SCENESETTER FOR U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 10-11

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001200

SIPDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE TAUSCHER
GENEVA FOR ALAN CARLSON TO PASS TO U/S TAUSCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV RS PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 10-11
VISIT TO WARSAW

Classified By: Ambassador Lee Feinstein. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Welcome. Since your visit to Warsaw in mid-September,
much has changed for the better in the bilateral
relationship, although clean-up may be needed in light of
Polish government statements on Patriot missiles following
the December 4 meeting between the Secretary and Foreign
Minister Sikorski. Overall the environment is significantly
better. The President had a positive 20-minute phone call
with Prime Minister Tusk on December 1; it was one of a small
handful of calls the President made to Allies outside the
Quad. Secretary Clinton called Foreign Minister Sikorski on
November 26, and held a bilateral meeting with him on the
margins of the NATO ministerial. Secretary Gates called
Defense Minister Klich on December 2. General Jones conducted
two DVCs with key Allies, including Poland, to consult on the
new Afghanistan strategy.


2. (C) The government's decision to adopt a more positive
approach is not only calculated to improve relations with the
United States, it is also a domestic political strategy
pitched for the Presidential election to be held in the fall
of 2010. The government wants to show not simply that it has
held its ground with Washington, but that relations between
Washington and Warsaw have warmed as a consequence of its
policies, as opposed to those of the previous Polish
government.


3. (C) In addition to the intense scope of high-level
contacts, Warsaw has said it wants your meetings this week to
be seen as valuable to the United States. As one senior
government official told me over lunch, twice for emphasis,
Warsaw recognizes that past meetings were evaluated on the
degree to which Poland felt adequately "pampered" by
Washington. Now, he said, the government wants these
meetings to be perceived in Washington as adding value for
the United States, because Poland wants the meetings to
continue regularly and at high levels. Moreover, the Poles
understand your positive role, and want to recognize it with
a SOFA signing, and a substantive exchange of views on issues
of importance to both governments. In addition, the Foreign
Minister has frequently praised the Administration's approach
to missile defense as better for Poland's security.


4. (C) The goal in the SCCG talks is to successfully conclude
the last phase of negotiations between the United States and
Poland, and begin a new chapter of high-level consultations
that befit a relationship between close allies. The
underlying idea is to establish a normal framework for
regular talks on issues of strategic importance for our
countries.

Afghanistan
--------------


5. (C) Poland's decision to increase its troop contributions
to ISAF by 600-1000 troops is one of the largest increases by
a NATO country. Poland is framing this decision not as a
gesture to the United States, but as an investment in the
strength and credibility of NATO and, as a consequence,
Poland's security. You should recognize Poland's signal
contribution to the Alliance effort in Afghanistan,
emphasizing their role as a staunch NATO ally (rather
thanking them for responding to a specific American request).
If they raise concerns about prospects for prevailing in
Afghanistan, indicate the similarity in the approach of both
governments to the mission. Poland's Afghan policy mirrors
that of President Obama, namely the combat mission is not
open ended, while economic, political and diplomatic
engagement with Pakistan and Afghanistan must continue.
(Note: Deputy Foreign Minister Najder was Poland's
ambassador to Aghanistan from March 2008-December 2009, and
has an analysis about the similarities and differences
between Iraq and Afghanistan that I can summarize for you in
person.)

SOFA and BMDA Annex
--------------


6. (C) The Vice President's October 20-21 visit was a turning
point, and the government has made a conscious decision to
pivot toward the future, rather than focus on the past. That
said, end-of-negotiation issues have popped up in the past
week, as well as some dissonance after the Brussels
ministerial meeting.

WARSAW 00001200 002 OF 002



-- SOFA: Foreign Minister Sikorski has said that the SOFA
negotiations have been successfully concluded. As the end
game on SOFA approaches, small issues remain to be nailed
down, as Kurt Amend has told you. Kurt will monitor the
situation closely and hopefully, working with the Embassy,
will be able to resolve them before your arrival.

-- BMDA: Although U.S. proposed changes to the BMDA are
cosmetic, Warsaw says it has not had the time to conduct an
interagency review of the proposed changes and will not be in
a position to reach agreement by December 10 on changes to
the BMDA annex. That does not reflect backsliding, in my
judgment; the government says it intends to seek ratification
of both documents soon and together. That said, you may wish
to ask about the possibility of initialing the BMDA during
your visit, while emphasizing the importance of settling this
soonest. At a minimum, during your visit, we should try to
reach an informal understanding on what is needed in the
text, and design a common plan for finalizing the agreement,
perhaps by exchanging diplomatic notes. The Poles want to
conclude an MD agreement soon, so they can bundle it with the
SOFA for parliamentary ratification.

Some Dissonance over Patriot Batteries
--------------


7. (C) Some discord developed over statements by the Foreign
Minister contending that Secretary Clinton said Patriot
Missile batteries rotating to Poland would be armed at all
times and fully operational. (Sikorski raised the issue
after a Polish report inaccurately quoted Assistant Secretary
Vershbow as saying the Patriots would be unarmed.) Sikorski
has been closely and visibly linked to the Patriots; he
dislikes media talk of "unarmed Patriots," and considers
management of this issue to be important.


8. (C) U.S. policy, however, remains unchanged. Our policy
is that the Patriot rotations are for training and exercise
and that there will be opportunities to conduct such training
and exercises with live ammunition over the course of the
rotations. We are seeking to agree on talking points with
the Poles in advance of your meeting, but you may need to
reinforce the point that the U.S. position has not changed,
and that the training and exercises will provide robust
training opportunities for both Polish and American soldiers.
The key point is to work together so as not to distract from
the positive outcomes of the SOFA signing and the SCCG.

Meetings with Sikorski and Klich
--------------


9. (C) In addition to the SOFA signing ceremony and the
SCCG, you are scheduled to meet Foreign Minister Sikorski and
Defense Minister Klich on December 10. We are scheduled to
discuss those meetings and update you on any new developments
over breakfast on December 10.
FEINSTEIN