POLISH MFA: ENGAGE BELARUS BUT PROTECT MINORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000323 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019 TAGS: PREL BO PL SUBJECT: POLISH MFA: ENGAGE BELARUS BUT PROTECT MINORITY INTERESTS REF: WARSAW 260 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Polish MFA continues to push for EU and U.S. engagement with Belarus to keep it out of Russia's clench, but insists that such engagement should not be at the expense of the Polish minority in Belarus. An MFA official told us the Union of Poles in Belarus held a successful election with minimal interference from Belarusian authorities, which he called a success of EU and Polish engagement. However, the official indicated that MFA staff are divided on the question of whether Belarusian President Lukashenka has done enough on the human rights front -- especially regarding the Polish minority -- to deserve an invitation to the EU summit in May that will launch the Eastern Partnership. In the end, the Poles will probably opt for further easing of policies toward Minsk. They may be too prone to describe treatment of the Polish minority as the main litmus test for human rights in Belarus. They have also set the bar quite low -- although the MFA is very appreciative that the GoB permitted Union of Poles elections to go forward, the Union still lacks legal status and its leaders continue to be harassed. END SUMMARY. UNION OF POLES: RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL ELECTION -------------- - ¶2. (C) Radoslaw Darski, the MFA desk officer for Belarus, told us March 23 that the Polish government was pleased and somewhat surprised that the Union of Poles in Belarus--the NGO that represents Polish minority interests in the country--had been allowed to hold its March 14-15 election. Darski said Belarusian authorities apparently harrassed Union leader Andzelika Borys and her associates in the electoral run-up, but the election itself proceeded "relatively smoothly" and Borys was reelected. He attributed this success to the carrots that the EU and Poland offered Belarus, namely the Eastern Partnership and the then-pending continuation of the EU visa sanctions waiver against Belarusian authorities. Darski pointed out, however, that there had been no movement in resolving the overall status of the Union of Poles in Belarus, which had been split into two factions by Belarusian authorities in 2005. Darski emphasized that Poland's decision to support a permanent removal of the EU visa ban would hinge in part on Belarus' treatment of the Union of Poles in coming months. UNDECIDED ON INVITING LUKASHENKA -------------- ¶3. (C) Darski acknowledged that MFA staff were divided on whether Poland should endorse an invitation for Belarusian President Lukashenka to the EU's May summit to launch the Eastern Partnership. He explained that "some officials within the Ministry" were not convinced that Lukashenka had done enough to implement reforms and resolve the status of the Union of Poles. These MFA officials supported an invitation to either the Belarusian Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. Others within the MFA argue that Lukashenka might completely turn away from the EU if he does not receive an invitation. Darski emphasized that "at this point, we cannot expect more from Belarus. The summit is in May and we saw what we saw. Poland and other EU members will have to make a political decision on the issue." GREATER STRATEGY TOWARDS BELARUS -------------- ¶4. (C) Darski expressed concern with "the U.S. pQicy of isolating Belarus" and said he hoped that the new U.S. administration would be more forward-leaning in reaching out to Minsk. Darski argued that the economic crisis, the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, and Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia have created a "pivotal" moment in dealing with Belarus. He said Lukashenka had become increasingly wary of Russia, but if the EU and U.S. failed to engage the current regime and draw it more toward the West, then Belarus could fall completely under Russia's "sphere of influence." Lukashenka has staked his credibility on maintaining economic stability in Belarus--a strategy that has so far kept the population from seeking political change. The global financial crisis poses a potential threat to that credibility, particularly if Belarus were to find itself unable to pay wages. In the end Lukashenka will probably seek the support of those who can provide the most cash and economic benefits, thereby prolonging his ability to stay in power. WARSAW 00000323 002 OF 002 COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The MFA is engaged in a delicate balancing act. On one hand, the Poles want to draw Belarus at least nominally closer to the West, before it is "too late" to save Belarus from being engulfed by a reassertive Russia. They voice concern that Washington does not understand the "urgency" of the situation and have described the more hard-line U.S. policy towards Belarus as "yielding few results." On the other hand, the MFA is cognizant that it should not appear to sacrifice human rights on the altar of improved relations with Lukashenka. The Polish government has already drawn fire from the Union of Poles in Belarus and Belarusian opposition groups for its alleged appeasement of the Lukashenka regime. ¶6. (C) In spite of the MFA's internal divisions, the Poles will likely press for further liberalization in the West's engagement with Belarus. Warsaw will at the same time insist on continued improvement in the overall human rights situation, but the Poles are probably too focused on the situation of the Polish minority, which they view as the key litmus test. They have also set the bar rather low regarding treatment of the Polish minority -- they have placed great weight on the GoB's acceptance of the Union of Poles elections, even though the Union still lacks legal status and its leaders are still being harassed. QUANRUD