POLES FATALISTIC ABOUT UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001112

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE; EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PL UP RS
SUBJECT: POLES FATALISTIC ABOUT UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DAN SAINZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Poland shares our desire to integrate Ukraine
into Western institutions, but many in the GoP view the
upcoming Ukrainian presidential election in zero-sum terms: a
likely victory for Russia and loss for Poland -- no matter
which candidate wins. Many Poles believe that for five
years, the GoP backed the wrong horse -- Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko -- and will lose influence now that his
political opponents are on the rise. Despite their current
pessimism, Poles have built a network of regional contacts
and aid programs that could continue to nudge Ukraine towards
the West. END SUMMARY.

THE REALIZATION: EGGS IN ONE BASKET
--------------


2. (C) Polish officials and think tank experts argue that
Poland will lose influence in Kyiv after the election,
whereas Russia has courted all key Ukrainian presidential
candidates except Yushchenko. They told us Poland had erred
by pinning its hopes on Yushchenko following the 2004 Orange
Revolution. Even as Yushchenko's popularity waned, Poland
continued to ignore influential politicians like
Russia-friendly opposition leader and former Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovych. Swept up in the excitement of the Orange
Revolution, Poles overestimated Yushchenko's ability to
consolidate power and lead Ukraine to the West. "We should
have cultivated links to all key politicians, even if
distasteful for us," lamented Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Relations and former
Chair of the Democratic Party (PD).


3. (C) To minimize damage from betting on the wrong horse,
the GoP over the past year has belatedly opened channels with
Yushchenko's rivals through visits and phone calls. Even
President Lech Kaczynski -- Yushchenko's closest ally in
Warsaw -- has reached out to the Ukrainian President's
political opponents, achieving "mixed results," according to
a presidential aide. Maciej Jakubik, an expert in
Kaczynski's Foreign Affairs Office, told us that Kaczynski is
"realistic" about Yushchenko's slim re-election chances. In
addition, Kaczynski has voiced increasing disappointment to
aides about Yushchenko's efforts to win the support of
Ukrainian nationalists, sometimes at Poland's expense.
Jakubik said the atmospherics of Yushchenko's September
meeting with Kaczynski were friendly, but "slightly dampened"
compared to previous visits.

TYMOSHENKO: BEST OF THE LOT?
--------------


4. (C) Most of our interlocutors agree that a victory by PM
Yuliya Tymoshenko would be the best -- but far from perfect
-- electoral outcome for Poland. Based on our conversations,
they see the scorecard as follows:

--TYMOSHENKO: Although Polish politicians, including PM Tusk,
have tepid relations with Tymoshenko, they see her as
pragmatic and willing to work with whomever offers the best
deal. Many Poles believe her election victory could give
Western countries a chance to lure Ukraine away from Russia,
provided they offer enough financial aid and visa-free
travel. But Poles fear that Russia's economic leverage will
trump the West's. Polish analysts also believe that
Tymoshenko will not resolve Polish-Ukrainian historical
irritants, and will merely sweep them under the rug.

--YANUKOVYCH: Poles generally view a Yanukovych victory as
the worst-case scenario for Poland. Not only would he align
Kyiv more closely with Moscow and kill Ukraine's NATO bid, he
would probably turn a cold shoulder to Warsaw because of
Poland's support for Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution.
In addition, they believe he would side with Russia in
ongoing disputes with Poland over sensitive historical
issues.

--YATSENYUK: Our contacts describe Yatsenyuk as either an
enigma or a paper tiger. After traveling to Kyiv in June, FM
Sikorski complained to his staff that Yatsenyuk was guarded
and superficial, making it hard to discern his views on
relations with Poland, Russia, and the EU. In addition,
Yatsenyuk's use of Russian campaign managers has sparked
concerns about Moscow's influence.

--YUSHCHENKO: Even if Yushchenko pulls off a miracle victory,
Polish analysts believe he would remain weak and lurch

WARSAW 00001112 002 OF 002


towards nationalism to shore up his support base in Western
Ukraine. Such a course would increase tensions with Poland
over historical issues, worsen political divisions in
Ukraine, and might even lead to Russian aggression against
Ukraine.

ALL IS NOT LOST
--------------


5. (C) Although Poland seems destined to lose influence with
the Presidential office in Kyiv, it can still draw Ukraine
towards Western institutions through its voice in the EU, its
aid programs, and its network of regional contacts.

-- EASTERN PARTNERSHIP (EPI). No matter who becomes
President, the EPI offers Ukraine the prospect of more aid
and freer travel to the EU. Poland, which co-sponsored the
EUR 600 million EPI with Sweden, can help keep the sometimes
reluctant EU engaged with Ukraine, especially after Warsaw
becomes EU President in 2011. Polish officials are also
impressed with the flexibility of U.S. aid programs in
Ukraine compared to the EU's rigid criteria. They would
likely be willing partners, along with the U.S., in urging
the EU to adopt a more flexible and targeted approach in
Ukraine, particularly in the context of the EPI.

-- LEVERAGING BILATERAL AID AND LOCAL CONTACTS. Poland can
still influence Ukraine through bilateral aid and contacts
with Ukrainian politicians, journalists and NGOs, many of
whom regularly travel to Poland. Polish officials tell us
they have focused efforts on boosting: independent judiciary
and media, EU/NATO integration efforts, and economic
management. While most of Poland's contacts are in western
Ukraine, some NGOs tell us they are gradually making headway
in the eastern part of the country. We should continue to
encourage Poland to export its economic and democratic
transformation experience to Ukraine.

-- FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT TIES. Finally, many Poles maintain
family and business relations with ethnic Ukrainians,
especially near the border, and thousands of Ukrainians work
in Poland, often illegally. While not subject to government
policy, this web of personal relationships, aided by a
bilateral agreement to open small border-crossing points,
will preserve Poland's influence in Ukraine for some time to
come.


6. (U) This cable has been cleared with Embassy Kyiv.
TULLEY