of ongoing initiatives is very useful, especially since many member countries are parties to these initiatives. The Armenian delegation was clearly fractured, or at least played both sides of the fence. The Armenian Chairman of the Working Group agreed with the points of the EU Ambassador while the Prime Minister's representative supported the Russian positions. ¶6. (C) The Russian objections were ultimately successful, as the delegations became tied up in trivial changes, and no real progress was made in terms of practical ways to improve cooperation among the BSEC member states. MINISTERS MORE COOPERATIVE -------------- ¶7. (C) By contrast, the March 20 meeting of energy ministers was relatively placid, with declarations by individual ministers clearly indicating support for greater cooperation and concrete results. The statements of the delegations were largely similar, supporting the need for more secure energy YEREVAN 00000235 002 OF 004 supplies and transit routes; diversification of supplies and alternative sources; lower prices for consumers; and support for interconnections in gas and electricity to the European market, among other themes. Many participants expressed concerns about the potential impact of the global economic crisis on attempts to implement international projects. NATIONAL DECLARATIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) National declarations revealed country-specific concerns: - Bulgaria stressed its interest in close ties with BSEC nations, stating its solid interest in supporting BSEC. The Bulgarian representative specifically expressed support for three Black Sea initiatives: the Nabucco gas pipeline, a LNG terminal in Bulgaria, and the Russia-Bulgaria SouthStream trans-Black Sea natural gas pipeline. - Georgia reiterated its strategic importance as an energy corridor, both for Caspian hydrocarbons as well as for regional power transmission. Georgia expressed specific support for Nabucco, and for developing power interconnections with Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. - Greece, an observer, encouraged the BSEC member states to improve communications in order to develop planning and trade in energy and other sectors. It stressed that as an EU member, its role in BSEC was to support other nations' development in line with EC requirements. - Moldova supported BSEC as it promotes the greater transmission linkages the nation is seeking to develop in the near future. Moldova envisions itself an important link for transmission of power between Russia, Ukraine and Romania. - Romania expressed its desire to fulfill EU objectives for energy system development and international trade, stressing the importance of compliance with environmental concerns. Romania also stressed the need for all countries to diversify supplies and transmission/transit routes for energy security. To do so, countries need to use the BSEC process to understand opportunities and develop infrastructure to meet internal and regional needs. Romania expressed that BSEC needed to move beyond agreements to develop joint, tangible undertakings. - The Russian delegation, led by its ambassador to Armenia, stressed that it is developing its energy infrastructure in accordance with the Russian Energy Strategy, which is compatible with the energy interests of the G8: Diversification of routes; energy efficiency; market development; and environment/ecology. Russia is heavily engaged in the development of transportation infrastructure, especially in oil and gas, and with the diversification of supply routes. Referring to recent "problems," Russia mentioned that it seeks mechanisms for early problem detection and prevention so that it can warn downstream nations of potential supply issues as soon as possible. Russia further stated that the Energy Charter (which it has not ratified) is not sufficient to resolve problems, and that a better mechanism for information exchange and joint resolution of international energy issues is needed. Russia seeks long-term contracts for countries to attain access to Russian supplies. In terms of projects, Russia mentioned a new pipeline that will connect the Caspian with Europe, and that it is developing SouthStream with Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria for the benefit of all of Southern Europe. Russia said it is committed to renewable energy, and cited a project to use hydrogen-powered transport for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. - Serbia is strongly interested in developing its gas and power markets for international investments, citing that it will have fully liberalized both by 2015. Serbia is focused on efficiency, securing supplies, environmental issues, and EU directives. Serbia is very hopeful for SouthStream, as it intends to develop 800 million cubic meters of gas storage for its own use and the use of neighboring Montenegro and Bosnia/Herzegovina. Serbia mentioned the importance of a 1319 km oil pipeline project from Romania to Italy that transits Serbia and will provide fuel for Southern Europe. It is also investing in 3000MW of new power production, renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, in anticipation of amendments to its energy law later this year that will encourage such innovations. - Turkey expressed its support for