POLES CAUTIOUS BUT OPEN-MINDED ON U.S. MD PROPOSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000983

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR GLANTZ, OSD FOR MITCHELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR PL
SUBJECT: POLES CAUTIOUS BUT OPEN-MINDED ON U.S. MD PROPOSAL

REF: A. A: WARSAW 972

B. B: IIR 6 878 0368 09

Classified By: Political Counselor F. Daniel Sainz for reasons 1.4 b an
d d


1. (C) SUMMARY. In the face of overwhelmingly negative
press coverage, Polish officials' initial skepticism
regarding the new U.S. offer on Missile Defense (MD) has
evolved slightly to a posture of wait-and-see (but not too
long). Both FM Sikorski and PM Tusk have issued guardedly
encouraging public statements (ref A),and the head of MFA's
Security Policy Department told poloffs that pending more
details, his office would probably propose that the MFA
recommend Polish participation in the revised U.S. MD
program. All interlocutors at MFA and MOD (ref B) asked for
written briefing materials at an early date. Foreign
Minister Sikorski has come under fire from all quarters as
the chief architect of what most Poles currently regard as a
failed government strategy of striking an MD deal with the
outgoing Bush administration. As a result, he will seek to
demonstrate the utmost caution before signing on to a new MD
system. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Shortly after his September 17 meeting with the U.S.
delegation headed by USD Flournoy, FM Sikorski noted that the
new U.S. approach could be more interesting than the previous
MD proposals. In a September 23 interview with
Rzeczpospolita, Sikorski was asked whether the U.S. MD
decision was a success or failure for Poland's foreign
policy; he replied that the decision means "Poland is still
in the game and has prospects of getting security benefits."
The Minister rejected arguments that Poland could have locked
in the Bush administration proposals through quick
ratification of the August 2008 agreement, noting that Poland
cannot "force a superpower to do something they are not
willing to do." Poloffs followed up with MFA Security Policy
and Americas Department officials as well as analysts at the
MFA-affiliated Polish Institute for International Relations
(PISM) to glean Polish views and encourage a positive Polish
response to the U.S. proposals.

HATED THE ROLL-OUT BUT WILLING TO TALK MORE ABOUT STRATEGY


3. (C) According to PISM analysts, neither Tusk nor
Sikorski were happy with the way the U.S. decision was
handled. U.S. media leaks before arrival of the U.S.
delegation queued the Poles to view SM-3 as a "downgrading"
of the original EIS plan. On the positive side, PISM's view
was that U.S. policy toward Russia was not/not the driving
force in the U.S. decision. In spite of widespread media
reports suggesting that the U.S. sacrificed EIS for the sake
of better relations with Moscow, PISM analysts accepted U.S.
explanations that effectiveness, cost, and threat
considerations shaped the U.S. decision. Moreover, PISM
noted that defense and other technical experts generally view
the new U.S. proposal as qualitatively better than the
original MD plan -- even in the absence of more detailed
information on SM-3 deployments. Analysts added that
Sikorski and other GOP officials are coming around to this
view as well.


4. (C) The Americas Department expressed concern with
Defense Secretary Gates' September 17 comment that the
original U.S. deployment schedule had been delayed in part
because of Poland's (and the Czech Republic's) failure to
ratify the August 2008 Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement
(BMDA). Americas Director Artur Orzechowski noted that the
U.S. had waited almost a year for the Obama administration to
determine its policy. PISM suggested that Gates' comments
had created political problems for the Tusk government, since
the political opposition, mainly from Law and Justice (PiS),
is now criticizing the GOP's "delay" in presenting the BMDA
immediately for ratification.

SOME CONFUSION ON SUBSTANCE OF NEW PROPOSAL


5. (C) Most interlocutors expressed confusion about timing
questions and asked about the solidity of U.S. commitment to
the proposal. Deputy Director Marek Szczygiel of the MFA
Security Affairs Department asked whether the "adaptive"
nature of the current U.S. MD plan meant that Poland could
not be sure that a prospective U.S.-Polish agreement to place
SM-3 missiles in Poland would be carried out. Director
Orzechowski of the Americas Department said he was unsure if
missiles would remain in Poland or be subject to relocation;
he also thought the later-phase anti-ICBM interceptors might
not go forward if the Iranian threat disappeared. In this
context, U.S. comments about the virtues of flexibility and

WARSAW 00000983 002 OF 002


mobility raised doubts: both PISM and the Security Policy
Department asked if the proposed site in Redzikowo would be
mobile or fixed.


6. (C) PISM analysts noted some uncertainly about whether
Poland will be the sole site in northern/central Europe for
the SM-3 system. Analysts asked whether there would be
competitors, and mentioned Romania and Turkey as most likely
"contenders" for this role.


7. (C) All interlocutors commented on Patriot. Szczygiel
of the Security Policy Department characterized the system's
deployment here as a "litmus test" for cooperation with the
U.S., and reiterated that Poles expect the U.S. to fulfill
its obligations under the Declaration of Strategic
Cooperation (DSC). Orzechowski said it was not clear during
the formal U.S. presentation whether after 2012, Patriot
equipment would be permanently stationed here along with the
garrison.

WAY AHEAD


8. (C) Adam Kobieracki, Director of the Department of
Security Policy, said the revised U.S. MD plan was not the
catastrophe the media describe, and his office would likely
recommend that Poland take part in the program, upon receipt
of adequate written information. However, PISM warned that
negotiations on the BMDA annex will likely be tough: Poles
will conduct more strenuous cost-benefit analysis of the new
program and seek assurances of U.S. commitment. Most
importantly, GOP officials will not be able to sell a new
agreement to the Parliament or Polish public opinion strictly
on the basis of helping its U.S. ally -- they will have to
demonstrate concretely that cooperation with the U.S.
enhances Poland's defense and national security.
Politically, the GOP will have to be perceived as driving a
hard bargain with the U.S.


9. (C) All our contacts recommended senior bilateral
consultations as soon as possible to demonstrate continued
U.S. commitment. Orzechowski suggested Secretary Clinton
visit Warsaw in November -- alternatively, Sikorski could
meet with the Secretary in Washington November 2-4 or perhaps
at the Berlin Security Conference. Both PISM and the
Americas Department suggested non-military topics to
supplement a Strategic Dialogue, which should not be viewed
as focused solely on security issues. PISM recommended
holding the first consultations in Warsaw to avoid possible
opposition claims that the GOP was answering a "summons" from
Washington. Kobieracki recommended that a senior USG
official brief U.S.-based Polish media on the MD decision, as
well as on the way ahead in Poland.

COMMENT


10. (C) Foreign Minister Sikorski has come under intense
criticism for the Polish Government's "failure" on MD. He
has been faulted across the political spectrum for concluding
the MD talks either too late (and not locking in the Bush
administration) or too soon (and not waiting for the incoming
U.S. administration). Some media analysts speculate that
Sikorski may soon lose his status as the most highly rated
Cabinet official in public opinion polls. Sikorski's
accountability for MD developments that most Poles have
viewed negatively to date explains the Minister's caution
toward the revised U.S. MD concepts. The MFA will continue
to seek asurances that the current U.S. plans are reliable,
and not subject to changing threat assessments. Sikorski and
his team will doubtless want to demonstrate a deliberate and
methodical approach to future MD talks, and will want to
receive in writing as many details as possible.
ASHE