SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001028

SIPDIS

FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ENRG ECON PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO
WARSAW

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Tulley for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Your visit to Warsaw is an opportunity to reset
relations with Poland, a loyal ally. Poles have long aspired
to building a special relationship with the U.S., on par with
what we have with the UK, but they believe the U.S. has not
always shown the same enthusiasm. To an extent, many Poles
still view the U.S. as a protective, post-Cold War "big
brother." While we may see Poland as a country that has
"graduated" and is ready to stand up on its own, many Poles
are still reluctant to take this step.


2. (C) PM Tusk is ready. He reportedly viewed former Central
European leaders' letter to President Obama as a step
backward. Thus far, however, his efforts to assert Polish
leadership have focused narrowly on the EU, not the
transatlantic relationship. He views our bilateral
partnership almost exclusively in security terms, issues in
which he is not personally interested or engaged. It's worth
the effort to try to bring him around. Tusk will likely be
elected president in 2010, and he will be a force in Polish
politics for the next decade. It's not too late to persuade
Tusk that security cooperation with the U.S. means more than
entanglement in U.S. conflicts, and that strategic
cooperation involves more than security. The Poles can
increasingly help us in the EU -- they share U.S. views and
welcome our input on most, if not all, regional security
issues, and are eager to coordinate with us on a range of
non-security issues, including climate/energy security and
development assistance.

FIRST STEP: CLEAR THE AIR


3. (C) Cooler Polish heads have begun to prevail since the
President's September 17 announcement on European Missile
Defense. Media no longer speculate about an "Obama-Medvedev
Pact" to improve U.S.-Russian relations over Poland's head.
While some still doubt our decision was truly made on the
basis of revised assessments of the Iranian threat, media and
policy makers are beginning to evaluate the new system on its
merits and potential to increase Polish security.


4. (C) A clear public message that Poland has the right of
first refusal on hosting SM-3 missiles -- and that Russia
will not have a veto over where and how system components are
deployed -- will help to ease Polish skepticism about U.S.
intentions. A similarly frank message that the U.S. intends
to move forward with commitments outlined in the August 2008
Declaration on Strategic Cooperation -- including the coveted
rotation of fully operational Patriot missiles -- will clear
the air and lay the groundwork for constructive discussions
on how we can improve strategic cooperation in other areas.
A brief discussion of our assessment of the Iranian nuclear
and missile programs -- which most Poles do not perceive as
threats -- would give Kaczynski and Tusk a better
understanding of our MD strategy and greater confidence in
trying to persuade the Polish public of the threat from Iran.



5. (C) While Tusk is unlikely to raise Poland's exclusion
from the Visa Waiver Program, Kaczynski might. If he
doesn't, the press will. It would be helpful to make a frank
statement that the Administration supports Poland's inclusion
in the Program and that we will continue efforts already
underway to help Poland meet the legislation's criteria.

RUSSIA / EASTERN EUROPE


6. (C) PM Tusk has tamped down the Russophobic rhetoric of
his populist predecessor and -- in much the same way we have
-- has focused on dialogue and pragmatic cooperation. Both
he and Kaczynski will be interested in an update on our
efforts to reset relations with Russia. Both will also want
to get a sense of U.S. priorities in Eastern Europe and the
Caucasus. Poles believe Ukraine holds the key to European
security. They are interested in stepping up U.S.-Polish
cooperation to promote stability in Ukraine and Georgia, and
would like the U.S. to coordinate with EU programs -- like
the Eastern Partnership -- designed to draw countries in the
region closer to Western institutions.

AFGHANISTAN


7. (C) Kaczynski and Tusk will also be eager to hear your
views on Afghanistan. Polish public opposition to
participation in ISAF is widespread but shallow, and the
government's commitment remains steady. Tusk and members of
his Cabinet have clearly stated that Polish troops will leave

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Afghanistan with NATO, not before. Poland currently has
2,000 soldiers in Afghanistan and last year assumed sole
military responsibility for Ghazni province. Tusk has
resisted Kaczynski's push for more troops, stating Poland
will focus instead on providing additional equipment and
increasing assistance for civilian reconstruction. Poland
has also vigorously pressed fellow EU member states to step
up support for police training missions and civil
reconstruction. The Poles are eager for our help in
developing strategies for civil reconstruction in Ghazni, as
well as bolstering domestic public support here in Poland.

CLIMATE CHANGE / ENERGY SECURITY


8. (C) Unlike many of its neighbors, Poland's reliance on
domestic coal for electricity lessens its dependence on
Russian energy. At the same time, this puts Poland at odds
with EU and global emissions caps, which favor imported
(Russian) gas and other alternatives to coal. Poles are not
deeply concerned with climate change, and are just now
grappling with how they will manage their international
obligations to reduce carbon emissions. They would like to
cooperate with the U.S. on developing clean coal, nuclear
power, and renewables. Poland could be a potential ally in
pushing the EU to take a balanced approach on emissions
reductions and developing a more coherent EU energy security
policy, including energy solidarity and Caspian outreach.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION


9. (C) Tusk remains disappointed that Poland has not been
invited to participate in the various G-20 summits and major
economies meetings. He may argue that a Central European
voice (Poland's being the most largest and most stable) is
needed at the table. Poland's economy has continued to grow
despite the global economic crisis thanks to a combination of
prudent fiscal policy, conservative banks and regulators,
immature debt markets, and lucky timing. Relatively strong
Polish consumption, a weaker currency, and influx of EU funds
have cushioned the blow from declining investments and
exports. Rising deficits related to the crisis, while still
modest by current EU standards, are beginning to raise
concern locally and among analysts. Poland has, along with
the U.S., advocated within the EU and international financial
institutions for a strong regional approach to the crisis and
has been particularly supportive of Ukraine and Baltic
states.

PRIVATE PROPERTY RESTITUTION


10. (C) While now may not seem the right time to put yet
another sensitive issue on the table, not doing so would send
the wrong message. Poles have not hesitated to be honest
when they are disappointed; neither should we. Poland is one
of the only countries in Central Europe that has not made
legislative provisions for an expedited, administrative
(rather than judicial) mechanism for resolving private
property restitution claims. The Government has completed
draft legislation, but refuses to submit it to parliament in
the midst of an economic crisis, even though claims will be
paid out over 15 years -- most after the economic crisis has
passed. A quiet reminder might help generate forward
momentum.

TULLEY