POLAND: GET NPT BACK ON TRACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000227 SIPDIS FOR THE DEPARTMENT (ISN/MNSA),GENEVA (CD),UNVIE (IAEA), USUN (POL),USNATO (POL),AND USEU (POL) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA, NPT, PL SUBJECT: POLAND: GET NPT BACK ON TRACK REF: STATE 6970 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (C) Summary. In response to reftel questions, Szymon Bochenski of the Polish MFA's Security Policy Department told us February 19 that Warsaw's top priority for the current Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle was to strengthen unity among NPT participants and bolster the treaty's effectiveness. He said it was absolutely critical for participants to agree to an agenda at the 2009 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting. Bochenski believes that balancing the peaceful development of nuclear energy with efforts to restrict the spread of enrichment capabilities will pose an increasingly difficult challenge for NPT participants. Regarding disarmament, he said Washington should "lead by example" and engage Russia in a serious disarmament dialogue. Bochenski emphasized that Poland wanted a discussion of negative consequences that could be imposed on countries that leave the NPT under Article 10. End Summary. TOP OBJECTIVE: UNIFY PARTICIPANTS, STRENGTHEN NPT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Bochenski said Poland's top objective for the 2009 PrepCom meeting in May and the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) was to strengthen unity among NPT participants and bolster the treaty's effectiveness. He emphasized that the current review process was critical to recovering from "the 2005 RevCon fiasco," during which participants could not reach agreement on an agenda. He said Washington had a short window of opportunity to capitalize on international goodwill towards the new administration and to put the NPT "back on track." Participants must reach consensus on a firm agenda during the PrepCom in order for the RevCon to be successful. He praised U.S. efforts to solicit other countries' input early in the review process. PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY -------------- ¶3. (C) Bochenski told us that NPT participants needed to determine how to treat fairly countries pursuing peaceful development of nuclear energy, while maintaining safeguards against those seeking nuclear weapons. Bochenski observed that pressures to cap carbon emissions, pursue alternative sources of energy, and enhance energy security were encouraging an increasing number of countries--including Poland--to pursue nuclear energy. The "right" of a country to possess enrichment technology was likely to become an increasingly contentious issue. He said that Poland favored the concept of developing "nuclear enrichment banks" under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Bochenski warned that efforts to tighten restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would probably provoke countries that were developing peaceful nuclear energy programs. He suggested that the issue could be addressed through the Nuclear Suppliers Group. U.S. DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA -------------- ¶4. (C) On the disarmament front, Bochenski said Washington should "lead by example" and engage in a serious dialogue with Moscow on nuclear weapons reductions. He argued that if the U.S. and Russia were to take the first steps toward serious disarmament, other countries would probably follow suit. NPT NOT EQUIPPED TO ADDRESS NON-COMPLIANCE -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to non-compliance, Bochenski said the issue could be addressed more effectively through the UN and various export control regimes, not the NPT. He said the text of the treaty failed to address non-compliance, arguing that the NPT did not contain provisions for dealing with actors who refuse to comply. LACK OF UNIVERSALITY -------------- ¶6. (C) Bochenski noted that non-NPT countries will have to be engaged at some point and brought under the auspices of the treaty. Poland supported the Additional Protocol (AP) as a verification mechanism and believed that the AP should be a precondition for supply of nuclear goods. STRENGTHEN PENALTIES FOR LEAVING TREATY -------------- ¶7. (C) The GoP wanted a discussion on Article 10, particularly on dealing with countries that leave the NPT. Bochenski argued that countries choosing to withdraw from the treaty regime should be sanctioned. He also believed there should be a mechanism in place to maintain IAEA inspections. CONTACTS -------------- ¶8. (U) Embassy Warsaw contact on nonproliferation issues is Rupert Finke, phone: 48-22-504-2267, e-mail: finkerc@state.gov. MFA contact is Szymon Bochenski, phone: 48-22-523-9644. e-mail: szymon.bochenski@msz.gov.pl. ASHE