CALGARY AND VANCOUVER FRAUD SUMMARY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 VANCOUVER 000261 SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/FPP DHS FOR CIS/FDNS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS ASEC KFRD CPAS CMGT CA SUBJECT: CALGARY AND VANCOUVER FRAUD SUMMARY REF: 08 STATE 074840 VANCOUVER 00000261 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. There are no significant fraud incidents to report for this period. Note that this report is on behalf of Calgary and Vancouver. End Summary. ¶2. (U) COUNTRY CONDITIONS. Vancouver and Calgary are low-fraud posts. Malafide travelers find it less difficult to attempt entry across the vast land border than apply for a visa. Vancouver, Canada's third largest city, is one of the most affluent and culturally diverse cities in North America. Recent immigrants from Asian countries including India, China, the Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan have flocked to the city in the past decade. In fact, a third of the city is of Chinese origin and Vancouver International Airport services daily flights from many Asian capitals. Eastern Europeans and Russians have also moved to Vancouver recently in significant numbers. Blaine, Washington, the closest land border, is a mere thirty minutes by car from downtown. ¶3. (U) Recent economic development and population growth have led to a skyrocketing real estate market and major ethnic diversity. The migration from abroad has also brought in criminal elements and Vancouver is becoming home to an increasing number of ethnic gangs. Vancouver has the highest density per square mile in the entire country. Foreign immigration remains the principal growth factor, reflected in the fact that less than half of all residents in the Vancouver area speak English at home. The application process for Canadian documents, including passports and local birth certificates, is fairly well-controlled. Post has not seen cases of fake Canadian permanent resident card, which has similar security features to the U.S. legal permanent resident card. However, local authorities recently acknowledged that counterfeiting is becoming a major problem in the province and post has seen cases of individuals obtaining British Columbia identification cards when they were not entitled to them. ¶4. (U) NIV FRAUD. Vancouver and Calgary detected fraud most notably in the H1B category. ¶5. (U) Although visitor visa (B1/B2) fraud appears less organized and less complicated, there continues to be incidences where applicants try to cover up prior orders of removal or unlawful presence in the U.S. They do so by changing names or other identifying information after leaving the U.S. and entering Canada either as immigrants or asylum claimants. Usually, these applicants have only recently arrived in Canada to seek legal status after residing unlawfully in the U.S. for years. They will also present brand-new passports to hide their previous travel. If IAFIS and IDENT do not catch these applicants, their American regional accent or better-than-average English will reveal that they have been residing in the U.S. for a long time. ¶6. (U) Since Calgary and Vancouver rarely see first-time H1B applicants who are not landed immigrants in Canada, there are usually no concerns about an applicant's skill or experience. That being said, during this reporting period Vancouver witnessed a string of Turkish applicants applying for first-time H1B visas. In most of the cases, their education was from Turkey and the applicants had come to apply in Vancouver directly from the U.S., where they had been most often been studying ESL. While the H1B petitions were for teaching positions at charter schools in the United States, most applicants had no prior teaching experience and the schools were listed as related to Fethullah Gulen. Post was in contact with FPMs in Turkey for guidance in how to proceed with those cases. ¶7. (U) Most H1B fraud in Vancouver occurs when applicants come to renew their H1B visas and the consular officers discover that they are actually doing something other than working for their Petitioner, or they have not been paid what they should and we discover that they are being "benched". Vancouver has seen fewer fraudulent H1B cases in this reporting period. One possible reason for this is that post significantly reduced U.S.-based renewal appointments during the summer because of staffing shortages. Another reason is that Vancouver has been reviewing VANCOUVER 00000261 002.2 OF 004 H1B cases much more closely since last year. By monitoring H1B bulletin boards and chat rooms last year, Vancouver realized that it was being targeted as an "easier" post in which to apply. By requesting additional documentation, such as earnings and leave documents, monthly bank statements, and pay records of applicants that had not earned the correct year-to-date salaries, this belief appears to have been dispelled. ¶8. (U) Calgary has worked aggressively in the last reporting period to identify possible H1-B fraud based on the information that was promulgated by Toronto in 09 Toronto 000193. Using the tools provided, Calgary has looked more effectively at possible "benching" of applicants and has been able to better respond to adverse PIMS reports prepared by Kentucky Consular Center's (KCC) FPU. In