POLAND: ARE WE SINCERE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000298

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRIED
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL
OSD FOR U/S FLOURNOY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PM PL
SUBJECT: POLAND: ARE WE SINCERE?

Classified By: Ambassador Ashe by reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) SUMMARY. Polish political leaders have largely
recovered from initial misgivings about recent U.S. overtures
to Russia. The President's public clarification of his
letter to President Medvedev, as well as the meeting between
FM Sikorski and Secretary Clinton, have set aside for now
Polish concerns that the U.S. will seek a grand bargain with
Russia at the expense of the U.S.-Poland strategic
relationship. Of continuing and perhaps increasing concern,
however, is the slow pace of consultations between our two
governments, especially at the heads level. There is a
growing fear among Polish government elites that Poland has
become an afterthought, or even a nuisance, in Washington
circles, and this is hard to swallow for a country that
considers itself a loyal ally and important contributor to
U.S. strategic interests in greater Europe and Afghanistan.
Much of this unease would dissipate with movement forward on
Prime Minister Tusk's request to meet with the President in
Washington in April. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) President Obama's clarifying remarks on the "secret
letters" to Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev struck a
welcome chord with Polish leaders. FM Radoslaw Sikorski came
away from his February 25 meeting with Secretary Clinton
favorably impressed by her perspective on Russia, telling the
press and us in private that the Secretary has "great
geo-political instincts." Concerns over the U.S.-Russian
dialogue are by no means dead, however. President Lech
Kaczynski recently told Polish media that any U.S. decision
to withdraw from missile defense (MD) to assuage Russia would
"be an unfriendly gesture towards Poland." The DCM was
grilled by Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff about whether
the US could, in essence, keep from being out maneuvered by
the Russians. Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski
told acting U/S Mull in Washington in early March that "it is
important to be 100 percent sure that Russia has no influence
on sovereign decisions ... that would be a disaster for both
of us."


3. (C) The GOP is anxious to engage the new administration
at a high political level. Prime Minister Tusk was extremely
pleased with his Munich meeting with the Vice President, and
Foreign Minister Sikorski greatly appreciated his meeting
with the Secretary. However, the GoP would like very much to
hear back on its request for PM Tusk's visit to the White
House. Privately, MFA officials have told us the Prime
Minister will lose credibility if he does not get a
Washington visit by the end of April. The Poles are aware of
the President's intentions to meet with his hosts on the
margins of the Informal US-EU Summit -- the Czech Republic --
where MD will clearly be on the agenda.


4. (C) We have also given Warsaw numerous assurances that
the U.S. intends to move forward with our strategic
relationship and will consult on MD, but Poles are keenly
aware of the lack of actual consultations -- either on the
Administration's thinking on MD or dialogue as envisioned in
the August 2008 Declaration on Strategic Cooperation. They
are being studiously patient as we sort through our policy
options and put in place key personnel, but the Poles are
increasingly frustrated about the absence of regular,
expected contacts.


5. (C) Promised consultations are not inconsiderable. The
consultative mechanisms established in the August 2008
Declaration of Strategic Cooperation are: a Strategic
Dialogue (SD),Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group
(SCCG),and High Level Defense Dialogue (HLDG). From the
Polish perspective, it is more important that these bodies
actually begin to meet (or least makes plans to do so) than
to wait until logistical and protocol arrangements are
determined, such as the rank of respective delegation
leaders, frequency of meetings, or portfolio
responsibilities. Indeed, the Poles now agree with us that
these issues are more likely to be resolved during the
meetings themselves than through formal exchanges beforehand.


6. (C) COMMENT. Although Polish leaders are thus far
reassured that there will be no secret U.S.-Russian deal
reached over Poland's head, they are increasingly nervous
about their perceived lack of access to U.S. leaders, and
worry that they are hearing about significant U.S.
initiatives that concern Poland (like on Missile Defense) in
the press and not from us directly. Our sense is that they
are beginning to doubt our sincerity, and that is no doubt a
confusing situation for a country that has consistently and
strongly supported the U.S. END COMMENT.

ASHE