AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN DOLDRUMS, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001058 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2024 TAGS: PREL AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN DOLDRUMS, BUT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTNERSHIP EXIST Classified By: Econ/Pol Counselor Dean Yap. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) For many reasons, the present Austrian Government has largely ignored foreign policy since its formation in December 2008. Some of the reasons -- economic crisis, budget cuts, lack of ministerial interest -- are specific to the new government. Others, however -- lack of a long-term goal, popular isolationism -- are deeply rooted. Though Austria has the potential to be a significant U.S. partner in southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region, overcoming both the immediate and the deeply-rooted causes of Austria's foreign policy doldrums will require significant U.S. effort, coordinated with major European partners. A Lack of Leadership -------------- ¶2. (C) The Grand Coalition government re-installed in Austria in Dec. 2008 brought a series of new faces into foreign policy leadership positions. However, neither Chancellor Faymann (SPO) nor Foreign Minister Spindelegger (OVP) had significant foreign policy experience. Since then, it has become clear that Faymann has no personal interest in foreign affairs -- we have heard this from xxxxxxxxxxxx as well as senior staff in the President's Office and Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Spindelegger, while widely credited with good intentions, is seen as uncertain in which direction he would like to lead the Ministry. xxxxxxxxxxxx has told us he believes Spindelegger will use the annual meeting of Austrian Ambassadors in September to set forth a clear vision for Austrian diplomacy. However, xxxxxxxxxxxx fears he doesn't have the combination of vision and focus needed to maximize Austria's limited resources. The third potential ministerial-level player in foreign policy, holdover Defense Minister Darabos, is also seen as uninterested in foreign and international security affairs and is openly hostile to deploying Austrian troops on dangerous missions abroad (e.g., to Afghanistan). Other ministries, for example Interior and Justice, when approached about support for international programs (e.g., police or judicial training in Afghanistan, have rejected the idea out of hand because of a combination of budgetary constraints, rising domestic needs, and danger). Little Time or Money -------------- ¶3. (C) Compounding the leadership problem, the economic crisis has meant that the political leadership has had little time to devote to foreign policy, unless it has a straightforward domestic political impact (such as maintaining Austria's effective ban on GMO agriculture or EU matters like the proposed common asylum policy). Moreover, the Government has cut foreign affairs related budgets deeply to compensate partially for massive new counter-cyclical spending. The defense, Foreign Ministry, and official development aid budget have all suffered significant cuts. The Chief of Defense has said that Austria cannot sustain its current overseas deployments on the new budget, let alone proceed with plans for force restructuring. The Foreign Ministry has closed several posts, reduced its travel budget by one third, and cut administrative budgets. Aid programs have not been cut outright, but because of the elimination of debt forgiveness spending, ODA is expected to fall from nearly 0.5% of GNI to 0.37% or less over two years. Deep-Seated Problems -------------- ¶4. (C) Austrians would likely remain ambivalent about foreign policy engagement even if the immediate problems noted above were resolved. Since the end of the Cold War in 1990/91 and joining the EU in 1995, political scientists like the SPO-affiliated Renner Institute's Erich Froeschl say Austria has had no central foreign policy objective. The population perceives no external threats and its international status is secure. Indeed, confronted with policies from Brussels that appear to threaten local interests (such as Austria's ban on GMO cultivation) and the perceived cultural threat and rise in crime related to immigration from other EU members and Turkey, many interlocutors say Austria has become more isolationist since 1995. The rise of right-wing populist parties since the mid-1990s can be seen as confirming this analysis. Austria's largest and most influential newspaper, the "Kronen Zeitung" (with a daily readership between one-third and half the population) regularly and polemically advocates isolationist, anti-EU, and anti-U.S. positions as well. It has, however, been moderate to positive toward Vienna 00001058 002.2 of 003 President Obama and some Krone columnists welcomed his Cairo and Accra speeches. ¶5. (C) The evolution of Austrians' understanding of their country's neutrality has reinforced isolationist sentiment. Imposed as a condition for the recovery of sovereignty in 1955, in the 1960s neutrality began to be seen as a virtue that enabled Austria to do things which members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact could not -- to include profiting nicely as host to numerous international organizations or playing a mediating role in the Middle East. At the end of the Cold War, efforts by conservatives to promote NATO membership could not overcome public attachment to "perpetual neutrality" and since then any questioning of neutrality has been near-taboo. However, the concept has also evolved further and is seized upon by opponents of any overseas engagement. Once invoked, further debate becomes almost impossible. Thus, even though the NATO deployment in Afghanistan comes under a UN mandate and even though Austria previously contributed troops there, opponents gain traction by arguing that Austrian participation (beyond a few staff officers in ISAF HQ) would be a violation of neutrality. The same argument was used against deploying troops to Chad for the purely humanitarian purpose