PM TUSK REMAINS MAN TO BEAT DESPITE SCANDAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001068 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/FO, EUR/CE, INR NSC FOR HOVENIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR PL SUBJECT: PM TUSK REMAINS MAN TO BEAT DESPITE SCANDAL REF: A. WARSAW 1039 ¶B. WARSAW 1065 ¶C. WARSAW 860 Classified By: Ambassador Feinstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: After nearly two years in office and in the midst of a corruption scandal and the global economic crisis, PM Tusk's public approval has held steady at around 50 percent, a feat unprecedented since 1989. By dismissing ministers implicated in the "Gamble-gate" scandal, even absent evidence of their guilt, Tusk has deprived the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) of the pretext it needed to launch a political war. Since founding PiS in 2001, the Kaczynski brothers have used emotional anti-corruption rhetoric to play on the public's deep-seeded distrust of Poland's political class. While a PiS resurgence was unlikely, Tusk hopes he has prevented PiS from inflicting mortal wounds on his Civic Platform (PO) party. Tusk is working to restore public trust in his government and to stabilize his support among PO rank-and-file. He is still the man to beat in the fall 2010 presidential elections. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) What does the "Gamble-gate" scandal mean for PM Donald Tusk and how will it impact his presidential ambitions? While the scandal (ref A) has caused public support for his Government to drop below 30 percent, Tusk himself remains wildly popular for a sitting prime minister. After nearly two years in office, in the midst of an economic crisis, and in the wake of a corruption scandal, Tusk's public support is holding steady at around 50 percent. This is unprecendented in post-communist Polish politics. ¶3. (C) Tusk acted quickly after news of the scandal broke, dismissing three ministers -- including his "right hand," deputy prime minister and close friend Grzegorz Schetyna, who was demoted to parliamentary caucus chair -- and three trusted political advisors. While each of the officials had been linked in some way to the "Gamble-gate" scandal or named in unrelated corruption investigations, no evidence has yet been presented that any of them broke the law. To date, there have been only insinuations that the officials permitted undue influence of gaming industry lobbyists on planned government legislation. Tusk's decision to fire close advisors without any evidence of misconduct may seem to outsiders like a crass public relations move. In reality, it shows Tusk has learned from the experience of predecessors toppled in corruption scandals. In particular, the 2002-2004 "Rywin-gate" scandal played out in the media for years and ultimately led to the resignation of PM Leszek Miller (Democratic Left Alliance, SLD) in 2004 and SLD's crushing defeat in 2005 elections. ¶4. (C) By removing "tainted" officials from the government (returning them to parliament),Tusk has effectively denied Law and Justice (PiS) chair Jaroslaw Kaczynski a powerful political weapon. Had Tusk rushed to the defense of his advisors, he would have given PiS ammunition to play on deep-seeded popular distrust of the state and politicians. A months-long volley of recriminations and finger-pointing in the media would have weakened Tusk, making him seem just another politician, rather than the man who "restored optimism" to Polish politics in 2007. Rather than letting PiS claim the moral high ground, Tusk has repeatedly stated that trust, transparency, and public confidence supersede personal loyalty to friends and advisors. ¶5. (C) Tusk also took an unusually forceful tack in dismissing the PiS-affiliated head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA),Mariusz Kaminski, depriving opposition leader Kaczynski of a key weapon. Tusk made clear he was doing so to prevent PiS from waging a political war on PO and the Government. The removal was politically risky given Kaminski's involvement in a corruption investigation targeting Tusk's Government, but Tusk has tried to innoculate himself by expressing full support for an independent parliamentary investigation. He also replaced Kaminski with a career law enforcement officer, rather than a PO operative. ¶6. (C) While it is unlikely the scandal would have led to a PiS resurgence, Tusk clearly hopes to prevent PiS from wounding his party mortally. A series of post-scandal public opinion polls show Tusk would still handily defeat incumbent Lech Kaczynski, or any other PiS candidate, in 2010 presidential elections. Less clear, though, is how Tusk would fare against former PM Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who remains noncommittal on his plans for 2010. Cimoszewicz, who is being courted by SLD but may decide to run as an WARSAW 00001068 002 OF 002 independent, has pulled even (within the margin of error) with Tusk in some polls. Cimoszewicz, Poland's former candidate for Council of Europe SYG, benefitted from months of press coverage highlighting his qualifications for that position. That said, Cimoszewicz may lack the fortitude for a tough campaign. ¶7. (C) Tusk knows that besides his personal popularity, he needs a strong party organization and rank-and-file support to win the presidency. Even after the presidential election, Tusk will need PO to advance his reform agenda. Tusk's decision to give Schetyna leadership of the party's parliamentary caucus, while risky, is his best bet to stem party infighting and reassert control. It could backfire. In addition to being Tusk's behind-the-scenes organization man and best friend, Schetyna had long been a friendly rival. In fact, it is widely believed Schetyna had been promised the premiership if Tusk were elected president. Schetyna made no effort to mask his displeasure at being demoted, even though there was no evidence of wrongdoing. Although Schetyna may ultimately pose an internal party threat, for now Tusk remains too popular to target. For the foreseeable future, Tusk and Schetyna will focus on reenergizing PO's rank and file and drawing public attention away from the scandal. ¶8. (C) If Tusk can put the corruption scandal behind him, he is likely to keep PO intact and firmly under his thumb. His first step toward restoring public trust in his Government was naming qualified experts, rather than party insiders, to vacant cabinet posts (ref B). Media also speculate he will soon send ineffective anti-corruption czar Julia Pitera (ref C) back to parliament and empower a more capable successor to clean house government-wide. Tusk's popularity will be boosted by IMF projections, propounded in the media, that Poland will emerge from the global economic crisis largely unscathed and that more robust growth is just around the corner. Tusk remains Poland's most popular politician. Barring further complications, he is likely to fend off rivals within PO and defeat other parties' contenders for the presidency in 2010. FEINSTEIN