SUPPORT FOR POLAND'S ASPIRING NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

UNCLAS WARSAW 001029 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/NESS, L-NPV, L-T, EUR/PRA AND S/EEE REBECA NEFF; USTR FOR ELIZABETH BALTZAN AND JARED RAGLAND; OMB FOR DAVID LEE; COMMERCE FOR HILLEARY SMITH AND STEVE CLAGGETT; DOE/NNSA FOR HEATHER LOONEY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ENRG EINV TRGY BEXP BTIO PL SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR POLAND'S ASPIRING NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM REF: A. WARSAW 1450 ¶B. WARSAW 958 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Polish government requests US assistance in launching a nuclear power program. PM Tusk's goal of generating nuclear power by 2020 is optimistic. However, simultaneously meeting Poland's carbon emissions commitments and addressing its energy security concerns will require diversifying away from coal. Poland's public and private sector leadership view nuclear as a vital piece of that diversification, achievable in the medium-term. The U.S. has an interest in seeing the GoP succeed in meeting its climate change and energy security goals, but Poland lacks the human capital to design and implement a nuclear program. Polish officials have specifically asked for US assistance in building that human capital. They would like to engage us early in the process as they begin to draft legislation and design regulatory infrastructure. End Summary. Why Nuclear? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Poland's reliance on domestic coal for 95% of its electricity insulates it somewhat from dependence on Russian energy. At the same time, this dependence on coal puts Poland at odds with EU-established emissions caps, which favor imported (Russian) gas or other alternatives. Poland will require huge investments in its outdated power sector in the coming years regardless of the nuclear program; some 60% of Poland's power plants are 25 years old or older. PM Tusk has made nuclear power, along with LNG, his primary response to solving Poland's energy-climate conundrum. Poland does not have a substantial anti-nuclear movement. Opposition party leaders including Law and Justice (PiS) energy experts have so far limited their criticism to the effectiveness of Tusk's energy policy implementation, and have generally been silent or even supportive of Poland's move toward nuclear. Next Steps Toward Implementation -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Hanna Trojanowska's appointment by PM Tusk last May as the new Commissioner for Nuclear Power signaled an acceleration of efforts to launch the program. While most analysts agree that the 2020 target Tusk announced last January is too optimistic, the GOP is aggressively advancing toward that goal. Trojanowska's new office in the Ministry of Economy will spearhead efforts to create the required legislative and regulatory infrastructure, and to build the international partnerships Poland will need to get this off the ground. Trojanowska is a technocrat who comes to the Ministry from Poland's largest state-owned power generator, Polish Energy Group (PGE),which has been tasked with contracting construction and ultimately operating the planned facilities. ¶4. (SBU) Trojanowska hopes to have regulatory legislation drafted by the end of 2009. Chair of the Parliament's Sub-Committee on Energy and member of the governing Civic Platform (PO) party, Andzrej Czerwinski, is optimistic about the prospects for passing that legislation in early 2010. He contends that the government's "Energy Strategy Through 2030" was long delayed because the government was building a multi-party consensus to support the long-term commitment needed to develop nuclear power, LNG, and other alternatives to coal. Poland Will Need Help -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Trojanowska discussed the GOP's need for international assistance at a recent informal meeting with the US delegation to the GNEP working group on fuel cycles, hosted in Warsaw the last week of September. One of her early priorities is to secure governmental cooperation, particularly with the U.S., including signing a Technical Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). While the Poles backed away from an earlier request due to bureaucratic reorganizations, they are now nearly ready to request a TIEA. They will also look to the National Nuclear Safety Administration, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy for assistance in everything from fuel cycle planning to structuring bids; however, their immediate priority is for personnel exchanges, training, and general help building the human capacity to develop a nuclear program. US industry representatives agree that Poland will need assistance in developing its regulatory capacity and have expressed concern that without US collaboration, the Polish government may be steered by a third country toward a particular technology or industry partner. Comment: Getting Started on Nuclear Cooperation -------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) Poland has at various levels asked to increase engagement with the U.S. on energy security and climate change. Earlier discussions of these issues have become bogged down in the details of Brussels negotiations or the morass of competing Russia-oriented energy projects. In contrast, support for Poland's nuclear program matches up well with our broader commercial interests, climate/energy security agenda, and fuel cycle and non-proliferation concerns. It also provides an opening for tangible bilateral cooperation on a genuine priority for PM Tusk. An appropriately high-level invitation from US energy officials to further discuss cooperation would crystallize Poland's still vague request for help and directly respond to one of Poland's top priorities. TULLEY