UGANDA TO CONSIDER ERITREA SANCTIONS RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000861 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: AU ER ETRD MARR PNAT PREL PTER SO SU UG UNGA, UNP SUBJECT: UGANDA TO CONSIDER ERITREA SANCTIONS RESOLUTION WHICH COVERS DJIBOUTI; REMAINS COMMITTED TO AMISOM Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a September 20 bilateral meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, USUN Ambassador Rice underlined that the U.S. supports a sanctions resolution on Eritrea that includes a condemnation and action in response to Eritrea,s destabilizing activities in both Somalia and Djibouti. President Museveni promised to consult with his delegation on Ugandan sponsorship of a joint resolution. Museveni provided assurances that Uganda remained resolute in its commitment to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),and noted that the Government of Uganda was considering deploying additional troops. Museveni said that the Ugandan military had run the remnants of the Lord,s Resistance Army (LRA) into the Central African Republic (CAR) and that the approximately 200 remaining LRA soldiers would be dealt with effectively there. A/S Carson and Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa also participated in the meeting. End Summary. -------------- -- Eritrea - Somalia/Djibouti Sanctions Resolution -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Rice emphasized that the U.S. strongly supports a resolution addresses the issue of Eritrea invading Djibouti. It is a matter of principle that the U.S. cannot ignore, which puts UNSC credibility at stake, and would make Eritrea feel it can continue to invade neighbors with impunity, she said. Museveni expressed concern that references to both Somalia and Djibouti in the draft UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions resolution might jeopardize its adoption chances. Rice said that she believes there is only one chance to secure a resolution, so Djibouti must be included, and noted that the international community has never effectively confronted Eritrea for invading neighboring countries on five occasions (Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia). She noted that in January, the UNSC gave Eritrea a deadline of six weeks to leave Djibouti or face sanctions. ¶3. (C) Rice reminded Museveni that past experience suggested that the UNSC would not block a resolution led by African members and supported by the African Union. She shared the U.S. read that, if Burkina Faso and Uganda co-sponsor this resolution, the British will support, the French will "keep their heads down" and will not block. FM Kutesa noted that Uganda had no substantive concerns over including Djibouti in the resolution. His concern, he said, was that because the AU had never passed an actual resolution that included Djibouti, the Russian and Chinese delegations would have to consult with their capitals before agreeing to it. Rice advised Kutesa not to be overly cautious, and reasserted that a resolution perceived to be African-led would not fail. She noted that, if it became clear during consultations that Russia and China had insurmountable concerns about including Djibouti, they could be dealt with before the issue came to vote. ¶4. (C) Rice noted that the Eritrean UNGA delegation would have an opportunity to meet with U.S., UN and other officials to explain its positions. Museveni stated that the "material interest" of Uganda is Somalia. Uganda has significant resources dedicated to AMISOM and is firmly committed to rooting out Islamic extremism in the region. He noted though that if the U.S. will only support a resolution on Somalia that includes Eritrea, and is confident that it would pass, Uganda will consider sponsoring it. He promised to consult with his delegation and communicate the result to Rice and Carson. Museveni subsequently told Ambassador Rice at the POTUS luncheon for African leaders of state that Uganda would support a resolution on both Djibouti and Somalia. ¶5. (C) Museveni also noted that he is concerned about Qatar causing problems in Somalia, and Ambassador Rice agreed that it was doing so through Eritrea. A/S Carson mentioned that he would be meeting with the Qatari Foreign Minister on September 25 and plans to raise this issue. -------------- AMISOM HQ Suicide Bombing -------------- ¶6. (C) In response to Rice and Carson's expressions of USUN NEW Y 00000861 002 OF 003 condolence, Museveni said that the suicide bombers responsible for the incident at AMISOM HQ on September 17 had taught the Ugandan military contingent there a lesson. He surmised that the security measures in place at the time of the bombing were insufficient given the threat level, and that his soldiers had not followed the security procedures they had trained in prior to deployment. Museveni said he had personally supervised the training program. Specifically, lack of blast walls, failure to deploy appropriate ammunition/armaments and unencrypted communications all contributed to the ability of the terrorists to gain proximity to the HQ facility, he said. Museveni provided reassurance that the Ugandans remained resolute in their AMISOM mission. The tragedy was "our fault," continued Museveni, and emphasized that the roadblock in front of the HQ should have been manned by tanks or armored cars - both of which the Ugandans have in Somalia but simply were not using. Rather, soldiers were manning roadblocks with rifles, which were used effectively to puncture the tires of the cars carrying the terrorists, preventing them from making it to the center of the compound, which would have resulted in much greater loss of life, he said. ¶7. (C) When asked whether this event changes the dynamic in Somalia, Museveni emphasized that Uganda was contemplating sending "more troops to clear out the terrorists." Rice wondered whether this meant "clearing out" Baidoa and Kismayo, and Museveni stated that Kismayo was a top priority due to its strategic importance as a port city. Nuclear non-Proliferation and Africa's Energy Needs ¶8. (C) Museveni said he believed the draft resolution on disarmament was very good. He appreciated the U.S. commitment to lead by example, and the support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Most members were pleased with the resolution, he said, and he would support it strongly. He underlined that the focus on energy would be "good for Africa," where hydroelectric power potential does not meet the energy needs of the continent's population. Ambassador Rice noted that hydroelectric power was not the only option for Africa - solar, geothermal, and biofuels should also be explored. Museveni pointed out that many of those options are cost-prohibitive, and that nuclear energy is an important option for African countries to explore. Ambassador Rice stressed the security challenges associated with nuclear energy production, especially in ensuring that the material is not diverted for illicit purposes. Museveni said this should not be a concern with sub-Saharan African nations, as they are not interested in nuclear weapons. Rice responded that it was not a question of intentions but rather the risk posed by poorly secured nuclear facilities that raised concerns. -------------- Lord,s Resistance Army (LRA) -------------- ¶9. (C) Museveni said that "the LRA is no longer a problem," because the Ugandan military had run its remnants into the Central African Republic (CAR). The government of the CAR (GoCAR) recently agreed to allow Ugandan troops to pursue the LRA in the CAR, and he believed the approximately 200 remaining LRA soldiers would be dealt with effectively there, adding that he believed that Joseph Kony is currently in the CAR. He noted his belief that fighting terrorism is "not a sprint, it is a marathon." A/S Carson thanked Museveni for Uganda's efforts, and noted that the U.S. recently approved additional support, including providing helicopters while Ugandan helicopters are being refurbished, supplying new trucks and munitions and continuing the intelligence-sharing relationship. -------------- Sudan -------------- ¶10. (C) Museveni mentioned that during a recent conversation, Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir noted that he had decided not to put up a candidate for Sudan-wide elections. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) focus now was on the independence referendum. In response to Museveni's request for U.S. views on the USUN NEW Y 00000861 003 OF 003 referendum/secession vote, both Rice and Carson emphasized that the people of southern Sudan should decide on unity or independence, as stipulated in the 2005 Peace Agreement to which the U.S. was a party. Ambassador Rice and A/S Carson underlined the importance of helping southern Sudan lay down the foundation for a viable and capable state should the people choose independence. Rice said significant work needed to be done in the areas of corruption and security sector reform. -------------- Participants -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Ugandan participants included Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa and UN PermRep Ambassador Ruhukana Ruganda. USUN Deputy Political Counselor Jim Donegan and AF/W Desk Officer Emily Narkis also participated on the U.S. side. ¶12. (U) A/S Carson has cleared this message. RICE