GUINEA: UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY DETAILS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000938 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC XY GV SUBJECT: GUINEA: UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY DETAILS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. UN Department of Political Affairs A/SYG Haile Menkerios briefed the Security Council on October 21 on the planned UN commission of inquiry (COI) into the atrocities committed in Guinea since September 28. He explained the expectations for the COI for which there was widespread support, cautioned about the security situation in Guinea, and warned of the "unprofessional" Guinean army. Ambassador DiCarlo supported ECOWAS' and Burkinabe President Compaore's efforts, and all Council members except Russia supported the COI. French Perm Rep Araud said he would circulate a draft Presidential Statement which would, inter alia, support the COI, stress the importance of establishing a new transitional authority, and welcome the statements of the AU, ECOWAS, and the International Contact Group. END SUMMARY. PLANS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ¶2. (SBU) UN Department of Political Affairs A/SYG Menkerios briefed the Security Council on his October 17 - 20 trip to West Africa, including his stops in Abuja, to meet with AU and ECOWAS members at the October 17 summit, Conakry, and Ouagadougou, to meet with Burkinabe President Campaore. He said that both AU Commission Chairman Ping and ECOWAS President Chambas supported the COI, as did junta leader Dadis Camara, and the Guinean prime minister, opposition, and civil society members. ¶3. (SBU) Menkerios expected the mandate for the COI to: (1) establish the facts (but not investigate events prior to September 28); (2) identify the crimes; (3) attribute responsibility; and (4) make accountability recommendations. He said that if Guinea's legal system is deemed insufficient to prosecute alleged perpetrators, a hybrid system might work (potentially including ECOWAS or other legal bodies),but noted an international criminal tribunal would be both time-consuming and difficult to arrange. ¶4. (SBU) Menkerios said the UN Secretariat would start drafting the Terms of Reference for the mandate immediately, and that a full security assessment would need to be conducted before the COI could commence. He expressed concern regarding the level of cooperation Dadis would offer. ¶5. (SBU) Menkerios thought the COI should consist of 3-5 members, including at least one woman and one African, hopefully from West Africa. He solicited candidates for the COI from the Council, as well as from the AU and ECOWAS. He anticipated the COI would take less than a month to complete its work. RUSSIA EXPRESSES CONCERN ¶6. (SBU) Russian PR Churkin expressed concern that the SYG would create a COI without specific Security Council approval. (Note: Churkin was not at the October 14 SYG lunch for Council PermReps, during which there was no opposition to Ban's idea to support an investigation. End Note.) Menkerios, Burkina Faso PR Kafando, and French PR Araud responded to Churkin's concerns by citing the implicit agreement made during the lunch, and Kafando noted that the Guinean opposition "Forces Vives" had requested an international investigation immediately following the September 28 atrocities. SECURITY FOR THE COI AND WITNESSES ¶7. (SBU) Menkerios said he was assured by ECOWAS that it would do "what is necessary" regarding security for the COI. He said that if Guinea's internal security mechanisms were deemed insufficient, ECOWAS would consider deploying security and military observers, along with human rights commissioners and observers. Direct (unspecified) intervention could be required if ECOWAS did not appear able to address the security concerns, Menkerios noted. PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FLOATED BY FRANCE ¶8. (SBU) Araud proposed a Presidential Statement (PRST) which would, inter alia, support the COI, stress the importance of establishing a new transitional authority, and welcome the statements of the AU, ECOWAS, and the International Contact Group. Araud said France expects to circulate a draft to the entire Council soon. Most members supported the idea of a PRST; China did not mention the PRST, while Mexico wanted additional information on the COI before USUN NEW Y 00000938 002 OF 002 offering its support. Churkin said a PRST was premature. U.S. SUPPORTS THE ECOWAS ARMS EMBARGO AND SANCTIONS ¶9. (SBU) Ambassador DiCarlo expressed strong support for the ECOWAS decision to impose an arms embargo on Guinea and to work with the AU on creating targeted sanctions against individuals. DiCarlo supported Burkinabe President Compaore's efforts to urge Dadis and the CNDD to step aside and establish a transitional authority to lead Guinea towards credible elections. All Council members joined her in welcoming Compaore's facilitation and all, except Churkin, expressed support for the COI. OTHER COUNCIL CONCERNS: SCR 1888 AND FUNDING ¶10. (SBU) Austrian PR Mayr-Harting was joined by Croatian PR Vilovic and Ambassador DiCarlo in highlighting the need to look at the implications of SCR 1888 (on women, peace, and security, adopted September 30) for this COI, since many of the atrocities under investigation were committed against women. The UK called for the COI to be funded from either voluntary contributions or existing resources. GUINEA'S ARMY IS A PROBLEM ¶11. (SBU) In conclusion, Menkerios expressed shock at the "unprofessional, disunited" appearance of the Guinean army, which lacked any promotion criteria and even allowed soldiers to return home with their weapons. Menkerios said that Dadis' hope to reform the military without a return to civilian rule would not be possible. Wolff