AUSTRIA'S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000437 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/A (REOTT) AND EUR/RPM (COPE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019 TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIA'S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO AFGHANISTAN REF: A. STATE 31102 ¶B. VIENNA 383 ¶C. VIENNA 359 ¶D. VIENNA 306 ¶E. 08 VIENNA 1893 Classified by: CDA Scott F. Kilner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Polchief discussed Ref A request on April 6 with Bruno Bilek, MFA Acting Director for East Asia and the Pacific (which includes Afghanistan under the MFA's schema). Bilek noted that, as reported reftels B-D, the GOA is considering providing training for Afghan police and judges outside of Afghanistan and, possibly, agricultural training, which could include alternative crop cultivation for poppy growers and/or arid zone forestry. He said police training was by far the most developed concept. The GOA would like to link its training in some way to the EUPOL mission, although, unlike EUPOL, the Austrian training program would operate outside of Afghanistan. GOA officials have had only general discussions about judicial and agricultural training. ¶2. (C) Bilek averred that the Austrian press and public views Afghanistan as a "deadly quagmire," and strongly opposes Austrian involvement. GOA leaders insist therefore that any Austrian contribution be as low profile as possible. Austria could become a target for a terrorist attack if it sent police trainers into Afghanistan, according to Bilek. Moreover, given public concerns about rising crime in Austria, the government would face harsh criticism from the press and opposition parties if it transferred experienced police officers to Afghanistan, he said. Bilek said he could not rule out the possibility that Austria might, in the future, provide some of the support listed reftel (special operations forces, a non-combat OMLT, funding for the Afghan National Army). But this could only happen if the security situation in Afghanistan improved dramatically, altering the image of the mission in Austria, he said. Comment: A Cautious, Selective Partner -------------- ¶3. (C) The GOA is reflexively cautious and selective in the extreme about where and when to join peacekeeping missions outside of what it considers its "backyard," the Balkans. It generally limits deployments to low-risk, non-combat missions under a UN or EU mandate, such as the current Chad operation. Nothing short of a lobbying effort by the top levels of the USG would have a chance of persuading the GOA to provide the kinds of support listed in reftel A, and even that might not do the trick. KILNER