these cases we have not developed any clear-cut instances of fraud, but have been able to ask additional questions to resolve inconsistencies and have hopefully avoided visa shopping within the mission and applicants coming to Calgary expecting a less thorough review of the applications. Both Calgary and Vancouver have found the PIMS reports in the new version of NIV very helpful in adjudicating this type of visa. ¶9. (U) Vancouver sees occasional fraud in treaty investor and trader visa categories. Sometimes the fraud involves the concealment of criminal ineligibilities that are usually revealed in secondary inspection at the border when a CBP officer accesses the applicant's Canadian criminal record. Other times, it appears that the applicant is filing for an E visa so that their children can attend school in the U.S. These applicants tend to be recently naturalized Canadian citizens who are looking to start small businesses in the U.S. while their children attend high school or college there. They are generally refused for not meeting the marginality requirement. Post has seen E applicants who were former asylum seekers in the U.S. who buy a small business in the U.S. upon becoming a Canadian citizen after three years of permanent residency in Canada. ¶10. (U) Vancouver continues to monitor international student applicants for possible fraud. Post conducted a validation study in the last year for Mexicans who are on student status in Canada. The results of the study seem to indicate that these students tend to abide by the terms of their B1/B2 visas. ¶11. (U) IV FRAUD. Vancouver does not process immigrant visas but does accept "clearly approvable" I-130 petitions. Post processes K visas for applicants who are resident in the consular district. K-visa applications are generally good with a few immigration-purposes only cases. ¶12. (U) DV FRAUD. Calgary and Vancouver do not process DV visas. ¶13. (U) ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD. As border controls strengthen and visa applicants are more rigorously screened, post believes attempted ACS and passport fraud will increase. One ACS fraud scenario involves the creation of a false identity. Historically, Canada has been a haven to Americans wishing to escape US authorities. Consequently, the ACS Unit encounters several people each year with outstanding warrants in the United States. A new passport requirement for alien residents in Canada means American fugitives, as well as others seeking to cut ties with the U.S., may try to assume false identities and obtains U.S. passports at the Consulate. ¶14. (U) In most of Calgary's ACS fraud cases, they have worked directly with the appropriate domestic FPMs and CA to help resolve questions. In fact, most potential cases have proven to be fairly easily resolved. As an example, Calgary has had several cases where applicants have denied having any previous lost or stolen passports or even any previously issued passports, but name checks revealed these claims to be incorrect. Similarly, many of Calgary's fraud cases dealt with suspicions about possibly questionable birth certificates. In all of these cases, the birth certificates were satisfactorily verified. VANCOUVER 00000261 003.2 OF 004 ¶15. (U) One of the more complicated cases Calgary has been working on involves a potential false claim of paternity that came to light when three children from the same mother and father applied for passports. Although Consular Reports of Birth Abroad had already been issued to all of the children a year earlier, the facial characteristics of the children seemed to point out the father of the first born son might have been different. The father through whom the children derived their citizenship is African-American, and the mother is not. Through coordination with our contacts in the vital records department who issued the original local birth certificate of the first child, we discovered that he was originally registered with a different last name and no father listed, and then nine years later, had the birth certificate changed to list the father and a different last name. The family now all lives in the U.S., and we are working with the Department to determine next steps. 16 (U) Vancouver was contacted last year by an American citizen resident on Vancouver Island who wished to renew her passport from 1999, the first ever issued to her, because she could not find out about what happened to her mail-in renewal in the United States. Post discovered that there is a fraud-hold on her case because the ID and social security number of the applicant is reported as matching a woman who died in the 1970's. In addition, the applicant purporting to be the American citizen helped her daughter to get her first American passport in 2000. Post finally persuaded the applicant to apply in person and had her into the Consulate General this reporting period. The fraud unit, in conjunction with DS and RSO, had the applicant fingerprinted and the results sent the results to DS in the Seattle Passport Agency for processing. Post is waiting to hear results in order to determine if she might have sought refuge in Canada from U.S. law enforcement. ¶17. (U) Lost and stolen passports are numerous. Statistics are difficult to compile, as many lost/stolen passports are either not reported or