ENGAGEMENT IN CAMEROON: PULLING TEETH, CHASING TAILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YAOUNDE 000396 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, INL USDOC FOR ITA - BURRESS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019 TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV EAID KCRM KJUS CM SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT IN CAMEROON: PULLING TEETH, CHASING TAILS YAOUNDE 00000396 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Political Officer Tad Brown for Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Cameroon's governance problems--and the challenges they create for USG assistance--are illustrated in the painstaking process required to send Cameroonian officials on an all-expenses training program in the US. Cameroonian President Biya told the Ambassador he wanted the training, and it had the support of the police hierarchy, but it took weeks of extensive Embassy lobbying at the most senior levels and, eventually, a phone call from the Prime Minister to President Biya, vacationing in Europe, to generate the official permission needed for nine Cameroonian police to travel on April 23 to International Law Enforcement Academy training in the U.S. End summary. Once Bitten -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In April 2008, Cameroon's ten candidates for an ILEA program had their boarding passes in hand when the airport police turned them away at the gate in Yaounde. They had been issued the visas and had a letter of endorsement from the General Delegate for National Security (DGSN - the head of national police - who had personally selected the candidates). They were blocked by the Cameroon's Border Police because they lacked Mission Orders, official travel documents that need to be personally signed by the Secretary General at the Presidency, Laurent Esso. Try, Try Again -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Our contacts in the Government of Cameroon (GRC) told us the travel had been refused because the Presidency was hesitant to let security officers depart Cameroon in the wake of social unrest that had rocked the country in February 2008. Concerned that the USG had lost funds in forfeited travel and other expenses, the Embassy refrained from offering further police training for the subsequent 12 months. Cognizant of the pressing need to improve governance in the security sector, however, the Embassy decided to accept GRC assurances that there would be no problems to send nine candidates to an Advanced Management Course in Roswell, New Mexico, in April 2009. More than a month in advance, the Ambassador solicited President Biya's personal support for the training, and officers from the Regional Security (RSO) and Pol-Econ Sections obtained assurances from officials in the DGSN and Presidency, including Esso and the Deputy Secretary General at the Presidency Philemon Yang. You Can't GIVE This Stuff Away -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Despite these assurances from the most senior levels of the GRC, the police officials were unable to obtain their Mission Orders with less than a week before the training. Not wanting to repeat the costly fiasco of April 2008, the Embassy launched a multilayered full-court press. On April 21, we wrote to Esso saying that if we did not have mission orders in our hands by 5 p.m. on April 22, the offer would be rescinded so we could recoup the cost of the tickets. Despite renewed assurances from Yang and dozens of unreturned phone calls to various offices throughout the Presidency, the Embassy's April 22 deadline for receiving the Mission Orders passed without action from the GRC. If You Want Something Done Right . . . -------------- ¶5. (C) At 6:00 on the evening of April 22, a family member of Prime Minister Inoni (to whom Post had back-channeled its communication with the Presidency) contacted Poloff at home to connect a phone call from Inoni who said: "I have just spoken with the President in Geneva. He is furious and cannot understand why this (the Mission Orders) is not being done. He wants these officials to travel. Can we still send them?" Inoni followed up with a call to the Charge, promising that we would have the orders by 10 a.m. the next day. The Embassy never received a response from Yang, Esso or anyone at the Presidency to our repeated phone calls, faxes and emails, but the Mission Orders were finally delivered at 4:10 p.m. on April 23, less than four hours before the officials traveled. In an April 30 call with Charge, Yang offered no apologies for not having returned our calls, confirmed that President Biya personally has to approve all such travel and offered to facilitate future clearances if we contact him "early in the process." Comment: Knock, Knock. Who is There? -------------- ¶6. (C) This episode is emblematic of Cameroon's crippling governance problems and the challenges the USG faces in trying to engage with the GRC to advance U.S. interests from enhanced security YAOUNDE 00000396 002.2 OF 002 to strengthened democracy. We still do not know if the Mission Orders were lost in the bureaucratic shuffle or held up for a reason (Esso is widely believed to be suspicious of growing U.S. engagement in Cameroon). Yang's assurances of future facilitation are small comfort; we did engage him and others at his level early and often, with no discernible effect. ¶7. (C) No matter the underlying cause, this saga is one more example (reftel) of Biya's inability to make his own office within his own government carry out his own instructions. This revelation is all the more troubling in light of the manifold challenges--from growing socio-economic pressures and rising insecurity to the uncertain transition to the post-Biya era--that confront Cameroon's leadership. FOX