BSEC, citing it as the appropriate forum to address regional energy and economic challenges. Turkey is happy with all its neighbors, claiming YEREVAN 00000235 003 OF 004 to have "good relations" with all of them, and it plans to increase dialogue and cooperation with all due to its strategic position as a transport and transit nation. The region will benefit and achieve greater stability through stronger economic linkages and the diversification of energy supplies and routes. Turkey said that the US role in the Black Sea region is significant, but did not explain why or how. Turkey also voiced its strong support for Nabucco as the best near-term option for gas supply diversification for Europe, as the 30bcma is needed for Europe and is not in competition with any other planned pipelines. Turkey said it looks to BSEC to help resolve technical issues and solve regional problems. In a sidebar with representatives of the Turkish Ministry of Energy, officials affirmed to the USAID representative from Embassy Tbilisi a commitment to develop renewable energy such that it represents 20 percent of its electric capacity, including some 10 GW of wind power, by ¶2015. In addition, plans are in high gear to develop some 3.5 to 5.5 GW of nuclear power generation by 2018. (Note: Turkish officials did not specify where these plants were located or whether they might compete with Armenia's plans for a replacement nuclear power plant, the feasibility of which will most likely depend on being able to sell electricity to Turkey. End Note). - Following its disputes with Russia in late 2008, Ukraine stressed a need to rethink energy policies from both European and regional perspectives. Ukraine stated that cooperation is only possible when political and economic conditions are stable. Ukraine counseled the Black Sea countries to be more active and involved in the stimulation of new technology development, looking to neighboring EU countries and beyond as examples. ¶9. (C) Armenia cited its development and adoption of a new Energy Security Strategy as the keystone to its strong commitment to the development of its energy systems. This strategy has four pillars: nuclear; renewables and energy efficiency; diversification of supplies and routes; and Regional Cooperation, especially through bodies like BSEC. Diversification represents a challenge for Armenia, yet the new gas connection with Iran represents a step towards gas security. In terms of cooperation, Armenia mentioned a new MOU with Iran on energy cooperation and parallel power system operations, and plans for the development of two new 440 kV lines to Iran and Georgia. It closed voicing strong support for BSEC. ¶9. (C) International bodies and observer nations were then asked to speak. One of the most interesting comments was made by the representative of the Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat. Representing 53 member countries, the Energy Charter Treaty sees itself in a support role to BSEC and other international bodies. The representative turned to the January energy crisis (Ukraine/Russia) and affirmed the Energy Charter Treaty was not at fault (especially as Russia has not ratified). He did agree, however, that these events have prompted interest in revisiting (but not renegotiating) the 1994 treaty with fresh eyes to strengthen support among member states and allow the treaty to better respond to international energy disputes. Regarding BSEC, the Energy Charter representative stated that BSEC coordination is important in promoting appropriate international energy policy dialogue toward EU objectives. ARMENIA-GEORGIA INTERCONNECTION -------------- ¶10. (C) After the Plenary Session, representatives from the US Missions in Georgia and Armenia met with the Deputy Ministers of Energy of the two countries. In this sidebar meeting, the USG floated the idea of an Armenia-Georgia Electricity Interconnection Working Group, to which USAID in each country would provide technical assistance and training for specific activities of mutual interest. The Working Group would look to the future synchronous operation of the Georgian and Armenian power systems and examine a set of technical, regulatory, and market issues that need to be considered in such a future scenario. The US proposed that the three governments sign a memorandum of cooperation, and passed out a draft prospectus for the Delegations to take back to their respective Ministers for review. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) We are encouraged by the interest in energy cooperation by the BSEC members, who clearly have strong motivation to improve their energy security, diversify their sources and improve efficiency. The Russian delegation seemed to come to the meeting prepared to block any substantive initiative or concrete action towards cooperation YEREVAN 00000235 004 OF 004 with the EU. It also seemed to have on its agenda promotion of its bilateral projects with individual countries in order to undermine multilateral initiatives of BSEC member countries. Of particular note, Russia expressed its interest and intent to develop mechanisms for enlisting European allies against transit countries in the event of future supply disruptions, such as the one that occurred in its dispute with Ukraine in January. End Comment. PENNINGTON