C-WP8-01022, INFORMATION ON SECURITY OF LITHUANIAN

S E C R E T VILNIUS 000055 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 TAGS: KNNP PINR MNUC PARM LH SUBJECT: C-WP8-01022, INFORMATION ON SECURITY OF LITHUANIAN NUCLEAR MATERIALS REF: 08 STATE 135193 Classified By: Ambassador Cloud for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Begin summary. Embassy Vilnius's responses below are keyed to questions in reftel. Questions are repeated below for ease of reading. POC is Economic Officer Daniel Gage, gagedlATstate.sgov.gov, for questions related to the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) and Pol/Mil Officer Michelle Hoyt, hoytmlATstate.sgov.gov, for questions related to Second Line of Defense (SLD). End summary. ¶2. (S) What specific security measures are in place at nuclear facilities? Are private guards, police officers, or military personnel used to guard facilities? What type of cooperation agreements, if any, exist between facility guards and local authorities? Are facility guards armed? If so, what kind of weapons do guards typically carry? Post has visited the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP),a Soviet-era RBMK style plant on several occasions in the past two years. At the entrance to the plant, security measures include metal detectors, id verification and guards with side arms controlling access. Within the plant, there are nuclear material detectors. During a 2007 tour as well as in a December 2008 conversation with Gytis Maksimovas, the head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI),we were told that there are anti-aircraft measures in place to protect the INPP from a plane entering its airspace without authorization. ¶3. (S) Are there specific regulations governing the transport of nuclear materials? Do the responsible authorities typically follow these regulations in transporting nuclear materials? All waste generated by the INPP is stored on-site at the plant in a secured, monitored location with fences and surveillance cameras. We visited the site in July 2007. The waste site uses dry casks made of steel and concrete manufactured by Skoda. A new fuel storage site is planned for the INPP as well. ¶4. (S) What plans or procedures has the national level government prepared for responding to the theft of nuclear material? What plans or procedures have been prepared for attacks on nuclear facilities? VATESI, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security Agency (VSD) and internal INPP security oversee the physical security of the plant and the nuclear materials stored therein. VATESI also conducts inspections of the internal security of the plant. The Ministry of the Interior has a special unit dedicated to the security of the plant and Lithuanian Air Force personnel are stationed nearby equipped with anti-aircraft measures. Lithuania has been a member of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program since 2002. Working with the Border Guard Service, SLD installed radiation detection equipment at the Vilnius airport in 2002 and then later at the newly built Vilnius airport terminal in 2007. SLD also replaced gamma only equipment with dual channel (neutron and gamma detectors) at five border crossings with Russia and Belarus in 2007-08. ¶5. (S) How has the addition of the EU-10 affected EURATOM's budget and number of inspectors? How has it affected the EURATOM 's and IAEA's workload with respect to safeguards inspections? Maksimovas told us that there have been no changes in regards to IAEA safety inspections with the addition of the EU-10. IAEA and EURATOM do joint inspections. Lithuania is a part of the integrated safeguards regime meaning the INPP does fewer inspections than before Lithuania joined the regime but its inspections can be unannounced except for annual inventory inspections. Maksimovas said IAEA and EURATOM do conduct unannounced inspections and monitor transfers of materials to fuel storage. ¶6. (S) Do EURATOM inspectors have the necessary resources to carry out inspections? Have there been any changes in inspection procedures, or in the number of inspections carried out annually? Maksimovas said that he hadn't seen any radical changes in the quality of EURATOM inspections. ¶7. (S) What has the reaction been among European Union member states to having inspections performed by both IAEA and EURATOM? Maksimovas mentioned no concerns or objections. When Lithuania's trilateral safeguard agreement (between the GOL, EURATOM and IAEA) entered into force on January 1, 2008 reporting changed slightly, mostly affecting format, procedure and the order of reporting. Final information is always sent to the IAEA and includes discussion of classical safeguards and additional reporting on the nuclear fuel cycle. ¶8. (S) How has joining the European Union affected new member states' bilateral IAEA safeguards agreements? Maksimovas said joining the EU did not affect Lithuania's bilateral relations with the IAEA, and they still conduct national and regional level projects, more than a dozen in Maksimovas's estimation. CLOUD