are returned to authorities other than the Consulate. Post estimates that perhaps 1,000 U.S. passports were lost or stolen during 2006. As full implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) goes into effect in 2009, requiring a passport or other WHTI compliant travel document for entering the United States by land or sea, this number will rise, as more Americans will carry passports. Vancouver has a particular problem regarding stolen passports. In 2006, it had the second-highest property theft rate of any urban area in North America. ¶18. (U) The historically open US-Canadian border often makes documenting physical presence in the United States difficult, if not impossible. Neither side of the border stamps entries in US passports. Proof of physical presence is, of course, required for transmitting citizenship to Canadian-born children. Within the past year, post has detected several individuals fabricating physical presence claims in order to meet the time requirements. Some applicants apply years after being refused an initial time, submitting different data and hoping for a different ruling. For this reason, posts very rarely accept affidavits as proof of physical presence. ¶19. (U) Canadian authorities go to great lengths to conceal adoptions on official records to protect individual privacy. Biological parent information on birth documents is routinely replaced with the details of the adopting parents with no evidence that a change ever took place. This makes concealing adoptions for the purposes of claiming derivative citizenship fairly easy. Post must scrutinize birth documents very carefully and always ask to see the "long" birth form, when available. ¶20. (U) ADOPTION FRAUD. No fraud to report. ¶21. (U) DNA TESTING. No DNA testing this reporting period. VANCOUVER 00000261 004.2 OF 004 ¶22. (U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD. No fraud to report. ¶23. (U) COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRY AUTHORITIES. Post enjoys a good working relationship with authorities from all levels of the host government. They are generally accessible and responsive to consular needs. ¶24. (U) AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. Given Vancouver's proximity to the U.S. border, there are significant concerns that foreign nationals view the region as a transit center for ultimate illegal entry into the United States. Vancouver is concerned about the increase in B1 visa applicants who wish to drive trucks into the U.S. Many of the applicants are Indian and come into Canada on a work permit for another line of work, such as construction, and subsequently take truck driver training classes and get commercial drivers licenses. The majority of truck driver applicants have never worked in this field before, have poor English skills, and provide employment letters that indicate that their jobs are contingent upon receipt of a U.S. visa. Post has become more interested in these cases after hearing about the arrest of an Indian national truck driver (Canadian landed immigrant),Amrit Pal Singh Narwal, at the U.S./Canada border in September 2009 for attempting to enter Canada with 144 kilos of cocaine. Post is now sending such applicants for a subsequent interview with our Fraud Investigator who runs searches on the Canadian trucking companies and contacts employers. By and large the businesses are small and run out homes operating as a dispatch center for a handful of trucks. The business phones are generally cell phones and the owners are sometimes related to the applicants. It is noteworthy to mention that there appears to be a growing friction between Eastern European truck drivers that dominate the Ontario and Eastern Canadian market and the influx of Indian truck drivers who are predominantly in Western Canada. ¶25. (U) Calgary is currently working with the Department on reported incidents of internet scammers who are using apparently photo-shopped American passports as proof of their identity to would-be targets. While these documents do not appear to have been used for travel (and most likely only exist in digital form),they have been sent to people with whom they have developed contacts with over the internet. After building the relationship, the scammer will then ask for money and send the passport image as proof of who they are. In the two most recent cases, it appears that the scammers have used the same background template for the passport, and digitally substituted different pictures and biographic data. Afraid that something might be amiss, the potential victims have sent the passport images to the Consulate for verification. ¶26. (U) Posts routinely refers cases to CBSA whenever applicants reveal information during a visa interview that indicates they committed fraud against Canadian immigration authorities. Similarly, CBSA counterparts refer cases to post whenever they believe the individual has committed fraud against U.S. authorities. ¶27. (U) STAFFING AND TRAINING. Vancouver and Calgary have part-time Fraud Prevention Managers (FPM) who are also NIV line officers. Calgary has a locally engaged staff member who serves as Fraud Prevention Manager Assistant and Vancouver hired a full-time fraud prevention investigator last year. The current investigator started work in Vancouver in February 2009. HILL