FRAUD SUMMARY - VLADIVOSTOK

UNCLAS VLADIVOSTOK 000099 DEPT FOR CA/FPP MOSCOW FOR CONSULAR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGER MOSCOW FOR CONSUL GENERAL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS SPAS CMGT ASEC RS SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - VLADIVOSTOK ¶1. Local Conditions: Though Primorye's government reported six percent growth in the gross regional product in 2008, the economic situation in the past few months is showing signs of trouble. The first sector to feel the economic crisis in Primorye was the mining and extracting industry. In late 2008 the industry began suffering from falling world prices for lead, zinc, and tungsten. Several mining facilities in the Russian Far East have suspended production and by January 2009, the timber sector also began to suffer. Unemployment is rising faster than originally predicted by the government, and with it criminality has risen as well. In addition to the general economic downturn, local businesses have suffered as a result of increased tariffs on timber exports, an increase in import fees on vehicles, and a recent prohibition on exporting scrap metal from ports in Primorye, affecting import-export businesses. Russian officials hoped that infrastructure projects being constructed for the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok would provide a boost in employment opportunities, but many of the construction jobs have gone to workers from China, Vietnam, and other regions within Russia. In addition, the number of planned projects has been dramatically decreased and federal funding for the projects remains a moving target. The Russian Pacific Fleet also announced plans to shed 5,000 officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers. Unemployment figures are dubious, however, as regional officials have reportedly been instructed to underreport unemployment. ¶2. Population continues to decline in the Russian Far East. The national resettlement program launched in 2006 and designed to attract newcomers to the RFE has been deemed a failure by GOR officials. Medvedev has asked Yedinaya Rossiya leaders to find new ways to encourage people to move to the RFE. The population of the region has declined since 1991 by 19.5% to 6.5 million. Recent polls have shown that approximately 70 percent of Russian Far East residents indicated a willingness to leave the area if better employment were available. ¶3. Despite these considerations, nonimmigrant visa fraud is generally low, due in part to the expense involved in traveling from the Russian Far East to the United States, and the fact that fraud schemes are likely to be caught relatively quickly here because of the relatively low visa load. Post has anticipated an increase in underemployed and/or unemployed applicants seeking NIVs; however, few have been seen and the refusal rate remains low. ¶4. NIV fraud: The most common type of B1/B2 fraud involves fraudulent documents; however, these documents are usually of low quality and an applicant's documents will often contain conflicting information. Over 40% of Vladivostok's NIVs are C1/Ds. Post finds very little C1/D fraud. The FSNs are familiar with the local ship companies and crewing agencies. Applicants for C1/D visas from unknown entities are closely scrutinized. Further, many of Vladivostok's C1/D applicants have previously held U.S. visas. ¶5. Vladivostok sees relatively few applications for L visas; however, 2 recent applications for transfers to newly established offices in the U.S. were the subjects of revocation memos. One applicant claimed to have worked for three years in an executive position for a Thai business that, according to the fraud officer in Bangkok, appears not to be operating. The other applicant operates a successful business here in Russia, but the U.S. office seems to be bogus. Both applicants appeared to be applying for L visas so that their children could study in the U.S. and/or so that their spouses could also live in the U.S. for unrelated purposes. ¶6. IV fraud: IVs are not processed in Vladivostok. ¶7. DV fraud: DVs are not processed in Vladivostok. ¶8. ACS and U.S. passport fraud: No ACS or U.S. Passport fraud has been detected. ¶9. Adoption fraud: Vladivostok pre-processes adoption cases for final adjudication in Moscow. No fraud has been detected. ¶10. Use of DNA testing: DNA testing has not been used during the previous six months. ¶11. Asylum and other DHS benefit fraud: None. ¶12. Alien smuggling, trafficking, organized crime, terrorist travel: Compared to previous years, there has been a decrease in the number of applicants that can clearly be identified as being associated with organized crime. Nevertheless, we occasionally see visa applicants who have been previously entered into Class as 3A2. ¶13. DS criminal fraud investigations: Vladivostok occasionally assists with DS investigations by providing relevant information from Vladivostok fraud files to DS in Moscow. ¶14. Host country passport, identity documents, and civil registry: Russian identity documents and records are generally considered to be reliable. ¶15. Cooperation with host government authorities: Vladivostok enjoys a good working relationship with local law enforcement authorities, including the militia and prosecutor's office. Requests for information regarding applicants suspected of criminal activity are usually promptly responded to. ¶16. Areas of particular concern: None at this time. ¶17. Staffing and training: Vladivostok has a single consular officer and four FSNs, all of whom work with the processing of visas and assist in fraud prevention by watching for suspicious applications and supporting documents. Note: The Consulate, with Embassy Moscow support, is seeking an additional American rotational position for the Consular and Political sections. The FSN primarily responsible for fraud prevention received anti-fraud training at FSI in 2004. The consular officer has participated in the Fraud Prevention Management, Advanced Namecheck, and Analytic Interviewing courses at FSI. ARMBRUSTER