C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000583

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA AND WESTERN FRIENDS AT AN IMPASSE
ON FUTURE OF UN MISSION

REF: A. STATE 59890

B. STATE 56222

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Per Ref A and B
instructions, USUN has maintained close unity with the Quad
in negotiations over extension of the mandate of the UN
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). At a June 10
negotiating session among Croatia, France, Germany, Russia,
U.K., and U.S. Permreps/Deputy Permreps, Russian Ambassador
Churkin refused to budge on any of the issues that cross our
redlines. Quad Ambassadors assess that Russia is unlikely to
accept a mission mandate that would not cross our redlines.
Ambassadors agreed to seek guidance from capitals, with the
expectation that the Security Council would not be able to
extend the UNOMIG mandate prior to its June 15 expiration.
USUN has laid out options below, discussed with Quad
Ambassadors, for a way forward. These options include
pursuing further discussion with Russia in capital, which
could include a one-two week technical rollover to allow more
time for negotiations; letting the mandate expire; adopting
another technical rollover of 4-6 months. USUN recommends
that Quad political directors consult on the way forward on
Thursday June 11, and requests Department guidance on next
steps in New York. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.


2. (C) Permreps/Deputy Permreps from Croatia, France,
Germany, Russia, U.K. and U.S. met on June 6 in an effort to
bridge differences on the text of a resolution that would
extend the UNOMIG mandate. Russian Permrep Vitaly Churkin
made clear that he would not negotiate on certain changes
Russia had proposed to the German draft resolution, which
would directly undermine Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Churkin insisted that there be no
mention of Resolution 1808, no mention of Georgia's
territorial integrity, and that the mission name must be
changed. Quad Ambassadors all insisted that the PP1
reference to "relevant resolutions on the situation in
Georgia, inclu

ding Resolution 1808..." was an absolute
redline for capitals. Churkin also refused an earlier
suggestion from Germany, which Quad Ambassadors had
subsequently agreed to, that the security regime and mandate
in the resolution be adopted verbatim from the SYG's report.
After several fruitless discussions on elements of the text
in which Churkin insisted on language that was unacceptable
to the Quad, French Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert summed up
the Quad position by saying that if Russia's goal was "to get
us to agree to a resolution that would recognize the
separatist entities, to get us to accept an asymmetrical
security regime, or to get us to force Georgia to sign
agreements with the separatist entities, then let's go home."
Churkin responded that there was nothing to talk about,
since Russia would insist that there be "nothing in the
resolution that would call into question the new status of
Abkhazia."


3. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, Quad Croatia
Ambassadors discussed the prospects for reaching an agreement
on a substantive resolution before the June 15 expiration of
the current mandate. Ambassadors assessed that it is highly
unlikely we would bridge gaps with Russia on resolution text
that would not cross our redlines on territorial integrity,
and that would institute a symmetrical security regime, which
Russian forces would be bound to accept. Ambassadors agreed
to jointly recommend to capitals that Quad Political
Directors discuss options on Thursday June 11, in order to
revert to New York with further guidance.


4. (C) USUN sees the following as possible options for a way
forward:

-- Pursue further discussions with Russia in capital. Quad
capitals may wish to seek confirmation directly with Moscow
about whether it is possible to find an agreed basis for
moving forward, given our significant divergence of views in
New York on the political framework for the mission. We
might need to adopt an interim resolution of 1-2 weeks,
pending further substantive negotiations. It would be
important to ensure that an interim technical rollover
resolution did not in itself contain/omit any language that
would signal a change to Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. A short rollover would make sense
only if we believe there is a basis for the Quad and Russia
to agree on a set of principles that would underline a new
mission.

-- Allow the mission to expire. The Quad have repeatedly
made clear that we will not accept a mission at any cost.
Georgia has repeatedly made this clear to us, but Russia has
also insisted that it will not accept a mission that crosses

USUN NEW Y 00000583 002 OF 002


their redlines. If we choose to let the mission expire, we
will need to make clear that we made a good faith effort
based on the SYG's recommendations to find a reasonable way
forward, and also supported the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of a UN member state.

-- Pursue another technical rollover of 4-6 months. As with
previous rollovers, we would need to ensure that a rollover
did not in itself diminish our understanding of Georgia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity. At a minimum, it
would need to refer to Resolution 1808, something that Russia
has already rejected in our negotiations over a substantive
resolution.


5. (C) ACTION REQUEST. USUN requests Department guidance on
further engagement with the Quad and Russia. END ACTION
REQUEST.
RICE