UNGA: UNSC REFORM: P5 MEET TO DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000658

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN
SUBJECT: UNGA: UNSC REFORM: P5 MEET TO DISCUSS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 049098

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: P5 Ambassadors met on July 2 to discuss
intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform.
The U.S. and Russia encouraged the P5 to coordinate on
positions, but the U.S. advocated against a uniform P5
position at this time since the broader membership and not
the P5 should be driving the negotiations. All voiced
openness to a discussion of the intermediate option during a
third round of intergovernmental negotiations, with some
noting there also should be a further discussion of the other
options. Both Russia and China urged that any future
overview papers from the Chair not focus exclusively on one
option over other options. Russia and China also spoke out
against a framework resolution to end the 63rd session and
instead suggested continuing the negotiations into the 64th
session. France urged that the momentum be continued into
the next session. On the possibility of a future P5
statement, the Chinese DPR suggested that, if progress on
negotiations merits it, a possible opportunity to say
something may be the P5 Foreign Ministers meeting with the
Secretary General during the UNGA General Debate. End
summary.


2. (C) UK DPR Parham hosted a P5 lunch, at the DPR level plus
experts, on July 2 to follow-up on the May 7 meeting of P5
Political Directors in London. He said that the end of the
second round of intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) afforded
an opportune time for the P5 to reflect upon the negotiations
to date and what to expect in the period ahead. Russian DPR
Dolgov spoke frankly and at great length throughout the lunch
about Russia's position on Council reform, thereby covering
many of the points that would have otherwise been made by
Ambassador DiCarlo for the U.S. or Chinese DPR Liu, as
Russia, the U.S., and China share many of the same positions.
France was represented at the expert level. The French
expert's comments demonstrated the divide on the issue inside
the P5 between France and the UK on one side and the
U.S./Russia/China on the other, though Parham minimized the
UK's differences with other P5 members.

P5 common positions
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo urged the P5 to have coordinated
positions but not to have a single P5 position because that
would be detrimental to the negotiating process since the P5
should not be in the lead. Russian DPR Dolgov urged the P5
to articulate common positions when it is helpful, such as
the P5's individual statements on the veto during the June
22-23 meeting of the informal plenary. (Note: He later
clarified that Russia has not taken completely off the table
the possibility of the extension of new vetoes in the Council
since that would be dependent upon the composition of an
expanded Council. End note.) He said the P5 needs to remind
the membership to focus on what is "implementable and
achievable" and of the Charter requirement that the entire P5
needs to ratify Charter amendments (per Article 108 of the UN
Charter),noting that not all P5 members had spoken out about
this requirement to date (only the U.S. and Russia have). He
justified the need for such uniform statements by saying it
would push those who are "playing with the exercise to be
more serious" and also warn those who will try to add on
other amendments that they should focus only on the matter at
hand, not on other subjects, for example, the selection of
the Secretary-General. Ambassador DiCarlo agreed, saying the
membership needs to be reminded of the P5's redlines. In
terms of a formal P5 position on the subject writ large,
Dolgov said that Russia is open to a uniform position if it
focuses on an ultimate solution that can capture the broadest
possible agreement but does not rush the matter and only when
all P5 members are ready. Liu said that while the P5 do have
differences, they should work together to keep the process
under control to avoid surprises.

Intermediate option
--------------



4. (C) UK DPR Parham noted the important link between the
Council's effectiveness and its perceived legitimacy. He
said that while the P5 have different perspectives, all agree
on the need to keep the process moving forward and one way to
do that is to have a session on the intermediate option and
another session on the other options in the third round. He
underlined that, to date, the intermediate option is not a
defined proposal. He also noted that the UK had demarched
African capitals in the run-up to the African Union Summit
and was told, almost uniformly, that there would be no
likelihood of flexibility emanating from the Summit on the
Ezulwini Consensus. The French expert pressed for progress
on the intermediate option as first suggested by the UK and
France in March 2008. He emphasized the need for a Security
Council reinforced with "key partners" and not the
intermediate solution proposed by the United for Consensus
(UFC) bloc.


5. (C) Dolgov said Russia has indicated interest in the
intermediate option because he does not think either of the
two other models will obtain the necessary two-thirds
support. He did clarify that some proposed scenarios for the
intermediate option would not be acceptable nationally to
Russia, so "modalities will matter." He stressed that if the
intermediate option is pursued, it should be a permanent
solution, not a stepping stone, and should include 5-6 year
terms with the possibility of re-election, not the 15-year
terms that Germany had suggested. If there is an expansion
to 21-22 members, under an intermediate option, it should be
with the firm understanding that there would not be the
possibility of future expansion. If there is a later review
of the intermediate option, he said, it should not include a
review of the veto option or working methods -- those should
no longer be on the table for discussion. He later clarified
that those two issues were included only to give something to
those who were not going to "get anything" from the expansion
process. Once the expansion process is completed, there is
"no need to keep the package intact," he stressed, and they
should be taken off the table in advance.


6. (C) Liu said that China is open to discussing the
intermediate option but not ready to narrow down the field of
available options. They would like to keep everything on the
table for the third round because if any one option is pushed
at this point, they believe it will split the membership, he
said. Ambassador DiCarlo said that, while the U.S. does not
yet have a position on the intermediate option, it is open to
a discussion of it by the membership during the third round.
She raised two lingering questions on the intermediate
option: how to ensure that countries are selected on the
basis of their positive contributions to the maintenance of
international peace and security and how can we ensure
responsible decision-making from longer-term members who are
constantly running for re-election.

Future overview papers
--------------


7. (C) Dolgov said that if Ambassador Tanin decides to
release another overview paper, it should remain his own
product but should not propose an exclusive focus on only the
two main proposals. Chinese DPR Liu said that he had spoken
to Ambassador Tanin and encouraged him to avoid narrowing
down any of the options currently on the table and not to
quantify the number of member states behind each of the
proposals, as some members had requested. He urged him to be
patient and wait for a compromise to emerge from the
intergovernmental negotiations.

How to transition
to the 64th session
--------------


8. (C) On a possible framework resolution to end the
session, Dolgov said such a resolution would not be helpful
since it would likely only focus on an expansion of the two
categories. Instead, he suggested that the focus be on the
achievement that intergovernmental negotiations were begun
during the 63rd session and the recommendation to continue
those negotiations during the 64th session. He urged


avoiding the "traditional bloodbath" at the end of the
session since nothing else will be possible except a
continuation of negotiations into the 64th session. An
attempt at anything more, he stressed, would hurt the UN and
damage future prospects for negotiations. He urged other P-5
members to speak individually with the PGA, Ambassador Tanin,
and the various blocs and urge all to continue moving forward
in a constructive manner.


9. (C) Liu agreed that it was important to be prepared on
how to wind up the 63rd session since (1) there would be no
compromise on a final agreement by then since the African
Union is likely to retain the Ezulwini Consensus and (2) the
President of the General Assembly may be keen to get
involved. He urged the other P5 members to send the message
individually that they are opposed to a framework resolution.
The French expert urged P5 members to prepare the transition
to the next UNGA session in order to keep up the momentum and
said that France believes narrowing the options is in order.


Possibility of a P5 statement
--------------


10. (C) UK DPR Parham raised the possibility of a P5
statement. Chinese DPR Liu suggested keeping the idea open
and dependent upon the progress of the negotiations. He
suggested that a possible opportunity to say something may be
when the P5 Foreign Ministers meet with the Secretary-General
during the General Debate in September.
RICE