POLAND SEEKS TO BUILD CSDP AS CREDIBLE PARTNER FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001204 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CE AND EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: PREL MCAP MARR NATO EU PL SUBJECT: POLAND SEEKS TO BUILD CSDP AS CREDIBLE PARTNER FOR NATO Classified By: Political External Chief Tony Kolankiewicz for Reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As one of the goals of its 2011 EU Presidency, Poland aims to give life to the European Union Common Security and Defense Policy. To that end, Polish PM Tusk and French President Sarkozy issued a Declaration on Security and Defense on November 5 in Paris. Polish MFA officials describe the effort as intended to complement rather than compete with NATO, and seek U.S. views on this point. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- FRANCO-POLISH SECURITY COOPERATION LAYS GROUNDWORK FOR CSDP -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has been an ardent supporter of the concept of a revamped CSDP and, more generally, closer Polish security ties to the European Union. Defense Minister Bogdan Klich has said Poland would be prepared to earmark troops for an EU rapid reaction force. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Director of the MFA's Security Policy Department, told PolCouns the bilateral security and defense declaration was the most important outcome of Tusk's visit to France. The document (e-mailed to EUR/CE) conveys the two countries' shared views on bilateral military cooperation, European security architecture, and arms control. As for CSDP's future direction, the declaration notes the need to reinforce EU solidarity and defense capabilities, while offering few details. Kobieracki thought a good place to start would be for CSDP to develop EU expertise in disaster and crisis management. He said Poland would use the declaration as a blueprint for CSDP prior to and during its 2011 EU presidency. He highlighted the declaration's positive tone, saying that past ESDP planners were too focused on what should not be done. ¶4. (C) The declaration reaffirms support for the Washington Treaty's Article 5, the strengthening of the trans-Atlantic alliance, and NATO's open door. There are several references to the "complementary and mutually reinforcing" functions of CSDP and NATO. Kobieracki, who took part in the months-long negotiation of the text and the Paris meetings, maintained that the Poles had insisted on many of the supportive references to NATO, which French officials had not disputed. He discounted media reports that the joint declaration was a response to alleged Polish frustration with U.S. and NATO security cooperation. Kobieracki said that defense cooperation with France, including possible contracts to keep Polish shipyards in business, would do nothing to diminish Warsaw's appreciation for its security relations with Washington or NATO. But when asked, Kobieracki declined to say whether current plans for CSDP would preserve NATO's right of first refusal to take part in a given security mission. ¶5. (C) With the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty and appointment of a new EU Foreign Minister, Kobieracki saw new prospects for security policy coordination as well. Poland wished to see establishment of a position for an EU Deputy High Representative for Foreign Affairs to coordinate CSDP and related security issues once Lisbon Treaty provisions were formally in place. Kobieracki said there was widespread support among EU members for a revitalized Policy. In his view, CSDP had the potential to galvanize European integration, as well as reinforce the trans-Atlantic relationship. -------------- MFA ON LONG-TERM GOALS -- AND SHORTCOMINGS -------------- ¶6. (C) In a November 18 briefing for NATO and EU embassies, Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder said ratification of the Lisbon Treaty offered an opportunity to re-energize CSDP and make the EU a more reliable partner for NATO. Najder said the GOP was acutely aware of the obstacles CSDP faced, and the Poles welcome ideas from both EU and non-EU sources. In the meantime, Poland will coordinate closely with Spain, Belgium, and Hungary -- the next three EU Presidents -- to maintain continuity on what would remain a long-term project. Highlighting four priority areas, Najder said Poland would work before and during its EU Presidency to improve: WARSAW 00001204 002 OF 002 -- Institutions and Mechanisms. Streamline planning, especially related to development of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, to improve EU efficiency in coping with emergencies. -- Cooperation with NATO. Step up consultations and overcome past problems related to information- and intelligence-sharing. -- Capabilities. Tight budgets should spur all EU members to foster regional and sub-regional security cooperation, undertake more joint development and funding of defense projects, and establish more combined military commands. (Najder cited recent plans to establish a Lithuanian/Polish/Ukrainian peacekeeping brigade.) -- Partnership Opportunities. CSDP could promote cooperation with the U.S. and others in areas like the EU's Mediterranean Union and Eastern Partnership Initiative. -------------- OPPORTUNITY FOR NATO AND U.S. -------------- ¶7. (C) Marek Cichocki of the Natolin European Center emphasized that some elements of CSDP are already a reality, especially related to the European Defense Agency and cooperation on defense industrial technology. However, implementation of the broader aspects of the Policy has been a perennial problem for the Union. Cichocki thought the EU's incoming permanent President and Foreign Affairs Representative had the potential to sustain broad, long-term policy initiatives like CSDP, unlike the rotating six-month presidencies. In his view, Poland's planned CSDP role for its EU presidency was "overstated," but Warsaw would use its increasingly effective coalition-building tactics within the Union to build support. Cichocki said the Franco-Polish security declaration was a good start, but Poland also needed to win British support for CSDP. ¶8. (C) Bartosz Wisniewski of the Polish Institute of International Affairs said he viewed CSDP as a positive development, and discounted the view that Warsaw was dissatisfied with its relations with either NATO or the U.S. To the contrary, Wisniewski said the Poles were firm believers in NATO's security guarantees and perceived themselves as among the strongest Allies. Warsaw had no interest in undermining NATO or in seeking alternatives to U.S. security cooperation, but it was natural for Poland to pursue every possible avenue to improve its own security. In Wisniewski's view, Washington should welcome Poland's offer to be "helpful" within the EU and take advantage of the opportunity to shape CSDP in a way that truly complements the Alliance. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Foreign Minister Sikorski once said that Poland could never choose between the EU and NATO; it would be like picking one parent over another. The Poles love both institutions -- they would like increased EU defense capabilities to augment NATO's ability to make good on Article 5 guarantees. And in the Polish view, some friendly rivalry might even spur both organizations to do a better job. That said, the Poles may have embraced CSDP without fully anticipating possible conflicts with NATO. Kobieracki says good riddance to the past "negativity" of ESDP planners, but some of the past redlines prevented the duplication of NATO assets or the downgrading of NATO prerogatives. ¶10. (C) The Europeans have been working on European Security Defense Policy for a decade, and it is unclear that the appointment of an EU Foreign Minister will give the initiative a jump start. As for the Poles, they are uncertain how to take CSDP to the next level, and are looking for suggestions on issues like participation, resource allocation, and relations with NATO. The Poles would be the last to jeopardize NATO security guarantees, and will listen closely to U.S. advice as to how to frame the upcoming EU debate. FEINSTEIN