BELARUS: A DULL GLOW AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VILNIUS 000155 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY MINSK SENDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2029 TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON PINR BO RS GG SUBJECT: BELARUS: A DULL GLOW AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? REF: 08 MINSK 265 Classified By: Jonathan Moore, Charge, Embassy Minsk, for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Charge met with Belarusian Presidential Administration Head Makey March 20. Makey pledged that "positive steps" would continue, expressed interest in dialogue with the U.S., showed perceptive understanding of both USG and EU approaches to Belarus, stressed that Belarus was under intense economic pressure from Russia to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and -- indirectly -- provided some insight into disputes of ideology and personality in the Presidential Administration. Stressing that it was not a guarantee, Makey also provided his personal view that an AMCIT in GOB custody since March 2008 would be released in "1-2 months." Meanwhile, there is some evidence of growing rivalries with the Presidential Administration. End summary. Bilateral Topics -------------- ¶2. (C) Having met collectively with EU heads of mission earlier March 20, Belarusian Presidential Amdministration (PA) Head Vladimir Makey began the one-on-one meeting by saying that he understood that both the USG and EU were following the human rights situation closely. He admitted that there are serious concerns, and had been some mistakes, but affirmed that "we have made positive steps" and said that more such steps are to follow. He expressed a preference for not discussing specific cases, and moved on to apologize that it had not been possible for PA First Deputy Head Nataliya Petkevich and Foreign Policy Advisor Valentin Rybakov to meet with EUR A/S Dan Fried March 11 in Washington. Makey cited scheduling difficulties that prevented Rybakov from being available to accompany Petkevich. Charge expressed the interest of the USG in placing such a meeting back on the agenda, and having a concrete, results-oriented dialogue. Makey was noncommittal; he did note that he hopes the GOB and USG can make progress prior to Charge's departure from Minsk in July. ¶3. (C) Makey thanked Charge for the USG's 90-day extension of the suspension of economic sanctions against Belarusian companies Polotsk Steklovolokhno and Lakokraska up to June 1. He said that the GOB would be responding positively, and that Charge would be briefed by the MFA on the relevant GOB step with reference to the U.S. Embassy's diplomatic staffing. (Comment: The GOB forced the departure of all but the last five U.S. diplomats from Minsk in March-May 2008, and has shown no indication since that the restriction would be lifted. End comment.) Charge confirmed that positive steps by the GOB on human rights would be reviewed favorably, but indicated to Makey that the USG position with reference to diplomatic staffing had not changed: it should not in any way be tied to sanctions. (In the end, however, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Oleynik -- carrying out the classic Belarusian MFA role of messenger, and nothing more -- met with Charge March 23 to convey the "good news" that the Embassy would be allowed to increase its staffing level by two/two persons on a temporary basis up to June 1. Charge pledged to inform Washington of the development, told Oleynik that there should be no connection between diplomatic staffing and sanctions, and suggested that the issue not be made public at this time; Oleynik agreed.) AMCIT's Humanitarian Release -------------- ¶4. (S) Given Makey's stated interest in progress, Charge pressed him on the need for the immediate release on humanitarian grounds of an AMCIT in GOB custody, who has served 12 months of a 38-month sentence ostensibly for "economic espionage" and is dying of diabetes and heart disease. Pointing out that the case is receiving high-level USG attention and that progress in U.S.-Belarusian bilateral relations will be extremely unlikely in the absence of the AMCIT's release, Charge asked Makey when the release would happen. Makey confirmed previous assertions that the AMCIT in question would be released, but then was very careful to say that he could make no guarantees about the release date: he said that appropriate GOB authorities were working on the case. Charge underlined that the decision rests with the Belarusian President and that others do not need to be involved. Makey reluctantly agreed, and said that he hoped release would be possible in one or two months. VILNIUS 00000155 002 OF 003 Belarus, EU, and the Eastern Partnership -------------- ¶5. (C) Makey raised the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative and the possible EaP summit in Prague May 7. He was very sanguine on