of protecting refugee camps on the border with Sudan. Attitude Toward the U.S. -------------- ¶6. (C) Many contacts, such as xxxxxxxxxxxx or Albert Rohan, now serving as President of the Austrian-American Society (a post-WWII friendship organization with chapters across Austria),also see both near-term and long-term problems in Austrians' view of the United States. Austrians from post-WWII generations are often skeptical of the benefits of the U.S. as the single superpower; their skepticism is reinforced by rejection of many G.W. Bush Administration policies but it goes farther, reflecting discomfort with U.S. policies in the Mideast and with the U.S. embrace of sanctions and other punitive measures. They also have a sense that U.S. society is not as socially just, democratic, or ruled-by-law as it should be. The election of President Obama has had some impact on these views. However, while the President personally is very popular, we have seen little movement in popular attitudes or government positions on, for example, taking former Guantanamo inmates (there have been hints the government is trying to find a quiet way to change it previous rejection, but the public remains deeply opposed),criminal data sharing agreements with the U.S. to combat terrorism and crime, or support for tougher sanctions on Iran. Our Public Affairs Section is preparing a poll that we expect will shed more light on Austrian attitudes toward the U.S. Austria Can Be a Partner -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite these problems, Austria has the potential to be a significant U.S. partner in several discrete regions. In the Balkans, Austria has shown an ability to project a coordinated, comprehensive strategy that perfectly complements U.S. diplomatic goals in the region. It has deployed hundreds of peacekeepers to Kosovo and Bosnia and is committed to maintaining that presence despite budget cuts. It provides -- bilaterally and through the EU -- significant development assistance and educational and cultural exchanges to the region. Austrian business is, through extensive investment, at the leading edge of integrating the region economically into European and global structures. Austrian diplomats promote the "European vocation" of the region and specific steps to move them toward the EU and the west. Foreign Minister Spindelegger has spoken frequently of Austria's potential role in the Black Sea region and beyond to the Caucasus. Until now, he has seemed to focus largely on providing support for Austrian economic penetration of the region. This, and particularly when energy projects such as the Nabucco pipeline are considered, is of clear benefit to the U.S. Spindelegger has not, however, as yet seemed to have a broader vision for his initiative. ¶8. (C) Austria also has a long record of support for arms control and disarmament efforts and has welcomed President Obama's nuclear arms control initiatives. As a strong supporter of the NPT, host of the IAEA, and a member of the UN Security Council in 2009-10, Austria is well placed to support U.S.-initiatives in this field. As a UNSC member, opportunities for diplomatic support in other fields may appear -- prior to its election to the UNSC, the GoA had signaled an interest in increasing its profile and presence in sub-Saharan Africa. We also see potential for cooperation on environmental policy in the UNFCCC process -- provided we can get detailed, advance information on U.S. positions to Vienna 00001058 003 of 003 allow for meaningfully detailed consultations with the GoA. On the public diplomacy side, the GoA remains committed to the Fulbright program; it is the majority financial contributor. Obstacles on the Road -------------- ¶9. (C) On the downside, Iran will be a bone of contention sometime in coming months. Whethe the issue is Iran,s nuclear weapons program or he Tehran regime,s heavy-handed curbs on democraization, we anticipate a period of difficult conersations regarding the likely need for tougher sancions. Although Austria will probably go along ith an EU consensus regarding Iran, within EU concils Vienna will opt for slower, softer measure. These differences are likely to crop up withi the UNSC as well. Similarly, on international law enforcement, specifics of money-laundering and information exchange measures will come into focus sooner or later and will find entrenched Austrian interests unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. and international bodies (e.g. OECD) to the extent needed for a variety of reasons. The USG will have to press vigorously for more responsible Austrian positions without closing the door to greater cooperation in other, less contentious areas that in time could have a beneficial spillover effect in the overall relationship. Getting To Yes -------------- ¶10. (C) Making the Austrians partners in such specific projects does not mean the USG must overcome all the obstacles outlined in paras 2-6 to a more activist Vienna. However, it does require specific, tailored messages delivered by and to senior levels. It also requires a vigorous public diplomacy program. The Embassy has made public diplomacy our top MSP priority in the last two years. Beyond PA, the Front Office, Econ/Pol, and other sections each devote considerable resources to this effort. We will continue to do so, engaging Austrian society across the board, across the country, and across the generations. The FO will also work to engage the GoA at ministerial level on the entire U.S agenda. To support our local efforts, we also urge senior Department officials responsible for the issues outlined above to engage the Austrian Embassy and, when in Europe, to visit Vienna for consultations. ¶11. (C) The GoA wants contact with the Obama Administration at cabinet level and higher. We are making it clear that such contact requires real U.S.-Austrian partnership. While some U.S. desires are probably unachievable (new military deployments, for example),there is potential for a new partnership that could meet with a favorable response in Vienna and help move Austria toward greater international engagement. Eacho