SPECIAL ENVOY OBASANJO SHARES VIEWS ON DRC, SOUTH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000652 SENSITIVE SIPDIS S/GWI FOR AMBASSADOR VERVEER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC RW SU GC XA SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY OBASANJO SHARES VIEWS ON DRC, SOUTH SUDAN ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Obasanjo met with Ambassador Rice on June 29 and the P5 Belgium on June 30. He told Rice that neither Rwanda nor the DRC wanted to shelter former CNDP leader Nkunda. He suggested implementing greater incentives to encourage FDLR combatants to return to Rwanda. Obasanjo said South Sudan still had the power to cause regional "mischief" and conveyed the message to the USG from South African President Zuma that South Africa "wants to work with the U.S. on Zimbabwe." Obasanjo briefed the P5 Belgium on the challenges of integrating the DRC military, the need to push the DRC leadership to address gender-based violence, and said DRC President Kabila thought the UN would coordinate local elections (which the UN is not mandated to do). END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) United Nations Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Olusegun Obasanjo told Ambassador Rice on June 29 that he was seeing mixed success for his efforts as envoy to the Great Lakes. He said former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda was a "hot potato" wanted by neither the DRC nor Rwanda, and suggested sending Nkunda to a third country might be the best option. Obasanjo said he was encouraging a meeting between DRC President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame in mid-July. He suggested strengthening the International Conference on the Great Lakes to add stability to the region. ¶3. (SBU) Obasanjo said relations between Rwanda and the DRC were improving, and that the DRC had sent the name of its proposed ambassador to the Rwandan government. He thought the FDLR rebel group was no longer a potent force but was still a major concern after splintering into many groups of 15-20 combatants each. Obasanjo said there must be a political solution, noting a purely military operation would most likely not fully uproot the FDLR from the DRC. He suggested that Rwanda should offer more incentives to former combatants to return, reintegrate and resettle in Rwanda. Obasanjo warned of the destabilizing potential of expatriate FDLR leaders and suggested more be done to restrain their propaganda and fund-raising in Europe and North America. ¶4. (SBU) Obasanjo gave Ambassador Rice a copy of the letter he sent to DRC President Kabila on 26 June 2009, in which he expressed his "shock and horror" at the rapes of female �A;inmates by FARDC soldiers during the recent prison unrest in Goma. Referring to the list of five FARDC officers accused of gender-based violence in the east that the Security Council gave to the DRC government during its visit in May, Ambassador Rice said she was disappointed that Kabila had to date taken no evident action. Rice called President Kabila's reaction to the Council's concern a "litmus test" of the sincerity of his stated intent to address impunity. ¶5. (SBU) Concerning South Sudan, Obasanjo said the international community must encourage all parties to accept the results of the upcoming election and referendum, suggesting South Sudan still had the power to "cause mischief" in the region. He said "if there is to be a (North/South) divorce, let's make it an amicable one." He said now is the time to plan for post-referendum action for Sudan. ¶6. (SBU) Obasanjo delivered a message from South African President Zuma to Ambassador Rice, saying "South Africa wants to work with the U.S. on Zimbabwe." Obasanjo believed Zuma is interested in improving relations with the United States. ¶7. (SBU) On June 30, Obasanjo told the P5 and Belgium's PermRep that the amalgam of militias incorporated into the DRC army in eastern Congo needed to be paid, barracked, and disciplined, but the DRC government lacked capacity to accomplish any of these requirements. Obasanjo reported 300,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home since the incorporation of the CNDP into the DRC army, but noted an additional 150,000 IDPs had been created because of the joint operations against the FDLR. He said that it may be time to put greater emphasis on a political approach to the issues of the Kivus, instead of relying solely on military operations. Obasanjo commented that concrete benchmarks for security sector reform and for regional cooperation would be beneficial. ¶8. (SBU) In response to a question posed by Ambassador DiCarlo regarding how to best address the issue of sexual violence in the DRC, Obasanjo said all perpetrators of sexual violence must be "brought to book," and President Kabila and USUN NEW Y 00000652 002 OF 002 the DRC Minister of Justice must be pressured to take action at the highest level to address impunity. He said the DRC is not responding well to the issue of gender-based violence, and he encouraged the international community to continue to hold the DRC government accountable. 9 (SBU) Responding to a French question regarding elections, Obasanjo said President Kabila told him that the UN was responsible for conducting regional elections (proposed for 2009),and that the DRC would conduct the 2011 national elections. Obasanjo said he did not believe the DRC would have the capacity to hold the 2011 elections itself, but the UN should act now to define its role in upcoming regional elections. (NOTE: The P5 Belgium representatives were surprised to hear Kabila's opinion, as no clear mandate exists for the UN to be the sole coordinator of regional elections. END NOTE). RICE