POLAND SEEKS TO BUILD CSDP AS CREDIBLE PARTNER FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001204

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PREL MCAP MARR NATO EU PL
SUBJECT: POLAND SEEKS TO BUILD CSDP AS CREDIBLE PARTNER FOR
NATO

Classified By: Political External Chief Tony Kolankiewicz for Reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: As one of the goals of its 2011 EU
Presidency, Poland aims to give life to the European Union
Common Security and Defense Policy. To that end, Polish PM
Tusk and French President Sarkozy issued a Declaration on
Security and Defense on November 5 in Paris. Polish MFA
officials describe the effort as intended to complement
rather than compete with NATO, and seek U.S. views on this
point. END SUMMARY.

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FRANCO-POLISH SECURITY COOPERATION LAYS GROUNDWORK FOR CSDP
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2. (U) Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has been an ardent
supporter of the concept of a revamped CSDP and, more
generally, closer Polish security ties to the European Union.
Defense Minister Bogdan Klich has said Poland would be
prepared to earmark troops for an EU rapid reaction force.


3. (C) Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Director of the MFA's
Security Policy Department, told PolCouns the bilateral
security and defense declaration was the most important
outcome of Tusk's visit to France. The document (e-mailed to
EUR/CE) conveys the two countries' shared views on bilateral
military cooperation, European security architecture, and
arms control. As for CSDP's future direction, the
declaration notes the need to reinforce EU solidarity and
defense capabilities, while offering few details. Kobieracki
thought a good place to start would be for CSDP to develop EU
expertise in disaster and crisis management. He said Poland
would use the declaration as a blueprint for CSDP prior to
and during its 2011 EU presidency. He highlighted the
declaration's positive tone, saying that past ESDP planners
were too focused on what should not be done.


4. (C) The declaration reaffirms support for the Washington
Treaty's Article 5, the strengthening of the trans-Atlantic
alliance, and NATO's open door. There are several references
to the "complementary and mutually reinforcing" functions of
CSDP and NATO. Kobieracki, who took part in the months-long
negotiation of the text and the Paris meetings, maintained
that the Poles had insisted on many of the supportive
references to NATO, which French officials had not disputed.
He discounted media reports that the joint declaration was a
response to alleged Polish frustration with U.S. and NATO
security cooperation. Kobieracki said that defense
cooperation with France, including possible contracts to keep
Polish shipyards in business, would do nothing to diminish
Warsaw's appreciation for its security relations with
Washington or NATO. But when asked, Kobieracki declined to
say whether current plans for CSDP would preserve NATO's
right of first refusal to take part in a given security
mission.


5. (C) With the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty and
appointment of a new EU Foreign Minister, Kobieracki saw new
prospects for security policy coordination as well. Poland
wished to see establishment of a position for an EU Deputy
High Representative for Foreign Affairs to coordinate CSDP
and related security issues once Lisbon Treaty provisions
were formally in place. Kobieracki said there was widespread
support among EU members for a revitalized Policy. In his
view, CSDP had the potential to galvanize European
integration, as well as reinforce the trans-Atlantic
relationship.

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MFA ON LONG-TERM GOALS -- AND SHORTCOMINGS
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6. (C) In a November 18 briefing for NATO and EU embassies,
Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder said ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty offered an opportunity to re-energize CSDP and
make the EU a more reliable partner for NATO. Najder said
the GOP was acutely aware of the obstacles CSDP faced, and
the Poles welcome ideas from both EU and non-EU sources. In
the meantime, Poland will coordinate closely with Spain,
Belgium, and Hungary -- the next three EU Presidents -- to
maintain continuity on what would remain a long-term project.
Highlighting four priority areas, Najder said Poland would
work before and during its EU Presidency to improve:

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-- Institutions and Mechanisms. Streamline planning,
especially related to development of the Crisis Management
and Planning Directorate, to improve EU efficiency in coping
with emergencies.

-- Cooperation with NATO. Step up consultations and overcome
past problems related to information- and
intelligence-sharing.

-- Capabilities. Tight budgets should spur all EU members to
foster regional and sub-regional security cooperation,
undertake more joint development and funding of defense
projects, and establish more combined military commands.
(Najder cited recent plans to establish a
Lithuanian/Polish/Ukrainian peacekeeping brigade.)

-- Partnership Opportunities. CSDP could promote cooperation
with the U.S. and others in areas like the EU's Mediterranean
Union and Eastern Partnership Initiative.

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OPPORTUNITY FOR NATO AND U.S.
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7. (C) Marek Cichocki of the Natolin European Center
emphasized that some elements of CSDP are already a reality,
especially related to the European Defense Agency and
cooperation on defense industrial technology. However,
implementation of the broader aspects of the Policy has been
a perennial problem for the Union. Cichocki thought the EU's
incoming permanent President and Foreign Affairs
Representative had the potential to sustain broad, long-term
policy initiatives like CSDP, unlike the rotating six-month
presidencies. In his view, Poland's planned CSDP role for
its EU presidency was "overstated," but Warsaw would use its
increasingly effective coalition-building tactics within the
Union to build support. Cichocki said the Franco-Polish
security declaration was a good start, but Poland also needed
to win British support for CSDP.


8. (C) Bartosz Wisniewski of the Polish Institute of
International Affairs said he viewed CSDP as a positive
development, and discounted the view that Warsaw was
dissatisfied with its relations with either NATO or the U.S.
To the contrary, Wisniewski said the Poles were firm
believers in NATO's security guarantees and perceived
themselves as among the strongest Allies. Warsaw had no
interest in undermining NATO or in seeking alternatives to
U.S. security cooperation, but it was natural for Poland to
pursue every possible avenue to improve its own security. In
Wisniewski's view, Washington should welcome Poland's offer
to be "helpful" within the EU and take advantage of the
opportunity to shape CSDP in a way that truly complements the
Alliance.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Foreign Minister Sikorski once said that Poland could
never choose between the EU and NATO; it would be like
picking one parent over another. The Poles love both
institutions -- they would like increased EU defense
capabilities to augment NATO's ability to make good on
Article 5 guarantees. And in the Polish view, some friendly
rivalry might even spur both organizations to do a better
job. That said, the Poles may have embraced CSDP without
fully anticipating possible conflicts with NATO. Kobieracki
says good riddance to the past "negativity" of ESDP planners,
but some of the past redlines prevented the duplication of
NATO assets or the downgrading of NATO prerogatives.


10. (C) The Europeans have been working on European
Security Defense Policy for a decade, and it is unclear that
the appointment of an EU Foreign Minister will give the
initiative a jump start. As for the Poles, they are
uncertain how to take CSDP to the next level, and are looking
for suggestions on issues like participation, resource
allocation, and relations with NATO. The Poles would be the
last to jeopardize NATO security guarantees, and will listen
closely to U.S. advice as to how to frame the upcoming EU
debate.
FEINSTEIN