AMBASSADOR RICE AND INDIAN PR PURI DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000817 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE AND INDIAN PR PURI DISCUSS U.S.-INDIA COOPERATION AT THE UN Classified By: AMB RICE for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Rice and a team from USUN met on August 26 with Indian Mission counterparts as the first step to deepen understanding and cooperation across a broad range of UN issues. The new Indian ambassador arrived with instructions to strengthen the U.S.-India relationship at the UN. Topics covered included the UN budget and management issues, peacekeeping, the Human Rights Council, regional voting blocks and the G77, the financial crisis, UNSC reform, South Asia regional issues, the Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism (CCIT),UN reform and the upcoming Security Council Summit on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament. Ambassador Puri urged progress towards passage of the CCIT and expressed a willingness to work with the U.S. behind the scenes to reach out to OIC countries on the fence. On UN budget reform, Ambassador Rice and Puri agreed to work together in the lead up to the UNGA 5th Committee session. They agreed the current assessment formula should be retained but explored other reform proposals, such as giving the SYG budget greater flexibility to move money and posts with concomitant accountability. Ambassador Rice reviewed the U.S. approach to Security Council expansion. Puri urged the U.S. to signal a preference for a specific formulation soon, saying that countries could live with the status quo for a while, but "someday something will snap." On Burma, Puri said, based on his government's "backchannel," Burma "wants to be flexible" and is "looking for engagement." He offered to use the "backchannel" to deliver any messages for the U.S. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Rice noted that this session with India was her first effort to go "in-depth" with a partner on wide range of issues and underscored India's key role as the world's largest democracy. She said she wanted to use this meeting to identify areas where India and the U.S. can work together at the UN. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Puri noted that he was encouraged by Ambassador Rice's speech at New York University last week, and was particularly interested in the section of the speech about forming new partnerships at the UN, which he said provided an ideal setting for the session. He said he has already observed concrete examples of the U.S.'s new approach at the UN (citing U.S. help in avoiding an impasse at the financial crisis conference),but hoped to secure a better understanding of U.S. strategy in that regard. Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism: ¶4. (C) Puri noted that the spate of high profile terrorist attacks of recent years has provided added urgency to the push to pass the Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism (CCIT). He suggested both countries needed passage of the CCIT for domestic constituencies. He noted the importance of U.S. leadership to help push for passage of the convention. He added that he understood that a vote on the convention should be avoided, but he believed there is a solid majority in favor of the convention. ¶5. (C) Puri said that Rohan Parera, Chair of the UN Committee on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, is confident he can produce a consensus text. He speculated that the Syrians, Egyptians, Iranians and possibly Algerians could oppose the convention, but the rest of the OIC countries will "come with us because they won't want to look bad." He said the major obstacle is OIC countries, who oppose an outcome "adverse to those under foreign occupation." He said India wants to find an accommodation to the OIC position, with one possible compromise being to include some agreed preambular language from the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Puri said this language should be acceptable to the U.S., because the U.S. signed that convention. Ambassador Wolff said we would need to check to ensure this was agreed and if it would be acceptable now. We also wanted to ensure this kind of language is not a carve out for terrorism. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Wolff also expressed concern that, even if consensus on a text was reached, spoilers could still bring amendments with language on foreign occupation to a vote in the General Assembly. The U.S. and India would then be faced with items amended from the floor. Puri said he shared this concern, but the key to avoiding this scenario would be to persuade Parera to present a bureau text to serve as the basis for negotiations. Then, the U.S. and India would have to secure commitments from OIC states not to cause trouble. ¶7. (C) Turning to a discussion of next steps, Puri said that "based on discussions in DC," India is willing to work with the U.S. behind the scenes and share the burden of reaching out to countries on the fence. He said India can "discretely send special envoys to a few of those countries." He stressed that India and the U.S. have little to lose by testing the waters. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Rice and Puri agreed that the U.S. and India would talk to Parera independently to make sure he captures the U.S. position in subsequent texts. Ambassador Rice noted that there were significant legal issues the U.S. has to resolve. She noted that Daniel Benjamin is meeting with a member of the Indian mission in DC this week and will likely raise these issues. Budget ¶9. (C) Ambassadors Rice and Puri agreed to work together in the lead up to the upcoming UNGA 5th Committee session. On the issue of the negotiation of the scales of assessment, Puri said India was not completely satisfied with the current assessment formula but was worried about what would happen if the scale was opened up for debate. (Comment: Following this meeting, Mr. Singh has told us that attacks on the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would likely result in proposals by the G-77 to lift the cap). He said the best course may be to "let the sleeping dog lie." Ambassador Rice agreed, noting that any change in the scale would complicate U.S. efforts to pay its dues on time and in full. Puri also expressed a desire to give the SYG greater flexibility to move money and posts through additional budget authority. Ambassador Wolff underscored that flexibility should be coupled with increased accountability. Puri agreed and suggested that budget resolutions providing flexibility to the SYG should include measures requiring periodic reporting to the membership. Security Council Reform ¶10. (C) Puri noted that many countries know the U.S. is undergoing an internal review of Security Reform proposals, but said it would be helpful if the U.S. signaled that it wants to expand the number of permanent seats. He said the debate over reform "will not move until the U.S. makes it move." Ambassador Rice reviewed the U.S. approach to Security Council expansion. She said that the U.S. is open to a limited expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members, but consideration of permanent members must be country-specific in nature. The U.S. is not interested in regional seats. she said, because we want to know who will be sitting