DPRK: U.S./JAPAN SHARE THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000602 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM ETTC MCAP KN UNSC SUBJECT: DPRK: U.S./JAPAN SHARE THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS Classified By: Amb. Susan Rice for Reasons 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Rice told Japanese Perm Rep Takasu that the United States is now focused on implementing the new sanctions imposed on the DPRK in resolution 1874. She explained that in the highly-likely event of a future DPRK provocation, Washington would prefer not to engage in a tit-for-tat game of escalating sanctions. She noted that there are few, if any, new sanctions available that Russia and China could support. Takasu agreed on the need to focus on 1874 implementation. He said he had already begun to manage Tokyo's expectations about the likely Council response to a new provocation. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On June 17, Ambassador Rice asked for a meeting with Japanese Perm Rep Takasu to discuss next steps on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),including possible responses to new provocations from the DPRK. Noting that she had consulted with senior Washington officials the previous week, Rice told Takasu that the immediate focus of U.S. efforts would be on implementing the new sanctions imposed on the DPRK in resolution 1874. She said that in the highly-likely event of a future DPRK provocation, Washington would probably not want to seek new rounds escalating sanctions. To do so, Rice argued, would be to engage in a tit-for-tat game with the DPRK. She further observed that there were few new sanctions measures available beyond those already imposed in resolution 1874. The only major element that was not included in 1874, she observed, was the authorization of military enforcement for inspections. China and Russia, she suggested, were unlikely to agree to such an authorization in the short term. ¶3. (C) Takasu agreed on the need to focus efforts on effective implementation of resolution 1874. In this regard, he said, Tokyo was redrafting legislation to allow its authorities to inspect vessels on the high seas. Takasu explained that Japan was also stepping up enforcement of financial measures and has been working, in concert with the P-3, on a new designations proposal for the DPRK Sanctions Committee. ¶4. (C) Takasu also agreed that a future DPRK provocation, such as a new missile or nuclear test, was highly likely. He said that knowing Washington's thoughts about how to respond to a new DPRK provocation would help him manage expectations in Tokyo. Takasu claimed he had already told Japanese policymakers that the next logical steps for new sanctions -- such as authorizing action under Article 42 of the UN Charter -- were unlikely to enjoy support from Russia and China. In the event of a new incident, he explained, Tokyo would probably instruct him to call for an emergency session of the Council and perhaps seek a Council Presidential Statement or press statement that would reaffirm resolutions 1718 and ¶1874. ¶5. (C) Rice acknowledged the need to do something for Japanese public opinion, but reminded Takasu that the DPRK's behavior was partly motivated by its desire to get attention. It would send the wrong signal, she said, and give Pyongyang the impression that they are in charge. Rice added that Takasu can start conditioning the press and public opinion now. RICE