GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WESTERWELLE MAIDEN VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 001533 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2009 TAGS: PREL EFIN ENRG IR GM AU SUBJECT: GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WESTERWELLE MAIDEN VISIT TO VIENNA: FINANCE, ENERGY, BALKANS, AND IRAN Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The German Embassy describes FonMin Westerwelle's Nov. 25 maiden visit to Austria as partly designed to strengthen the new Minster's standing and image vis-a-vis Chancellor Merkel and as part of a larger Westerwelle effort to improve Germany's standing with smaller EU member states. His discussions with Austrian Foreign Minister Spindelegger focused on energy (a mutual update),the Western Balkans (where Germany is reluctant to embrace Austria's 5-7 year timeframe for EU membership for much of the former Yugoslavia),the SWIFT negotiations (where the two sides saw eye-to-eye),and Iran (where Germany is for the moment satisfied with Austria's position). End Summary. Domestic and International Background to the Visit -------------- -------------- ¶2. German Embassy DCM Hartmut Krausser put FonMin Westerwelle's visit in two contexts. He explained first that the FDP and its leader were attempting to improve their positions in the German government vis--vis the more experienced CDU/CSU. Particularly because Merkel's international experience was so much more extensive than his own, Westerwelle saw a need to move quickly to burnish his own credentials by extensive early travel. Krausser also said that the FDP perceives a need to improve relations with the smaller EU member states. He cited several incidents in which Germany was seen as having slighted these states, and noted that Austria was particularly unhappy with German pressure on bank secrecy and other financial matters. Energy -------------- ¶3. (C) The discussion of energy largely focused on the two countries' efforts to diversify energy sources and delivery routes to Europe. The Austrians, Krausser said, indicated their skepticism about Russia's South Stream project, with Spindelegger saying it would move ahead at a pace commensurate with its commercial viability, although also acknowledging Russian pressure to conclude an early inter-governmental agreement. Western Balkans -------------- ¶4. (C) The Germans and Austrians differ, Krausser said, on the emphasis that should be given to Serb, Bosnian, and Montenegrin accession to the EU. The Austrians would like a 5-7 year perspective for accession. The Germans, however, believe that their population is tired of EU-related political drama and needs a break. They also doubt the ability of thse countries to adopt and implement the acquis in a few years and do not want more Bulgarias or Rumanias in the EU. SWIFT -------------- ¶5. (C) The two sides saw eye-to-eye on the data protection weaknesses of the agreement, and agreed on the idea of a limited extension. Econ/Pol Counselor noted U.S. concerns that, in light of EU studies concluding that U.S. and European data protection was equivalent, much of the opposition to SWIFT and other data exchange agreements was based on misinformation or political motives. Iran -------------- ¶6. (C) The Germans are satisfied for now with Austria's position -- that it will support the negotiation of meaningful sanctions in the UNSC. They recognize, however, that if sanctions outside the UN framework should prove necessary, Austria will be at best a reluctant partner, EACHO