GEORGIA: UN DPKO SHARES DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000051

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: UN DPKO SHARES DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS

REF: USUN 1184

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. As reported Reftel, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) favors a revised interim
monitoring mission in Georgia to replace the existing UN
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). DPKO shared with USUN
a draft of the Secretary-General's (SYG) "observations" to be
included in his Report on Georgia to be released on February

5. The proposed new UN mandate would be based upon the
security zones and restricted weapons zones laid out in the
Moscow Agreement, which regulates the separation of Abkhaz
and Georgian forces in the Abkhazia, Georgia zone of
conflict. However, in contrast to the Moscow Agreement, the
new UN interim monitoring mission would monitor not only
adherence of Georgian and Abkhaz forces to the security
regime, but the movements of Russian forces as well. The SYG
would also recommend that the interim mandate be kept in
place pending ongoing discussions on more permanent security
arrangements facilitated by the UN. The new UN mission would
observe adherence to the security arrangements, investigate
incidents and violations, continue to facilitate dialogue
leading toward lasting security arrangements, and assist IDPs
with returns and resettlement and facilitate humanitarian
assistance. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
permitted Deputy PolCouns and Poloff to read a DPKO draft of
the recommendations included in a draft of the "Observations"
section of the Secretary General's (SYG) report on the
situation in Georgia, which will be distributed on February

5. DPKO Office Director David Harland and Georgia Desk
Officer Akylbai Eleusizov invited U.S. comment on the draft
proposals. Harland said he believed the U.S. position on the
future of UNOMIG would be a key factor in determining its
future, and he wanted the DPKO recommendations to be helpful
to the Council's deliberations.


3. (C) Harland believes there is little chance for the
Council to agree to act under either Chapter 7-Threats to
International Peace and Security, or Chapter 6-Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes, to constitute a new UN mandate.
However, he explained that DPKO does not favor a technical
rollover, for fear that it would invite Russia to continue
hardening its military positions along the administrative
boundary between Abkhazia and Georgia proper. The current
UNOMIG mission mandate is to monitor and report on compliance
by Georgia and Abkhazia with the terms of the former Moscow
Agreement and to observe the operation of the CIS
peacekeeping force which patrolled the security zones prior
to the August 2008 conflict. In the absence of a new agreed
security regime that includes Russia, Harland said UNOMIG can
do little more than report on the erosion of the current
security situation along the cease-fire line. He said UNOMIG
movements have also been restricted by the Russian and Abkhaz
forces, and cited examples of current violations of the terms
of the former Moscow Agreement, including ongoing Abkhaz
preparations to build a military base in the Gali district in
the former security zone, frequent movements of Russian and
Abkhaz tanks into the security zone, and the ongoing creation
of trenches and weapons platforms along the Abkhaz/Georgia
boundary. According to Harland, Abkhaz and Georgian forces
have also both violated the security and restricted weapons
regimes of the former agreement.


4. (SBU) Instead of recommending a technical rollover, the
SYG would recommend elements of an interim security regime,
pending the outcome of ongoing discussions about more
permanent security arrangements. The following elements
(paraphrased from paragraph 6 of the draft "Observations"
section of the SYG's Report) would serve as the basis for the
interim UN mandate and continued security discussions between
the parties:

- All parties commit to a cease-fire.
- The security and restricted weapons zones and the security
regime from the Moscow Agreement would continue to be in
effect. (Note. Limits on military forces or heavy weaponry
in the zones would apply to all parties, including Russian
forces. This is a departure from the Moscow Agreement, under
which only Abkhaz and Georgia forces were subject to the
restrictions, while CIS Peacekeeping Forces were permitted to
patrol in the security zones. End Note.)
- There would be a numerical limit on law enforcement
personnel in the security zone, and they would need to
maintain a minimum distance of 650 meters from the cease-fire
line.
- Overflights of the security zone would be banned.
- All parties would need to provide advance notice of changes
to the positions of their security forces.
- Representatives of the parties would coordinate with other

USUN NEW Y 00000051 002 OF 002


representatives of the other parties to resolve incidents and
problems.


5. (SBU) The mandate of a proposed new UN mission would be as
follows (paraphrased from paragraph 8 of the draft
observations):

- Observe and report on the adherence of all parties to the
security regime.
- Investigate incidents and violations of the security regime.
- Patrol the Kodori Valley.
- Maintain contact with the parties.
- Assist the parties in the establishment of a comprehensive
security regime.
- Assist in the return of internally displaced persons.
- Assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

COMMENT
--------------

6. (C) The key change in the draft DPKO recommendations from
the existing UN mandate is that all parties, including
Russian forces, would be subject to the new security regime,
although the draft paragraphs we reviewed did not mention any
of the parties by name. Harland contends that designation of
Russia as a party to the conflict is implicit in the report's
indication that all non-UN forces in Abkhazia would be
"monitored", whereas the former CIS forces engaged in
"monitoring" other forces. A Security Council resolution to
constitute a new mission would need to make more clear than
this "monitored/monitoring" distinction that Russian forces,
which previously were engaged as part of the CIS peacekeeping
force in monitoring the Moscow Agreement, would no longer
have that role. The UN would monitor all forces in the
security zones. Russia will refuse to accept new limits
placed upon its military presence by the Security Council and
pursuing this proposal would lead to a dust-up with Moscow.
Notwithstanding the likely recommendation of the SYG, we
still maintain that the best way forward is a technical
rollover or the French-proposed rollover plus. END COMMENT.
Rice