this topic: Belarus wants fair and equal treatment, and equal status in the EaP -- "it must be 27 plus six, not 27 plus five plus one" -- but is not particularly concerned about who gets invited to the summit or even if there is one. Russia/Georgia: Currency Swap, Pressure to Recognize -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Makey's energies were at their lowest point when he raised the issue of bilateral relations with Russia and Belarus' profound dependence on its largest neighbor: "We don't see a way out." Beyond almost-complete reliance on Russian energy, Belarus' need for Russian credit and/or access to Russian markets is driving the GOB's current view, he said. Makey reported that Russian President Medvedev, in discussions with his Belarusian counterpart, has shown willingness to support a USD 3 billion currency swap (rather than a further cash credit). According to Makey, Moscow has said that Belarusian recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is an obligatory element of the currency swap. (Comment: Lukashenka's current trip to Sochi, which has included a meeting with Abkhaz "President" Bagapsh, is further evidence of GOB efforts to placate Moscow on this topic. End comment.) ¶7. (C) Makey said that Belarus would regret the resultant breaking of ties with Tbilisi, with which Minsk has previously maintained cordial relations as well as openness for Georgian trade and investment. Charge pointed out that the USG supported Belarus' sovereignty, and strongly opposed any steps to recognize sovereign Georgian territory as independent. Makey acknowledged that, but seemed resigned to recognition as unavoidable; he added that "senior Europeans" had told Lukashenka to avoid recognition as long as possible but did not seem inclined to punish Belarus if it moved in that direction. ¶8. (S) Lithuanian Ambassador to Belarus Edminas Bagdonas (protect) noted to Charge March 23 that Makey had told EU heads of mission March 20 that the only way out from Russian pressure would be for the EU to give Belarus 2-3 billion Euros; Makey did not make any request for similar loans or credits in his meeting with Charge. Atmospherics and Intrigues -------------- ¶9. (C) Makey was animated, thoughtful, and pleasant throughout the one-on-one meeting, which lasted over one hour. He began by apologizing for a scheduling mistake; the MFA had informed Charge that the Makey meeting would be March 19, but Charge was told upon arrival at the Presidential Administration March 19 that the meeting would be the following day. ¶10. (S) On a different level, there was a distinct change in the way that Makey referred to PA colleagues Petkevich and Rybakov from Charge's previous meeting (reftel). Makey had previously suggested that Charge maintain close contacts with Rybakov. However, after learning that information provided by the Charge to Rybakov had not been passed along to him, Makey insisted that Charge take direct contact information for his office and be in touch more often. Also, Makey's lack of enthusiasm for a new Petkevich trip to the U.S. was palpable. Comment -------------- ¶11. (S) Having Makey as a ready, accessible interlocutor is a good thing, as will be any forthcoming proof that the same regime which has rearrested former political prisoners and forcibly conscripted young opposition activists is actually becoming more benign. The gesture of allowing the Embassy in Minsk to have two more staff on a TDY basis is of course laughable: while it does show a certain desire to reach out to the USG, it does confirm that true progress on staffing will take more time. Separately, the possibility of different factions within the Presidential Administratoin is an interesting one. Some ambassadors, including the Palestinian Dean, are convinced that Petkevich and Rybakov are up to no good. Other recent sources, such as "Sovetskaya Belarus" editor-in-chief Pavel Yakubovich, have suggested VILNIUS 00000155 003 OF 003 privately to Charge that Makey is a reformer and Petkevich is not. ¶12. (S) Post tends to believe that while it must be inordinately difficult to be a senior staff member for a vitriolic and unpredictable boss like Lukashenka, it is highly unlikely that Belarus' strongman would foster two active schools of thought in a single institution, and much more likely that the differences are in ego and ambition rather than strategy. In any case, however, it is important that the GOB is not shutting out the U.S. and in its own curious way is actually trying to make some progress. Upcoming events, such as public demonstrations March 25 (which the Embassy and EU colleagues will monitor) and/or recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, will show whether the regime is on a better track and worthy of direct dialogue. If and when the USG is ready to expand that dialogue with Belarus, it is post's recommendation that we focus more on Presidential Administration Head Makey. CLOUD