Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09WARSAW16
2009-01-08 08:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHWR #0016 0080806 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 080806Z JAN 09 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7564 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0144 RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0047 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0769 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0191 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0100 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0353 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0465
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000016
SIPDIS
EUR/CE (MORRIS AND LOCHMAN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: GG PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS
OF GEORGIA
REF: STATE 134559
Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000016
SIPDIS
EUR/CE (MORRIS AND LOCHMAN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: GG PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS
OF GEORGIA
REF: STATE 134559
Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)
1. (C) Polish Deputy FM Andrzej Kremer told DCM that the GoP
fully agrees with U.S. strategic objectives, but is concerned
about the tactics outlined in reftel. For instance, the EU
could find itself in a legal bind (and it's legal commitment
to defend Georgian territorial integrity called into
question) if visa facilitation and free trade (under the
Eastern Partnership) were not extended to all of Georgia,
including the separatist regions. Many in the separatist
regions already have Russian passports, and could travel
under the EU-Russia passport regime -- and presumably we
would not be talking about visa sanctions against Russian
passport holders.
2. (C) Kremer also noted difficulties with using
reconstruction assistance and U.S./EU investment in the
separatist regions as incentives, given security and
infrastructure concerns and Western business' rather
"contained" interest in investing in the region. Kremer
stressed that these issues are not deal-breakers, but
complications that merit consideration.
3. (C) Kremer said the EU and the U.S. should focus first on
drawing separatists away from Russia, perhaps returning to
Georgian President Saakashvili's original proposals on
limited autonomy as a starting point. He wondered aloud why
the international community had not focused more on Northern
Ossetia's desire for autonomy from Russia, and the obvious
pressure Russia's recognition of South Ossetia had put on
this and other separatist movements in Russia. Kremer asked
about the timing of U.S. plans to sign a strategic
cooperation agreement with Georgia and the content of the
agreement. Noting Russian arguments that Kosovo had set a
precedent, Kremer also asked whether the U.S. plans to
present its position to the International Court of Justice.
4. (C) Comment. The Poles are anxious to be good
interlocutors for the U.S. on a way forward with the
separatist regions of Georgia, and Kremer was thoughtful in
his approach to USG suggestions. Kremer is likely to be part
of the next SoFA plenary, currently scheduled for February
2-3 in Washington. If this trip pans out, it would be
advantageous to invite Kremer for consultations on Georgia
during his visit. He is responsible within the Polish
Government for the success of the Eastern Partnership, and
may be able to help us avoid any obvious friction points
between this EU initiative and our suggested path forward
with Georgia's separatist regions. End Comment.
ASHE
SIPDIS
EUR/CE (MORRIS AND LOCHMAN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: GG PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: POLISH VIEWS ON WAY FORWARD ON SEPARATIST REGIONS
OF GEORGIA
REF: STATE 134559
Classified By: DCM QUANRUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)
1. (C) Polish Deputy FM Andrzej Kremer told DCM that the GoP
fully agrees with U.S. strategic objectives, but is concerned
about the tactics outlined in reftel. For instance, the EU
could find itself in a legal bind (and it's legal commitment
to defend Georgian territorial integrity called into
question) if visa facilitation and free trade (under the
Eastern Partnership) were not extended to all of Georgia,
including the separatist regions. Many in the separatist
regions already have Russian passports, and could travel
under the EU-Russia passport regime -- and presumably we
would not be talking about visa sanctions against Russian
passport holders.
2. (C) Kremer also noted difficulties with using
reconstruction assistance and U.S./EU investment in the
separatist regions as incentives, given security and
infrastructure concerns and Western business' rather
"contained" interest in investing in the region. Kremer
stressed that these issues are not deal-breakers, but
complications that merit consideration.
3. (C) Kremer said the EU and the U.S. should focus first on
drawing separatists away from Russia, perhaps returning to
Georgian President Saakashvili's original proposals on
limited autonomy as a starting point. He wondered aloud why
the international community had not focused more on Northern
Ossetia's desire for autonomy from Russia, and the obvious
pressure Russia's recognition of South Ossetia had put on
this and other separatist movements in Russia. Kremer asked
about the timing of U.S. plans to sign a strategic
cooperation agreement with Georgia and the content of the
agreement. Noting Russian arguments that Kosovo had set a
precedent, Kremer also asked whether the U.S. plans to
present its position to the International Court of Justice.
4. (C) Comment. The Poles are anxious to be good
interlocutors for the U.S. on a way forward with the
separatist regions of Georgia, and Kremer was thoughtful in
his approach to USG suggestions. Kremer is likely to be part
of the next SoFA plenary, currently scheduled for February
2-3 in Washington. If this trip pans out, it would be
advantageous to invite Kremer for consultations on Georgia
during his visit. He is responsible within the Polish
Government for the success of the Eastern Partnership, and
may be able to help us avoid any obvious friction points
between this EU initiative and our suggested path forward
with Georgia's separatist regions. End Comment.
ASHE