GEORGIA/RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR'S RICE MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000090 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC GG RS SUBJECT: GEORGIA/RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR'S RICE MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PERMREP CHURKIN REF: USUN 58 Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Russian PermRep Vitaly Churkin met with Ambassador Rice and Ambassador DiCarlo on February 3 to sound out the U.S. position on an extension of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. Churkin said Russia wanted to see a new resolution emphasize the terms of the "Medvedev-Sarkozy" agreement rather than the now-defunct Moscow agreement, in order to reflect what Russia sees as changed circumstances on the ground. Churkin also raised Russia's long-standing desire to have the Abkaz de facto authorities appear in New York, saying it was important to consider the Abkhaz point of view on security arrangements. Ambassador Rice emphasized that the U.S. would oppose Abkhaz appearance in New York under Rule 39. She deflected discussion of an Arria-format meeting, saying that the U.S. wanted to get clarity on the substance of a UN mandate. Rice identified symmetrical security zones in the Abkhazia/Georgia zone of conflict, facilitating IDP and refugee returns, and giving impetus to the Geneva process as important U.S. objectives. Ambassador Churkin did not rule out the possibility of Russian agreement on some form of a security zone. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin met with Ambassador Rice and Ambassador DiCarlo on February 3 to sound out U.S. views on the extension of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Ambassador Rice recalled her previous conversation with Ambassador Churkin (reftel),saying the United States wanted a viable rollover that contributes constructively to the talks taking place in Geneva. The U.S. is not seeking a fight with Russia, she said, and would like to achieve a rollover with minimal anxiety and pain. Rice suggested that she and Churkin focus on substantive aspects of a new resolution rather than procedural questions. One key objective, she said, was getting symmetrical security zones on either side of the conflict line, as had been the case under the Moscow Agreement. She said energizing the Geneva process was also important, and she hoped it would reach some conclusions on future security arrangements that the Security Council could codify in a new resolution. Rice also emphasized the importance of highlighting the need to facilitate IDP and refugee returns. 3.(C) Ambassador Churkin said Russia also wanted to be constructive, and identified three potential outcomes to the negotiations as he saw it: They could fall apart, and we would arrive at nothing; we could get a simple technical rollover as we had done in October, which would add no momentum to the Geneva process and make the Security Council's work more difficult. Russia's preference would be for a third option, a substantive resolution. Churkin believed the "Sarkozy-Medvedev" agreements (of August 12 and September 8, 2008) should serve as the point of departure for such a resolution. ¶4. (C) Referring to security zones as described in the German draft resolution, Churkin emphasized that Georgia had pulled out of the Moscow Agreement, which had been the basis for the former symmetrical security zones. He argued that the "Sarkozy-Medvedev plan", in contrast to the Moscow Agreement, created a security zone "adjacent" to Abkhazia, in Georgia proper. Ambassador DiCarlo pointed out that the U.S. and other members of the Group of Friends have a differing view of the August 12 and September 8 agreements. She added that the presence of UN observers and the symmetry of the zones is important to give confidence to both Abkhaz and Georgians. Rice made clear that getting the security zones as a piece of the puzzle was important to the U.S., and that we could work constructively with Russia to find language to characterize the zones that would be acceptable to all. Churkin clarified that he was "not saying there should be no zone in Abkhazia", but did not suggest that they would be symmetrical. ¶5. (C) Churkin also raised the potential appearance of Abkhaz (de facto) leaders before the Council in New York. Without referring directly to either an Arria-format meeting or a Council invitation under Rule 39, Churkin said it was becoming increasingly difficult to disregard the Abkhaz when discussing security arrangements for Abkhazia. He said he was happy that the Geneva co-chairs had found a solution to allow Abkhaz leaders to participate in working groups there. Referring to the long-standing Russian effort to get Abkhaz participation in a Council meeting, he said he was not "feeling the pressure yet" from the Abkhaz, but "this thing cannot continue indefinitely." He said he thought it unavoidable that we would have to revisit the issue at some point. Rice