in the council. There is a big difference between Nigeria, and Libya or Sudan. She also said that the Africans are deadlocked, and not much would change until they signal other options. Puri insisted that the Africans are waiting for a simple signal from the U.S. He added that interested countries could live with the current formulation for a while, but "someday something will snap." Ambassador Rice asked Puri: "(w)e know what India wants for India, but we want to know what India envisions for the Security Council of the future." Puri took the point without answering the question, acknowledging that this was something all aspiring members had to keep in mind. Regional Blocks / G-77 ¶11. (C) Puri expressed frustration over the influence of regional blocks within the UN, acknowledging that all sides are guilty of block voting. The G-77, he said, is manipulated by a few corrosive stakeholders, allowing countries like Libya and Nicaragua to hold the presidencies of the General Assembly. Ambassador Rice underscored the importance of breaking through these blocks to find maximum cooperation to deal with shared challenges. The current voting dynamics, she said, serve none of our interests. Puri promised to find ways to cooperate. Ambassador Rice also suggested a few areas where the two countries should begin working together, including the Human Rights Council, UNGA 3rd Committee, and the Palestinian resolutions in the General Assembly. Puri said that the 3rd committee and Human Rights Council are hobbled by one issue: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once the conflict is resolved, we can begin to more constructively engage. Ambassador Rice responded that we should not be passive; we must change the dynamic proactively and help lower the temperature, which could contribute to progress on the ground. Burma ¶12. (C) Ambassador Rice told Puri that the U.S. was discouraged by the ASSK verdict and not assuaged by the commutation of her sentence because it achieves the same goal of sidelining the main opposition candidate. ¶13. (C) Puri said, based on "backchannel information," Burma "wants to be flexible" and is "looking for engagement." Puri added that Security Council action could have adverse consequences because "every time the UK, France and the U.S. pummel Burma in the Security Council, you drive them right to the Chinese." Ambassador Rice responded that ASSK's arrest made engagement more difficult, absent significant, credible steps by the Burmese government. She added that the U.S. will look to India to stand with us, because of our shared commitment to democracy. Puri responded that India is committed to standing up for democratic principles, and the U.S. can count on Indian support. However, he questioned the effectiveness of sanctions and asked "(w)here are the carrots?" He said younger generation military commanders are oblivious to outside pressure because they are more isolated than the current ruling "geritocracy." He offered to use his government's "backchannel" to deliver any messages for the U.S. Sri Lanka ¶14. (C) Ambassador Rice thanked India for its contributions to the humanitarian relief operation in Sri Lanka, and said she is troubled by the GoSL's unwillingness to assist returning IDPs. Puri said he is "beginning to get worried" about Sri Lanka because, though military operations have ended, the GoSL has failed to implement key initiatives, such as the 13th amendment, and assist returning IDPs. He noted that the GoSL has some legitimate military reasons (e.g., demining) to prevent IDPs from returning to certain areas, but it's difficult to understand the "political reasons" for preventing return. He said that India would be willing to make reinforcing messages that the GoSL needs to more do on IDPs and reconciliation. Nepal ¶15. (C) Puri expressed concern about the slow pace at which the constitutional process was unfolding in Nepal, and the continued risk of instabilty. The Nepalese government needs to find a way to bring the Maoists back into the government; however, the issue of military integration was more complicated. He expressed clear support for the Nepalese Army position and rejected the idea of any "root and branch" reform that would entail inclusion of Maoists in the professional army. He thought flexibility could be found in other parts of the security sector, such as border control. ¶16. (C) On the UN's role, Puri noted with appreciation UNMIN's previous activities focused on elections and arms monitoring, but said that the focus going forward needed to center more on help with the constitutional drafting process and broader peacebuilding. His Deputy related the Nepalese situation to the broader challenge of nation-building in insecure or fragile environments, though he wondered whether the UN always had the right people with relevant experience in building institutions in unstable places. He added that both the government and Maoists would benefit from a "healthy discussion of the future of Nepal," and expressed interest in mechanisms for broader dialogue. ¶17. (C) Puri expressed frustration with NGO and other critiques of Indian influence in Nepal, rejecting allegations of meddling. Afghanistan ¶18. (C) Ambassador Rice noted that the challenge in fragile states like Afghanistan is to ensure that donor priorities are aligned with recipient government priorities. Right now, there is no common database to track donor projects and insufficient transparency. Puri asked if there is anywhere in the international community where this information is collated? Ambassador Rice responded that the UN is trying to do this now but it's unclear they can succeed. Peacekeeping ¶19. (C) Ambassador Rice thanked the Indians for their country's long history of contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions, and noted that she was able to see E Indian troops in the field when she visited Liberia and the DRC. She and Puri agreed to work together to strengthen peacekeeping mandates, implement the proposals coming out of the New Horizons report and look for ways to reactivate the UN Military Staff Committee. Financial Crisis ¶20. (C) Puri confirmed that India was a committed member of the G-20 and understood that the UN was not the venue for deciding on the reform of international financial architecture. He saw the most constructive role for the UN as centering on the impact of the financial crisis on development. He expressed interest in the new UN Global Impact Vulnerability Alert System (GIVAS) and said he wanted to see member states generally put real issues on the table, with competent facilitators to guide any subsequent process, and not get bogged down in ideological posturing. He expressed particular appreciation for the dialogue initiated by the US in April with India and other emerging economies who were members of both the G-77 and the G20. This had been influential in shaping their own position on the Financial Crisis Conference in June. (Note: Deputy NSA Michael Froman came to New York for these consultations in April, a second round of which just occurred on August 26.). Non-proliferation ¶21. (C) Puri reported disappointment in Delhi that the India-U.S. agreement has not translated into broader progress. He said India should not be treated as a country outside of the NPT framework, noting that India has brought 64% of its thermonuclear capacity under IAEA safeguards. RICE