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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
09USUNNEWYORK570 2009-06-06 01:57:00 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: RUSSIA INSISTS ON NEW 'POLITICAL

Tags:   PREL PGOV PHUM UNOMIG UNSC RS GG 
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VZCZCXRO2197
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0570/01 1570157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060157Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6688
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000570 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNOMIG UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA INSISTS ON NEW 'POLITICAL
FRAMEWORK' FOR UN MISSION

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) SUMMARY. Russian Permrep Churkin continued to resist
substantive negotiations, on June 5, on a draft resolution to
extend UNOMIG beyond June 15. Churkin insisted that Western
partners needed to present a draft resolution within Moscow's
preferred "political framework" before he would engage on the
text. He made clear that such a framework would suggest that
the Georgia conflict is resolved and that Russia was not a
party to it. He said a resolution within this framework
would also omit any reference to Georgia's territorial
integrity and would not include Georgia within the name of
the UN mission. Also on June 5, Russia presented the Quad
with a concept paper on the security regime he wants included
in the draft resolution. Georgian Permrep Lomaia told
Ambassador DiCarlo on June 5 that Georgia is prepared to
withhold consent to a UN mission if a SC resolution were to
cross Georgian redlines. USUN will continue to engage with
Western allies to plot a way forward, with the goal of
achieving a substantive mandate and security regime that does
not cross our redlines. END SUMMARY.



--------------------------


Political Framework


--------------------------



2, (SBU) At a meeting of Permreps/Deputy Permreps from
Croatia, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and United
States on June 5, Russian Permrep Vitaly Churkin continued to
resist negotiating the text of a German draft resolution
extending the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG),
insisting instead that the current "political framework" for
the resolution was unacceptable. Churkin emphasized that,
"Moscow wants agreement on the political framework first-- if
there is not clarity on the political framework, the rest is
meaningless." During the meeting, Churkin resisted defining
what he considers to be a reasonable political framework
since, he said, he had already shared his views with
Ambassdor Matussek. This statement prompted Matussek to run
down a list of Russian concerns that included references to
territorial integrity of Georgia, reference to Georgia in the
name of the UN mission, language in the resolution which
considers the conflict to be unresolved, language which
suggests that Russia is a party to the conflict, and
reference to a future UN presence in South Ossetia,
references to the ICJ case or to the OSCE, and references to
interethnic policing. Churkin agreed that those were some,
but not all, of the Russian concerns. Churkin pointed out
some paragraphs in the draft resolution that contained
language that was unacceptable to Russia, though he still
maintained he would not engage in detailed negotiations
unless presented with a new draft.



--------------------------


Security Regime


--------------------------





3. (SBU) Also on June 5, Russia presented to the Quad a
concept paper on the security regime currently laid out in
OP3 of the German draft resolution. (USUN has passed this
paper via email to IO/UNP.) The security regime proposed by
Russia differs in several respects from the SYG's
recommendations in paragraph 65 of his May 19 report. UN
observers would be specifically tasked with observing
compliance with the "Sarkozy-Medvedev" agreements of August
12 and September 8 under the security regime. It is not
clear whether the ceasefire line --the Russian paper refers
to the ceasefire line as a "border"-- would extend all the
way along the administrative boundary to Russia, or whether
it would extend only along the 80km ceasefire line of the
former Moscow agreement. The security regime does not
include extension of the restricted weapons zones or UN
monitoring of the Upper Kodori Valley. Several other aspects
of the security regime differ from the SYG's proposals.



--------------------------


Georgian Views


--------------------------





4. (C) Separately on June 5, Ambassador DiCarlo updated
Georgian Permrep Lomaia and Deputy Permrep Chikovani on the
state of the negotiations. DiCarlo reinforced that the U.S.
was being firm, despite Russia's intransigence. DiCarlo said
that since we had not yet received any written proposals from
Russia, it would be premature to judge them. However, she
reinforced with Lomaia that it would be in Georgia's interest
to have a security regime with international observers on the
ground in order to monitor and report on Russian activities
in the conflict zone. A continued UN mission, she said,
would also make clear that the international community does
not view the conflict as resolved.

USUN NEW Y 00000570 002 OF 002





5. (C) Lomaia said he thought Georgia was unlikely to gain
anything "on the ground" by having a UN mission, but could
likely "lose something on paper." He added, "One more
resolution that doesn't mention Georgia-- I don't think this
is something we could live with." He emphasized that Georgia
intended to stick to all of the redlines that had been
outlined in a letter to Secretary Clinton, and that had been
reinforced by Georgia in subsequent meetings in Tbilisi,
Washington and New York. Georgia, he said, was prepared to
withhold consent for the mission if Georgian redlines were
not met. Ambassador DiCarlo told Lomaia frankly that it
would be very difficult to get a direct reference to
Georgia's territorial integrity in the next resolution-- one
of Georgia's redlines-- since the last two resolutions (1839,
1866) had only referred to Georgia's territorial integrity
indirectly, by reference to Resolution 1808.



6. (C) Lomaia wondered aloud whether a 6-month technical
rollover might be an alternative to "killing the mission,"
since he thought the dynamics on the ground could change as a
result of the developing U.S.-Russia relationship.



--------------------------


Comment


--------------------------





7. (C) Permreps/Deputy Permreps from France, the U.K. and the
U.S. plan to meet on Monday June 8 to plot a way forward,
given significant Russian intransigence. We will also need
to continue to engage closely with Georgia during the coming
days. If we do break through the logjam with Russia and come
to an agreement on a security regime and a mandate that does
not cross our redlines, Georgia will need to be prepared to
accept such an agreement.
RICE