Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09WARSAW16
2009-01-08 08:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:  

POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS

Tags:  GG PL PREL RS 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWR #0016 0080806
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080806Z JAN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7564
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0144
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0047
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0769
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0191
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0100
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0353
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0465
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000016 

SIPDIS

EUR/CE (MORRIS AND LOCHMAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: GG PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS
OF GEORGIA

REF: STATE 134559

Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000016 SIPDIS EUR/CE (MORRIS AND LOCHMAN) E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019 TAGS: GG PL PREL RS SUBJECT: POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS OF GEORGIA REF: STATE 134559 Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Polish Deputy FM Andrzej Kremer told DCM that the GoP fully agrees with U.S. strategic objectives, but is concerned about the tactics outlined in reftel. For instance, the EU could find itself in a legal bind (and it's legal commitment to defend Georgian territorial integrity called into question) if visa facilitation and free trade (under the Eastern Partnership) were not extended to all of Georgia, including the separatist regions. Many in the separatist regions already have Russian passports, and could travel under the EU-Russia passport regime -- and presumably we would not be talking about visa sanctions against Russian passport holders. ¶2. (C) Kremer also noted difficulties with using reconstruction assistance and U.S./EU investment in the separatist regions as incentives, given security and infrastructure concerns and Western business' rather "contained" interest in investing in the region. Kremer stressed that these issues are not deal-breakers, but complications that merit consideration. ¶3. (C) Kremer said the EU and the U.S. should focus first on drawing separatists away from Russia, perhaps returning to Georgian President Saakashvili's original proposals on limited autonomy as a starting point. He wondered aloud why the international community had not focused more on Northern Ossetia's desire for autonomy from Russia, and the obvious pressure Russia's recognition of South Ossetia had put on this and other separatist movements in Russia. Kremer asked about the timing of U.S. plans to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Georgia and the content of the agreement. Noting Russian arguments that Kosovo had set a precedent, Kremer also asked whether the U.S. plans to present its position to the International Court of Justice. ¶4. (C) Comment. The Poles are anxious to be good interlocutors for the U.S. on a way forward with the separatist regions of Georgia, and Kremer was thoughtful in his approach to USG suggestions. Kremer is likely to be part of the next SoFA plenary, currently scheduled for February 2-3 in Washington. If this trip pans out, it would be advantageous to invite Kremer for consultations on Georgia during his visit. He is responsible within the Polish Government for the success of the Eastern Partnership, and may be able to help us avoid any obvious friction points between this EU initiative and our suggested path forward with Georgia's separatist regions. End Comment. ASHE

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