FOLLOW UP ON G-7 INITIATIVE ON REGULAR AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000562 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2025 TAGS: PREL AMGT AORC UN SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP ON G-7 INITIATIVE ON REGULAR AND PEACEKEEPING SCALES OF ASSESSMENT REF: USUN 518 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D.Wolff For Reasons 1.4 b ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On May 28, 2009, the Canadian Mission hosted a follow up meeting of the G7 at the level of Fifth Committee experts to the scale of assessment discussion that occurred in Geneva in April 2009 among the Directors of the International Organization Bureaus from the capitals of the G7 Members (US, Japan, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Canada). The attendees were: Wasim Mir, Daragh Russell and James Roscoe for the UK, Gregory Cazelet for France, Ken Mukai and Masatoshi Sugiura for Japan, Joerg Stosberg for Germany, Chris Plunkett and Patrick Quealey for Canada, Bruce Rashkow and Eileen Merritt for the US Mission. The focus of the meeting was on the next steps in developing the joint strategy for scales of assessment; specifically inviting Mexico, the Republic of Korea (ROK),and Sweden to join the group; the Lower Per Capita Income Adjustment (LPCIA); peacekeeping scale of assessments; and the sharing of information. The US, echoing the concerns it had raised in the recent B-5 follow up meeting (Reftel) raised the issue that before the group engaged in outreach, the group had to define what the joint initiative entailed, including agreement on redlines and determine the interrelationship between the regular budget and peacekeeping scale. Other participants generally agreed that the G7 should reach preliminary agreement on LPCIA, peacekeeping scale, and redlines, before expanding the group. The Canadians indicated two additional meetings would be scheduled in June: the first to deal with LPCIA and the second to deal with the peacekeeping scale. END SUMMARY -------------- Outreach -------------- ¶2. (U) The Canadians hosted the meeting to discuss next steps in developing a joint strategy for the scales of assessment debate this fall. The initial discussion focused on inviting Mexico, the ROK and Sweden to join the group immediately. The French indicated that it is important to get early involvement of Mexico and the ROK to ensure a larger front to achieve success on the group's objective. They also indicated that it was critical to engage Sweden early as they will have the EU Presidency in the fall. The Canadians, German and British agreed that the Swedes should be included in the brainstorming and idea sharing sooner rather than later to ensure a unified front. The US expressed concern that the scales initiative needed to be clearly defined before expanding the group or otherwise conducting outreach. The Canadians asked that the group consider gathering more information and analysis on how to conduct outreach. ¶3. (U) The UK emphasized that it didn't want the group to be stuck doing analysis until December, and that the US is the "back marker on this" and that "we will not wait for you". It stressed that the group needed to mobilize quickly to get the change they are seeking on scales. The US stated that it understood these meetings to be an effort to fashion a "joint initiative" and that we needed to define that initiative before engaging in outreach. The Canadians confirmed that the meetings are still an effort to build a common strategy and that it would take some time over the summer to get it done. The Canadians expressed the concern that when the other 3 countries joined the group, the group had to be amenable to considering any new ideas they might have. The group agreed with the Canadians concern. With that concern in mind, the group agreed to develop preliminary positions on LPCIA and the peacekeeping scales, as well as redlines, before reaching out to other States. The Canadians suggested and the other participants agreed on 2 meetings in June: the first to deal with LPCIA and the second to deal with the peacekeeping scale. -------------- Redlines -------------- ¶4. (U) The US continued to voice concern around the issues associated with redlines. The UK indicated its understanding that for the US the redline was not raising the cap and that more generally the group should not advocate changes in the regular budget scale or peacekeeping scale that will result in a detriment to the rest of the group. ¶5. (U) The UK identified three essential approaches to the LPCIA; 1) lowering LPCIA across the board; 2) differentiating LPCIA for different countries e.g. stepped gradient; and 3) putting a limit on LPCIA. It indicated that lowering LPCIA across the board would be a redline for the UK. The Canadians stated any approach that the group comes up with should not hurt any member of the group in scales and that this was implicit in the three principles described in the Canadian Geneva Report. -------------- LPCIA -------------- ¶6. (U) The US indicated it remained to be seen what proposals the group could agree upon for changing LPCIA, whether the proposals address two of the three or even one of the three LPCIA elements on scale, and the strategies implicit in achieving agreement on such proposals before arriving at a common position. The Canadians responded that the difficulties in breaking off Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) or simply China, from the G77 would need to be considered in this context. -------------- Peacekeeping Scale of Assessment -------------- ¶7. (U) Initially, the US participant raised concern on the relationships of the peacekeeping scale negotiation to the regular budget scale negotiations, and the complex and delicate question of strategy. The Japanese indicated that we needed to wait until more analysis had been conducted on the peacekeeping scale to determine the group's position, especially in light of the differing positions on that scale. They mentioned, for example, that the EU had 3 different positions on the peacekeeping scale that needed to be coordinated. Therefore, they cautioned that a careful approach must be taken to avoid harming the peacekeeping scale. ¶8. (U) The French emphatically stated that the group could not miss the opportunity, since the peacekeeping scale only comes up every nine years, to correct and eliminate the anomalies in that scale, and that the peacekeeping scale should be used as a leverage in the strategy to get an agreement on the regular budget scale. The French and the UK stated that eliminating Category C from the peacekeeping scale and placing those member states i.e. the Gulf States of Kuwait, QATAR and Bahrain, in Category B would have a small impact. According to the Canadians, there maybe some cracks in the G77 wall of solidarity that could be explored to assist in affecting change on the scale. They indicated that they were told that some of the Gulf States were upset that they were paying more than China on the regular budget scale. However, they questioned whether the group could target too many countries at the same time without forcing them to retreat to their G77 wall of solidarity since they could determine they could lose more by separating on this issue. The US cautioned that publicly seeking to breach G77 solidarity would be very difficult, and possibly counter productive. However, US suggested that it might be possible for members of the group individually to approach Category C states (i.e. Kuwait, QATAR and Bahrain),and encourage them to assume a greater burden for peacekeeping activities by voluntarily moving from Category C to Category B. -------------- Data Sharing -------------- ¶9. (U) The UK and French offered to share two sets of analysis that they have developed; 1) the impact of LPCIA proposals on the G7; and 2) on the impact of LPCIA proposals in the regular budget scale on the peacekeeping scale. -------------- Conclusion -------------- ¶10. (U) There will be the two meetings of the G-7 experts in June: the first seeking to reach agreement on an approach to LPCIA and the second on an approach to the peacekeeping scale. The Canadians will distribute the analysis developed by the UK and French in preparation for the two meetings. The Canadians asked that the participants: 1) be prepared to provide a list of advantages and disadvantages on the LPCIA to determine what the most realistic option will be; and 2)familiarize themselves with the different categories of the peacekeeping scale. They indicated the first of the two meetings will probably be scheduled the week of June 8 following the conclusion of the Fifth Committee Peacekeeping session. RICE