POLAND LIKELY TO INCREASE ISAF DEPLOYMENT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000309 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO AF PK PL SUBJECT: POLAND LIKELY TO INCREASE ISAF DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Political Counselor Daniel Sainz for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) (C) SUMMARY: SCA DAS Patrick Moon briefed top GoP officials March 18-19 on the status of the U.S. policy review regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan and expressed appreciation for Poland's contributions in Ghazni Province. Polish officials generally concurred with the U.S. situation assessment and prescriptions for the way ahead, especially the focus on dealing with Afghanistan within a broader regional context and cultivating prospects for a thriving civil society. Of particular interest: -- Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski confirmed Poland's intention to increase its 1600-strong contingent in ISAF by 400-600 troops, as well as to enhance force mobility and protection. (In this respect, Poles have requested the U.S. to extend the lease for armored protective vehicles.) -- Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder reported that FM Radoslaw Sikorski met March 16 in Brussels with EU foreign ministers from leading "ISAF stakeholders" in a bid for European Commission support for a "civilian surge" in Afghanistan. -- In addition to the planned troop increase, Warsaw will also deploy two police training teams from its gendarmarie and step up civilian reconstruction projects in Ghazni Province. -- Poles will counter local media reports that the U.S. is "forcing" the Polish troop increase by chasing Taliban elements out of provinces surrounding Ghazni. -- Krzysztof Lisek, Chairman of the Sejm's Foreign Affairs Committee, said political support for the mission in Ghazni Province remained strong despite public opinion polls indicating that almost 80% of Poles opposed the deployment. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) All Polish interlocutors were pleased with the opportunity to exchange views with a senior U.S. official on Afghanistan. They generally concurred with Moon's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and welcomed the U.S. policy review's emphasis on a comprehensive regional approach over the next 3-5 years. Komorowski hoped that in 3-5 years, the coalition would improve the security situation to the point where we can start to discuss an exit strategy. He and Najder agreed with Moon's observation that rebuilding local governance in Afghanistan and offering more military aid for Pakistan and development assistance for residents of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were key elements of the strategy to promote long-term political stability throughout the region. Najder stressed the importance of Afghanistan and the ISAF mission to Poland, highlighting Foreign Minister Sikorski's personal engagement. -------------- DECISION EXPECTED NEXT WEEK ON ISAF INCREASE -------------- ¶3. (C) Both Najder and Komorowski told Moon that Poland would likely increase its troop level in ISAF despite the GoP's serious financial problems. Komorowski explained in more detail that the government's Council of Ministers would consider the decision sometime during the week of March 24, then forward it onward to President Lech Kaczynski for final approval. The President's agreement appeared to be a certainty, since the President's Chief of the National Security Bureau, Aleksander Szczyglo, had written the government to propose a troop increase; the government would frame its decision as a response to that request. Komorowski said the only remaining question was whether the increase would amount to 400 or 600 troops, bringing deployment strength up to 2000-2200. Regardless of the final count, Komorowski maintained, it would represent almost a doubling of Poland's military contribution to ISAF since last year. ¶4. (C) In addition to increased manpower, Komorowski said the Polish contingent in ISAF will increase its ratio of combat/support personnel from 3:7 to 4:6. Commanders also hope to improve mobility, intelligence, and force protection. Komorowski reminded Moon that at last month's NATO Defense Ministerial meeting in Krakow, Defense Minister Bogdan Klich had asked Secretary Gates for an extension of the lease on U.S.-supplied mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) armored vehicles and asked that we follow up on the request. Komorowski also pointedly reminded DAS Moon of the standing request for a White House visit by Prime Minister Tusk. -------------- POLAND SEEKING MORE EU ENGAGEMENT WARSAW 00000309 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) Najder reported on Sikorski's March 16 breakfast meeting in Brussels with EU foreign ministers from "major ISAF stakeholder" nations like the UK, France, the Netherlands and the Czechs (EU Presidency). The main purpose was to spark European Commission support for a "civilian surge" in Afghanistan to complement NATO's military efforts. Najder lamented the paltry EU budget allocated for development assistance in Afghanistan. Najder said the foreign ministers had agreed that no additional infrastructure would be needed to channel EU aid to the region, but the Union had to improve coordination with NATO, as well as with the U.S. -------------- MORE POLISH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶6. (C) The Defense Ministry will soon deploy two military police training teams, according to Najder, which will be staffed by gendarmarie personnel. Najder emphasized Poland's view that law enforcement training was crucial to long-term success in Afghanistan. ¶7. (C) A Ministry development assistance specialist briefed Moon on Poland's evolving aid program in Afghanistan. Reconstruction efforts began modestly in 2002 with small-scale projects implemented by Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Last year the number of projects in Ghazni Province amounted to 20, but this year there will be approximately 30, mainly bilateral in nature and centered on education, public health, and improvement of potable water resources. Overall, there has been a fivefold increase in the GoP's budget for such projects and, for the first time this year, the MFA persuaded other GoP ministries, such as Health and Infrastructure, to participate in Afghan development assistance. The Poles are now able to consider more ambitious projects like road-building. In addition to bilateral aid, the GoP funnels money through international organizations, such as the World Food Program and the Afghan Government's Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. ¶8. (C) Najder suggested that a frank discussion of the effectiveness of Poland's civilian assistance programs would be useful. He acknowledged a steep learning curve for Polish NGOs, which would welcome better coordination with the U.S., as well as advice on improving assistance delivery. Since Poland and the U.S. had different experiences in this field, Najder thought the two sides might be able "to learn from each other." Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Director of the MFA's Department of Security Affairs, told DAS Moon that Poland has had to get around legal obstacles to deploying civilians in PRTs by appointing Afghanistan volunteers to the army reserve. -------------- COUNTERING LOCAL MEDIA REPORTS -------------- ¶9. (C) Komorowski agreed with the DCM's suggestion to coordinate our respective media messages to counter adverse media reporting. Several media have claimed that a U.S. offensive against Taliban elements in provinces surrounding Ghazni had "forced" the government to increase the number of Polish troops there. Komorowski said he had already begun to correct such misperceptions in the media. But he took on board the message that the proposed Polish increase should be characterized as part of a closely-coordinated, common effort of U.S. and Polish forces in Afghanistan. -------------- POLITICAL SUPPORT STRONG -------------- ¶10. (C) Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Lisek told Moon that none of the political parties currently represented in Parliament opposed the Afghan mission, despite public opinion polls showing that almost 80% of the population did not support the deployment. Lisek said politicians were aware that the ISAF mission might become even more difficult in the near future, but the only serious complaints among parliamentarians to date concerned the quality of the troops' equipment. ¶11. (U) DAS Moon has cleared this message. QUANRUD