POLAND AND RUSSIA TO HOLD REGULAR SECURITY MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000026

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: MCAP PREL MARR RS PL
SUBJECT: POLAND AND RUSSIA TO HOLD REGULAR SECURITY MEETINGS

Classified By: DCM Quanrud for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Poland and Russia have agreed to a regular dialogue
to discuss a wide range of security issues, including the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, NATO-Russia relations,
non-proliferation, and missile defense (MD). The decision
occurred in the context of a December 19 meeting between
Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Przemyslaw Grudzinski and his
Russian counterpart, Sergey Ryabkov, that focused on missile
defense-related transparency and confidence-building measures
(TCBMs). According to Marek Szczygiel, Deputy Director of
the MFA's Security Policy Department, Ryabkov accepted
Grudzinski's invitation to travel to Warsaw to continue the
dialogue in early spring. Szczygiel said the meetings would
be inter-agency in structure, led by the two Deputy Foreign
Ministers. He added that Warsaw had not yet developed a
specific agenda for the spring meeting, but the Poles were
prepared to address virtually all security issues. One
exception was licensing of Soviet-era military equipment,
which would remain the subject of a separate bilateral
exchange with Moscow; the next meeting on this issue was
tentatively scheduled for the second half of March in Warsaw.


2. (C) Szczygiel characterized the December 19 meeting on
TCBMs as disappointing but not surprising, and the Poles came
away from the meeting without agreement or progress on TCBMs.
The Russian side presented a litany of familiar complaints
about the proposed MD program in Europe, focusing on its
alleged offensive capability and the likelihood that it would
contribute to instability on the continent. The Russians
also took aim at NATO, criticizing Alliance support for MD,
as enunciated in December's NATO Foreign Ministers statement.
According to Szczygiel, Ryabkov asserted that the U.S.
intended to subvert NATO's own MD program by integrating it
into the U.S. system rather than the stated goal of
integrating the U.S. program into that of the Alliance.
Thus, the U.S. would control all MD-related decision-making.
Szczygiel emphasized that the Polish side interpreted
Ryabkov's assertions as classic Russian attempts to create
dissension within the Alliance.


3. (C) In general, Szczygiel said the Russians were not
willing seriously to discuss TCBMs because that would connote
acceptance of MD deployment in central Europe. The Poles
believe Russia still hopes to block MD deployment and/or that
the incoming US Administration will delay or cancel the
program. Szczygiel noted positively, however, that the
Russians seemed willing to continue a regular security
dialogue, to include MD-related discussions, even if
deployment proceeds as currently planned.


4. (C) Looking ahead, Szczygiel said the Poles were
disappointed that the Russian side was not willing to
consider reciprocity as part of a TCBM package. Ryabkov
dismissed Polish (and Czech) insistence on inspecting Russian
facilities as "unreasonable." Szczygiel emphasized that
Warsaw was open to a Russian presence in Poland but would
continue to insist on the "reciprocity rule" since anything
less would be hard to accept politically. He added that the
Polish side had offered to limit its right of inspection to
facilities in Kaliningrad, but the Russians were not prepared
to discuss the issue. In spite of Russian stonewalling on
TCBMs, the Polish impression was that the session in Moscow
had been useful, especially the agreement to establish a
regular bilateral security dialogue. Tangible progress on
TCBMs and other difficult security issues will have to wait
until at least the next round in Warsaw.
ASHE