POLISH FM SIKORSKI TO CODEL LEVIN: WE WANT "REAL"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000468 SIPDIS EUR, PM, H E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OREP RS PL SUBJECT: POLISH FM SIKORSKI TO CODEL LEVIN: WE WANT "REAL" PATRIOTS REF: WARSAW 375 Classified By: Ambassador Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Polish FM Sikorski told CODEL Levin that Poland "would not suffer" but "would look silly" if the U.S. decided not to pursue Missile Defense and is open to alternatives that would ease Russian concerns. Sikorski stressed that Poland's ultimate aim is to have an increased U.S. and/or NATO presence in Poland to bolster Article 5 guarantees. Sikorski said the GOP welcomed President Obama's April 5 pledge to uphold U.S. commitments on Patriots, but emphasized that only a real battery would be taken as a sign of U.S. military commitment. The presence of non-combat personnel would not be sufficient from Poland's perspective. Sikorski reiterated Poland's commitment to a limited victory in Afghanistan, indicated his personal commitment to squeezing more reconstruction assistance out of the EU, and positively assessed the new U.S. Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Senator Carl Levin (D-MI),Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), and Senator Susan Collins (R-ME),met with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski April 16 to discuss Missile Defense (MD),Polish interest in a U.S. Patriot battery, and Afghanistan. U.S. "ROCK SOLID" ON ARTICLE FIVE ¶3. (C) Senator Levin began by conveying the President's message that the U.S. commitment to the NATO Article 5 guarantee is "rock solid." The U.S. appreciates Poland's political investment in MD. While the U.S. might ultimately decide not to pursue MD, either because of a Czech decision not to host the MD RADAR facility, or for other reasons, the U.S. remains committed to strengthening relations and military cooperation with Poland. Even if cooperation takes a different form than that envisioned in the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement or the accompanying political declaration, the U.S. is committed to making the relationship "stronger than ever." POLAND "WILL NOT SUFFER" WITHOUT MD ¶4. (C) Asked whether MD or Patriots are more important for Poland, Sikorski said Poland "would not suffer" but "would look silly" if the U.S. decided not to pursue MD. He noted that Poland agreed to host the MD site for the same reason it deployed 18,000 troops to Iraq, even though Poland's national security was not threatened by Iraq -- because Poland is a loyal ally and friend of the United States. While Poland agrees that Iran "wants the bomb," there is "less urgency" from the GOP's perspective because Poland is not an Iranian target. That said, Poland had paid a "significant price" with EU members and with Russia for agreeing to MD. "We were told the U.S. would persuade the Russians. It hasn't worked out like that." ¶5. (C) Senator Nelson warned that if the Czechs reject the proposed MD radar site, the Polish component of MD would be put in jeopardy under current U.S. legislation. Sikorski pointed out that the Czechs had postponed a vote on the RADAR site, not rejected it outright, because they are not sure if the U.S. still wants to pursue MD. Senator Nelson expressed doubt that Iran would abandon its nuclear weapons or missile programs, but noted that the Iranian threat to Europe could be met for the foreseeable future with AEGIS and THAAD systems. ¶6. (C) In the event the U.S. decides to withdraw from MD, Nelson said, the U.S. could minimize the political fallout for Poland by sticking to political declaration commitments, increasing the U.S. military presence, and finding other ways to help Poland improve interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO allies. Sikorski said Poland was receptive to alternate proposals, but added "you have to make up your own mind." U.S. FOOTPRINT KEY ¶7. (C) Sikorski stressed that Poland's ultimate aim is to have an increased U.S. and/or NATO presence in Poland to bolster Article 5 guarantees. "The U.S. has fewer troops in Poland than it does in Georgia," he said. As a "border state" with Russia, Poland feels less secure than other NATO members. NATO infrastructure should be more spread out, Sikorski argued, adding that Western European locations are still "disproportionately favored" by the Alliance. From this perspective, the U.S. "symbolic gesture" to move a WARSAW 00000468 002 OF 002 Patriot battery to Poland would convince Poles that Article 5 is more than just a paper guarantee. WHAT ABOUT RUSSIA? ¶8. (C) On the prospect of Russian participation in MD, Sikorski said Poland would welcome any package that eases Russian concerns. "We do not want to be the target of Russian countermeasures." He noted that Poland had voluntarily talked to the Russians about "invasive" confidence-building measures that would be equivalent to allowing Russian inspectors a permanent presence on Polish soil. Sikorski opined that Russia would continue to "use its own paranoia as a bargaining chip" with the United States. ¶9. (C) Sikorski said he had heard reports that President Obama and Russian President Medvedev had agreed in London to negotiate a secret "post-ABM" agreement. If that is the case, Sikorski said, Poland would like to know more about it. Stressing the importance of "Polish confidence" in the U.S.-Russia dialogue process, Sikorski said Poland would appreciate consultations in advance of any decision, especially since Poland "had stuck its head out" for the U.S. PATRIOTS ¶10. (C) Turning to Patriots, Sikorski said the GOP welcomed President Obama's pledge -- in his April 5 meeting with President Kaczynski and PM Tusk -- to fulfill commitments outlined in the August 2008 political declaration. That said, "we want a real battery, not a training one," Sikorski said. He claimed U.S. negotiators had promised the GOP it would transfer an actual battery stationed in Germany to Poland. "Only a real battery will be taken as a sign of a U.S. military commitment." When Senator Levin pointed out that there would be a U.S. presence even if the Patriots are used for training purposes, Sikorski replied that the presence of non-combat personnel was "not sufficient." ¶11. (C) Asked whether Poland wanted an operational battery because it would send a stronger signal to the Russians, Sikorski claimed that the German-based battery Poland had been promised, with the proviso that it would periodically be transported to Israel for combat. "We want to be treated the same as any other NATO member. We do not want second-class status," Sikorski said. Sikorski said he had heard through the grapevine that the U.S. was talking to Russia about Patriots. "If true, this is worrisome. You should speak to your ally about Patriots, not Russia," Sikorski said. AFGHANISTAN ¶12. (C) Sikorski said Poland views the threat in Afghanistan differently than Iraq. Because Afghanistan is a NATO operation, the Alliance's credibility is at stake. Sikorski noted that Poland was one of three NATO members that responded to President Obama's request by increasing its "investment" in Afghanistan. Poland will increase its troop levels from 1600 to 2000 by the end of April and, by summer, will identify 200 more to be dedicated as a Strategic Reserve that will be prepared to move forward, as needed, during the election period. ¶13. (C) Poland is working to convince Mongolia to contribute an additional 200 troops to the Polish contingent, which would mean Poland will be at brigade strength for the Afghan elections. Sikorski said Poland is trying to convince its EU partners of the need to "surge" on development assistance and civil reconstruction. "We need to squeeze more resources out of the EU," he said. ¶14. (C) Sikorski positively assessed the U.S. strategy to deal jointly with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan needs to be encouraged to take on extremists in the Tribal Areas. Moreover, persuading India to deescalate its presence on the border will allow Pakistan to divert forces to the Tribal Areas. ¶15. (C) Sikorski expressed his conviction that victory -- defined in limited terms, i.e., creating stable conditions that would let the Afghan Government take over -- is possible. He cited improvements in security, including decreasing levels of violence over the long term, but reiterated the importance of defeating the Taliban in Pakistan. ¶16. (U) CODEL Levin has cleared this message. ASHE