1. (C) SUMMARY. At an annual lunch with P-5 missions to the
UN, Cyprus President Demitris Christofias said he was not
optimistic about the possible outcome of Cyprus reunification
talks. He cited Turkish PM Erdogan as being responsible for
Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat's hard position on a
confederation of two equal states. Christofias said he was
prepared to allow 50,000 Turkish "settlers" to remain on the
island as part of a settlement, and urged the international
community to maintain pressure on Turkey to abide by its
commitments to open Turkish ports to Cypriot traffic.
Ambassador Wolff praised Christofias' efforts so far, and
suggested that heightened Greek Cypriot criticism of Special
Advisor Downer could disrupt the settlement process.
Christofias said Downer was at times undiplomatic and
careless in his public statements. On the margins,
Ambassador Wolff urged Christofias' to raise human rights
with Cuban authorities when he visits Cuba. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Cyprus President Demitris Christofias met with
Permreps from the United Kingdom and Russia and Deputy
Permreps from the U.S., France and China on September 25,
during an annual P-5 luncheon on the margins of the UNGA
General Debate. Summarizing his views of the reunification
negotiations currently underway, Christofias said he was not
optimistic about the outcome. There were philosophical
differences between the two sides, he said, not just
different negotiating positions. In particular, Christofias
referred to the Turkish Cypriot position that Cyprus should
be a confederation of two equal states, with each constituent
states able to establish foreign relations. This, he said,
was contrary to the agreed starting point for negotiations
between Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat. He said he had shown good will toward Talat by
offering a rotating presidency/vice-presidency for the
federal state (one from each community), but that Talat had
not reciprocated. Christofias attributed Talat's hard line
on this issue to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan.



3. (C) Christofias said 160,000 Turkish settlers had moved to
the island since the partition. He said he was prepared to
allow 50,000 of the settlers to remain in the context of a
settlement. On the question of property, he said most of the
ownership disputes were in the Turkish Cypriot area, and
added that he wanted to see the Famagusta area opened to
Greek Cypriot resettlement. He called for the international
community and the European Union to maintain pressure on
Turkey to fully comply with its obligations to open its ports
to Cyprus in advance of the review of Turkey's EU acquis in
December 2009.



4. (C) Christofias also blamed the Turkish Cypriot side for
the lack of progress on security guarantees, which had been
set aside in the first round. He understood it would not be
feasible to have military bases in the Turkish Cypriot areas.
U.K. Permrep Sawers said that he could foresee the U.K.
offering up some territory as part of a comprehensive
settlement, but would maintain U.K. sovereign base areas.



4. (C) Christofias said he had asked UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon during their bilateral meeting on the margins of the
UNGA General Debate about his plans to visit the island. The
SYG said he would consider visiting Cyprus, but only if he
could announce some progress in the negotiations.



5. (C) Ambassador Wolff offered U.S. support for Christofias'
efforts, applauded the creativity he had shown in the
negotiations so far, and urged him to persevere in the
difficult effort to reach a solution. Per Ref email, Wolff
also stressed that the Good Offices mission led by Special
Advisor Downer was essential to the success of the
negotiations, and said criticism of Downer had become a
distraction that risked impeding progress. Christofias
replied that he had welcomed Downer's appointment as Special
Advisor, but that Downer had at times characterized the
negotiations to the media and NGOs in terms that the
President thought were careless and undiplomatic.
Christofias said he was frankly surprised by Downer's
comments to the media that the Greek Cypriot side should
forget about the departure of settlers from the island, and
by a suggestion from Downer that the UN might not keep
UNFICYP in place.



6. (C) COMMENT. Christofias' reaction to Downer's activities
and his demeanor when discussing the Special Advisor suggest
that Downer does not have the President's full support and
confidence. Christofias was clearly uncomfortable when

USUN NEW Y 00000859 002 OF 002


Ambassador Wolff raised the matter in front of Foreign
Minister Kyprianou. END COMMENT.

CUBA


--------------------------




7. (C) Ambassador Wolff took Christofias aside at the end of
the lunch and urged him to use his upcoming visit to Cuba to
stress to the authorities the importance of respecting human
rights. Christofias said that Nicosia had made a similar
request of him, but offered no further comment.
RICE