SCENESETTER FOR YOUR FEBRUARY 25 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000185

SIPDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PREL OVIP MARR US PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR FEBRUARY 25 MEETING WITH
POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER SIKORSKI

Classified By: The Ambassador for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) At the top of Foreign Minister Radoslaw "Radek"
Sikorski's agenda when you meet next week will be securing an
symbolically important early White House meeting for Prime
Minister Donald Tusk. The Poles want an early summit --
preferably by April -- to signal that the new administration
is interested in pursuing the deeper strategic partnership
with Poland put in motion last year, as well as assure the
Polish public that the U.S. fresh start with Russia is not at
Poland's expense. A newcomer to the ruling Civic Platform
(PO) party, Sikorski owes his position to Tusk, who in turn
has given Sikorski broad authority in the area of foreign
policy and even key security issues.


2. (C) The fate of Missile Defense will also clearly be on
Sikorski's mind. Last summer, Sikorski personally sold the
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) to his reluctant
Prime Minister -- and both somewhat awkwardly await a U.S.
decision on the way forward. Tusk agreed to Missile Defense
for three reasons: 1) we asked; 2) saying no was potentially
much more problematic than saying yes; and 3) with the U.S.
agreement to deploy a rotating battery of Patriots to Poland
starting in 2009, Tusk could credibly argue that BMDA on net
increased Polish security. I doubt that either Iranian
threats or Russian foot stomping played much into Tusk's
thinking -- although the Russia incursion into Georgia was
"motivating," and provided him additional justification.


3. (C) While waiting for our Missile Defense decision, the
Poles are also pressing for implementation of the bilateral
Strategic Declaration of Cooperation, issued side-by-side
with BMDA last summer. The Declaration promises U.S. defense
modernization aid, a high-level Strategic Dialogue and the
Patriot rotation, slotted to become permanent beginning in

2012. Although a negligible military asset next to Russian
capabilities, the Patriot rotation puts U.S. boots on Polish
soil, something all Poles think will inherently improve their
security situation. The Strategic Dialogue is also important
to the Minister, who like many here suspect Eastern Europe
has fallen off the U.S. radar.


4. (C) It will not be news to you that Poland feels
under-appreciated and historically buffeted by the winds of
U.S.-Russian relations, and for that reason Sikorski will
look to you for comfort on a number of issues. He will want
to hear that the U.S. is committed to moving forward with the
Patriot missile rotation this year, despite uncertainty with
Missile Defense and the new page with Russia. He will be
looking to get a sense of your priorities for Russia, Ukraine
and Georgia, and to gauge your awareness of Polish-Swedish
efforts to reach out to states on Europe's border under the
so-called "EU Eastern Partnership Initiative." Poland's
ongoing exclusion from the Visa Waiver Program grates badly,
and Sikorski may ask if you see a way forward with the new
Congress. Sikorski will also be wondering if you are willing
to support his candidacy for NATO Secretary General, or if
any of the new members of NATO stand a chance in this contest.


5. (C) It may sound at this point like the Poles are
demanding, but they are our consistent strong allies. Polish
goals overlap remarkably with our goals. Poles admire
America more than any other country in Europe. Sikorski
himself is a worthy and frank partner who is not shy about
advancing our shared values. Less Russophobic than their
predecessors, Sikorski and Tusk nevertheless persistently
push to extend European and trans-Atlantic institutions
eastward. The Poles served honorably in Iraq and fight
without caveats in Afghanistan -- one of the few ISAF
partners to do so. (The Taliban's murder of a Polish hostage
in Pakistan has redoubled Sikorski's intensely personal
commitment to stay the course in Afghanistan.) Helping the
Poles succeed with us in Afghanistan, moving ahead with our
strategic dialogue, and lashing them to us on regional policy
are all extremely worthwhile investments. I urge you to see
this first meeting as a downpayment that will pay rich
dividends during your tenure.
ASHE