GEORGIA: UN DPKO SHARES DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000051 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: UN DPKO SHARES DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS REF: USUN 1184 Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. As reported Reftel, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) favors a revised interim monitoring mission in Georgia to replace the existing UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). DPKO shared with USUN a draft of the Secretary-General's (SYG) "observations" to be included in his Report on Georgia to be released on February ¶5. The proposed new UN mandate would be based upon the security zones and restricted weapons zones laid out in the Moscow Agreement, which regulates the separation of Abkhaz and Georgian forces in the Abkhazia, Georgia zone of conflict. However, in contrast to the Moscow Agreement, the new UN interim monitoring mission would monitor not only adherence of Georgian and Abkhaz forces to the security regime, but the movements of Russian forces as well. The SYG would also recommend that the interim mandate be kept in place pending ongoing discussions on more permanent security arrangements facilitated by the UN. The new UN mission would observe adherence to the security arrangements, investigate incidents and violations, continue to facilitate dialogue leading toward lasting security arrangements, and assist IDPs with returns and resettlement and facilitate humanitarian assistance. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) permitted Deputy PolCouns and Poloff to read a DPKO draft of the recommendations included in a draft of the "Observations" section of the Secretary General's (SYG) report on the situation in Georgia, which will be distributed on February ¶5. DPKO Office Director David Harland and Georgia Desk Officer Akylbai Eleusizov invited U.S. comment on the draft proposals. Harland said he believed the U.S. position on the future of UNOMIG would be a key factor in determining its future, and he wanted the DPKO recommendations to be helpful to the Council's deliberations. ¶3. (C) Harland believes there is little chance for the Council to agree to act under either Chapter 7-Threats to International Peace and Security, or Chapter 6-Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, to constitute a new UN mandate. However, he explained that DPKO does not favor a technical rollover, for fear that it would invite Russia to continue hardening its military positions along the administrative boundary between Abkhazia and Georgia proper. The current UNOMIG mission mandate is to monitor and report on compliance by Georgia and Abkhazia with the terms of the former Moscow Agreement and to observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force which patrolled the security zones prior to the August 2008 conflict. In the absence of a new agreed security regime that includes Russia, Harland said UNOMIG can do little more than report on the erosion of the current security situation along the cease-fire line. He said UNOMIG movements have also been restricted by the Russian and Abkhaz forces, and cited examples of current violations of the terms of the former Moscow Agreement, including ongoing Abkhaz preparations to build a military base in the Gali district in the former security zone, frequent movements of Russian and Abkhaz tanks into the security zone, and the ongoing creation of trenches and weapons platforms along the Abkhaz/Georgia boundary. According to Harland, Abkhaz and Georgian forces have also both violated the security and restricted weapons regimes of the former agreement. ¶4. (SBU) Instead of recommending a technical rollover, the SYG would recommend elements of an interim security regime, pending the outcome of ongoing discussions about more permanent security arrangements. The following elements (paraphrased from paragraph 6 of the draft "Observations" section of the SYG's Report) would serve as the basis for the interim UN mandate and continued security discussions between the parties: - All parties commit to a cease-fire. - The security and restricted weapons zones and the security regime from the Moscow Agreement would continue to be in effect. (Note. Limits on military forces or heavy weaponry in the zones would apply to all parties, including Russian forces. This is a departure from the Moscow Agreement, under which only Abkhaz and Georgia forces were subject to the restrictions, while CIS Peacekeeping Forces were permitted to patrol in the security zones. End Note.) - There would be a numerical limit on law enforcement personnel in the security zone, and they would need to maintain a minimum distance of 650 meters from the cease-fire line. - Overflights of the security zone would be banned. - All parties would need to provide advance notice of changes to the positions of their security forces. - Representatives of the parties would coordinate with other USUN NEW Y 00000051 002 OF 002 representatives of the other parties to resolve incidents and problems. ¶5. (SBU) The mandate of a proposed new UN mission would be as follows (paraphrased from paragraph 8 of the draft observations): - Observe and report on the adherence of all parties to the security regime. - Investigate incidents and violations of the security regime. - Patrol the Kodori Valley. - Maintain contact with the parties. - Assist the parties in the establishment of a comprehensive security regime. - Assist in the return of internally displaced persons. - Assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The key change in the draft DPKO recommendations from the existing UN mandate is that all parties, including Russian forces, would be subject to the new security regime, although the draft paragraphs we reviewed did not mention any of the parties by name. Harland contends that designation of Russia as a party to the conflict is implicit in the report's indication that all non-UN forces in Abkhazia would be "monitored", whereas the former CIS forces engaged in "monitoring" other forces. A Security Council resolution to constitute a new mission would need to make more clear than this "monitored/monitoring" distinction that Russian forces, which previously were engaged as part of the CIS peacekeeping force in monitoring the Moscow Agreement, would no longer have that role. The UN would monitor all forces in the security zones. Russia will refuse to accept new limits placed upon its military presence by the Security Council and pursuing this proposal would lead to a dust-up with Moscow. Notwithstanding the likely recommendation of the SYG, we still maintain that the best way forward is a technical rollover or the French-proposed rollover plus. END COMMENT. Rice