UNGA: UNSC REFORM: P5 MEET TO DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000658 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019 TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN SUBJECT: UNGA: UNSC REFORM: P5 MEET TO DISCUSS INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS REF: STATE 049098 Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: P5 Ambassadors met on July 2 to discuss intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. The U.S. and Russia encouraged the P5 to coordinate on positions, but the U.S. advocated against a uniform P5 position at this time since the broader membership and not the P5 should be driving the negotiations. All voiced openness to a discussion of the intermediate option during a third round of intergovernmental negotiations, with some noting there also should be a further discussion of the other options. Both Russia and China urged that any future overview papers from the Chair not focus exclusively on one option over other options. Russia and China also spoke out against a framework resolution to end the 63rd session and instead suggested continuing the negotiations into the 64th session. France urged that the momentum be continued into the next session. On the possibility of a future P5 statement, the Chinese DPR suggested that, if progress on negotiations merits it, a possible opportunity to say something may be the P5 Foreign Ministers meeting with the Secretary General during the UNGA General Debate. End summary. ¶2. (C) UK DPR Parham hosted a P5 lunch, at the DPR level plus experts, on July 2 to follow-up on the May 7 meeting of P5 Political Directors in London. He said that the end of the second round of intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) afforded an opportune time for the P5 to reflect upon the negotiations to date and what to expect in the period ahead. Russian DPR Dolgov spoke frankly and at great length throughout the lunch about Russia's position on Council reform, thereby covering many of the points that would have otherwise been made by Ambassador DiCarlo for the U.S. or Chinese DPR Liu, as Russia, the U.S., and China share many of the same positions. France was represented at the expert level. The French expert's comments demonstrated the divide on the issue inside the P5 between France and the UK on one side and the U.S./Russia/China on the other, though Parham minimized the UK's differences with other P5 members. P5 common positions -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo urged the P5 to have coordinated positions but not to have a single P5 position because that would be detrimental to the negotiating process since the P5 should not be in the lead. Russian DPR Dolgov urged the P5 to articulate common positions when it is helpful, such as the P5's individual statements on the veto during the June 22-23 meeting of the informal plenary. (Note: He later clarified that Russia has not taken completely off the table the possibility of the extension of new vetoes in the Council since that would be dependent upon the composition of an expanded Council. End note.) He said the P5 needs to remind the membership to focus on what is "implementable and achievable" and of the Charter requirement that the entire P5 needs to ratify Charter amendments (per Article 108 of the UN Charter),noting that not all P5 members had spoken out about this requirement to date (only the U.S. and Russia have). He justified the need for such uniform statements by saying it would push those who are "playing with the exercise to be more serious" and also warn those who will try to add on other amendments that they should focus only on the matter at hand, not on other subjects, for example, the selection of the Secretary-General. Ambassador DiCarlo agreed, saying the membership needs to be reminded of the P5's redlines. In terms of a formal P5 position on the subject writ large, Dolgov said that Russia is open to a uniform position if it focuses on an ultimate solution that can capture the broadest possible agreement but does not rush the matter and only when all P5 members are ready. Liu said that while the P5 do have differences, they should work together to keep the process under control to avoid surprises. Intermediate option -------------- ¶4. (C) UK DPR Parham noted the important link between the Council's effectiveness and its perceived legitimacy. He said that while the P5 have different perspectives, all agree on the need to keep the process moving forward and one way to do that is to have a session on the intermediate option and another session on the other options in the third round. He underlined that, to date, the intermediate option is not a defined proposal. He also noted that the UK had demarched African capitals in the run-up to the African Union Summit and was told, almost uniformly, that there would be no likelihood of flexibility emanating from the Summit on the Ezulwini Consensus. The French expert pressed for progress on the intermediate option as first suggested by the UK and France in March 2008. He emphasized the need for a Security Council reinforced with "key partners" and not the intermediate solution proposed by the United for Consensus (UFC) bloc. ¶5. (C) Dolgov said Russia has indicated interest in the intermediate option because he does not think either of the two other models will obtain the necessary two-thirds support. He did clarify that some proposed scenarios for the intermediate option would not be acceptable nationally to Russia, so "modalities will matter." He stressed that if the intermediate option is pursued, it should be a permanent solution, not a stepping stone, and should include 5-6 year terms with the possibility of re-election, not the 15-year terms that Germany had suggested. If there is an expansion to 21-22 members, under an intermediate option, it should be with the firm understanding that there would not be the possibility of future expansion. If there is a later review of the intermediate option, he said, it should not include a review of the veto option or working methods -- those should no longer be on the table for discussion. He later clarified that those two issues were included only to give something to those who were not going to "get anything" from the expansion process. Once the expansion process is completed, there is "no need to keep the package intact," he stressed, and they should be taken off the table in advance. ¶6. (C) Liu said that China is open to discussing the intermediate option but not ready to narrow down the field of available options. They would like to keep everything on the table for the third round because if any one option is pushed at this point, they believe it will split the membership, he said. Ambassador DiCarlo said that, while the U.S. does not yet have a position on the intermediate option, it is open to a discussion of it by the membership during the third round. She raised two lingering questions on the intermediate option: how to ensure that countries are selected on the basis of their positive contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and how can we ensure responsible decision-making from longer-term members who are constantly running for re-election. Future overview papers -------------- ¶7. (C) Dolgov said that if Ambassador Tanin decides to release another overview paper, it should remain his own product but should not propose an exclusive focus on only the two main proposals. Chinese DPR Liu said that he had spoken to Ambassador Tanin and encouraged him to avoid narrowing down any of the options currently on the table and not to quantify the number of member states behind each of the proposals, as some members had requested. He urged him to be patient and wait for a compromise to emerge from the intergovernmental negotiations. How to transition to the 64th session -------------- ¶8. (C) On a possible framework resolution to end the session, Dolgov said such a resolution would not be helpful since it would likely only focus on an expansion of the two categories. Instead, he suggested that the focus be on the achievement that intergovernmental negotiations were begun during the 63rd session and the recommendation to continue those negotiations during the 64th session. He urged avoiding the "traditional bloodbath" at the end of the session since nothing else will be possible except a continuation of negotiations into the 64th session. An attempt at anything more, he stressed, would hurt the UN and damage future prospects for negotiations. He urged other P-5 members to speak individually with the PGA, Ambassador Tanin, and the various blocs and urge all to continue moving forward in a constructive manner. ¶9. (C) Liu agreed that it was important to be prepared on how to wind up the 63rd session since (1) there would be no compromise on a final agreement by then since the African Union is likely to retain the Ezulwini Consensus and (2) the President of the General Assembly may be keen to get involved. He urged the other P5 members to send the message individually that they are opposed to a framework resolution. The French expert urged P5 members to prepare the transition to the next UNGA session in order to keep up the momentum and said that France believes narrowing the options is in order. Possibility of a P5 statement -------------- ¶10. (C) UK DPR Parham raised the possibility of a P5 statement. Chinese DPR Liu suggested keeping the idea open and dependent upon the progress of the negotiations. He suggested that a possible opportunity to say something may be when the P5 Foreign Ministers meet with the Secretary-General during the General Debate in September. RICE