ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY IN AUSTRIA -- REACHING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000379 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2014 TAGS: SENV PREL KGHG OPRC EUN AU SUBJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY IN AUSTRIA -- REACHING BEYOND G-7 AND MEM REF: VIENNA 54 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott Kilner. Reason: 1.4(b) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. policy on climate change and the environment are a key yardstick Austrians use to judge USG credibility as a global actor. Austria is also fertile ground for climate diplomacy, as an environmentally conscious but growth-minded country that has fallen woefully short of its Kyoto goals and where many (privately) admit the bankruptcy of Kyoto-style grandstanding. ¶2. (C) Post hopes to gain maximum effect from the wave of goodwill towards the new U.S. Administration -- and avoid disappointments if USG and European negotiating positions diverge in the lead-up to Copenhagen. Our central concern is to "get the word out" beyond the more limited channels of G-7 and Major Economies processes. Practical ways to advance our climate agenda include more direct contact with climate/environmental negotiators, early and detailed briefings on U.S. positions, and enhanced reporting on negotiation outcomes. These would help us engage local opinion-leaders (government, media, NGO's) in the way we already engage stakeholders on trade policy. Austrians (and perhaps other like-minded Europeans) want to believe in a "new" USG commitment to fight climate change -- and could become our allies on key issues. END SUMMARY. Engaging the "Rest" of Europe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) As the world's 25th largest economy, Austria does not participate in the G-7 or Major Economies processes which have served as the principal platforms for U.S. climate outreach in recent years. Climate diplomacy has thus largely been an Embassy responsibility. Since the lead-up to the December 2007 Bali UNFCCC Conference, Embassy Vienna has ramped up its environmental outreach to engage policy-makers and other stakeholders, including skeptical NGOs such as Greenpeace and Global 2000. After initial misgivings, key groups acknowledged that the USG was becoming more active and effective, expressing interest in continued dialogue. Our challenge has been to maintain that dialogue, providing Austrian stakeholders with an alternative to the perspective they naturally receive from interlocutors in other EU member states. ¶4. (C) Despite its small size, Austria could become a pragmatic partner on many climate issues. The Austrian economy has outperformed its western neighbors for the past decade, and Austrians like to think of themselves as more growth-minded than most of western Europe ("the better Germany" as a GoA finance minister termed it). As leading investors in eastern Europe, Austrian companies (and their political patrons) have become more flexible and expeditionary since 1989 -- even willing to buck some prevailing trends among other western European countries. For instance, Austrian and German leadership worked successfully to resist stringent new CO2 emission standards for cars; the GoA also fought a single-handed (if ultimately losing) battle against an EU mandate requiring it to boost its renewable share of the energy mix from 25% today to 34% by 2020. ¶5. (C) Austria's relatively strong growth has also led it to fail miserably in meeting its own Kyoto Protocol obligations -- and made it more careful about taking on unrealistic new obligations. After a decade of grandstanding, the Austrian body politic - including the ruling Grand Coalition parties -- now leans towards the pragmatic on this issue. Practical Steps - - - - - - - - ¶6. (U) GUIDANCE: One key to successful climate diplomacy in Austria is receiving detailed guidance on U.S. policy far enough in advance of international meetings (such as the UNFCCC) to intervene effectively. Like other EU member states, the GoA fields its national position within an EU caucus prior to multilateral negotiations. To influence GoA positions, Post needs to present U.S. views to the GoA (and Austrian NGOs) in advance of EU- internal negotiations. Demarches delivered after the EU has fixed its position have little impact. Detail is also helpful for the GoA to understand how USG issues might fit into EU horse-trading. Post would also welcome more publicly usable detailed guidance (e.g., fact sheets, position papers, etc.) so that we can regularly VIENNA 00000379 002 OF 002 share these with media and other opinion leaders. ¶7. (C) PRESENCE: U.S. policy would be well served by more face-to-face discussions between Austrian and USG officials and technical experts working on climate change, either via DVC or as part of regional trips to European capitals. We recall that, in the case of missile defense (a highly controversial topic in Europe initially),a robust U.S. program of official briefings overseas help to defuse a potentially divisive debate in Austria. Our Public Affairs section recruits a variety of speakers on environment/energy, but in the end, only informed USG voices can credibly convey that the U.S. environmental commitment starts at the top (rather than being just a civil society movement in America, as many Europeans imagine). In this connection, Embassy Vienna sees high potential for tie-ins to the considerable multilateral presence in Vienna, such as senior USG visitors to the International Atomic Energy Agency. ¶8. (U) AFTER-ACTION: Outreach after multilateral meetings on climate change (like the December 2007 Bali conference) is another critical opportunity to exert influence. To that end, Post encourages timely front- channel or email readouts after UNFCCC and other important environmental meetings. COMMENT - - - - ¶9. (C) In Austria, the time is clearly opportune for climate outreach. Austrians are starting to move beyond rhetorical activism, where process and politics matter more than results, and are increasingly ready to embrace the new U.S. Administration as a partner. We believe a strong diplomatic and public outreach program, engaging Vienna and a number of other European capitals, can quickly and decisively move the issue "beyond Kyoto" and strengthen the pragmatists who are our natural allies. We urge the Department to support this effort with information and resources. KILNER