CYPRUS: SPECIAL ADVISOR DOWNER BRIEFS THE SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000453 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UNSC CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SPECIAL ADVISOR DOWNER BRIEFS THE SECURITY COUNCIL ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The SYG's Special Advisor for Cyprus, Alexander Downer, told the Security Council on April 30 he is "cautiously optimistic" about the current negotiations over reunification of the island. The two leaders had made "steady progress" since talks began in September 2008, but the negotiations needed more momentum or they could "atrophy and die". He warned against the international community trying to impose solutions, but also said the two sides needed reminders of the need to compromise. He asked the Council to stay involved with the issue and to reinforce through its statements and resolutions that it had "high expectations." All Security Council members offered support for Downer and backed a Presidential Statement (PRST) from the Council to publicly underscore this support, though the Turkish Ambassador made clear he did not think the PRST was balanced. Ambassador Rice and several other speakers urged the Secretary-General to look for ways to increase the momentum of the talks and acknowledged the need to encourage the leaders of the two communities to make compromises. END SUMMARY. -------------- DOWNER "CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus told the Security Council in closed consultations on April 30 that he is "cautiously optimistic" that the negotiations between Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat that began on September 3, 2008 could succeed. The current negotiations were an unprecedented opportunity to reach a settlement, he said, and the two leaders were sincere in their efforts. Downer reported that the two leaders had made steady progress on several "chapters" of the talks since they began in September 2008, including power sharing and governance, property, EU, and economic matters. The "core of hard issues"--security guarantees, territory, and status of settlers-- had not yet been broached, and he thought he would have a better sense of where things stood after the first pass through all chapters. During the next phase of negotiations, he would try to resolve areas where there was room for compromise and set aside the most difficult questions until the end. ¶3. (SBU) Downer did not know when the process might reach its final stages. The talks could not be spun out for years, he said. They needed to maintain momentum or they would "atrophy and die". The Greek Cypriots, were resistant to setting timetables, but in broad terms, Downer assessed that a certain momentum had been maintained. In addition to the 26 meetings between the two leaders, representatives of the sides and subject matter experts had met on numerous occasions. Downer emphasized that the two sides would need "constant reminders" from the international community (IC) of the need to compromise. This could not be seen as a zero-sum game. ¶4. (SBU) Downer emphasized that the talks were being held under UN auspices, but his involvement continued to be part-time. He sees the role of his Good Offices mission as assisting the sides to reach an agreement, but not to act as an arbitrator or to impose solutions on them. He reinforced that the issues need to be resolved by the local people themselves, as they will need to be put to the populations in simultaneous referenda. He said it is essential that the solution have the support of the leaders who will have to convince their people to support the settlement, adding that the IC should be "cautious and thoughtful about how we provide help." Downer thought the IC could be helpful by finding opportunities to meet with the leaders and emphasize their support for the talks. The Security Council could also support the process by focusing on the issue from time to time, and by emphasizing in its statements and resolutions that the Council has high expectations for the process. Downer thought the Presidential Statement to be issued by the Council would also be a helpful signal. -------------- Strong Support from the Council -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Speaking in response, every Council member offered their continuing support to Downer's efforts through the UN's Good Offices Mission, stressed the need to increase or maintain the momentum, welcomed recent confidence building measures, and acknowledged the need to reinforce with the sides that they would need to compromise. United Kingdom Ambassador Sawers, first to respond to Downer, remarked that the current round of negotiations had a different quality from previous efforts to resolve the Cyprus question, and USUN NEW Y 00000453 002 OF 002 that it was up to the communities to reach a solution. He emphasized that the talks could not go on forever, and it would be important to push toward a conclusion. Sawers introduced the draft Presidential Statement (PRST),which he said had been widely vetted with the parties. ¶6. (SBU) Ambassdor Rice commended the progress made so far in the talks, as well as the confidence building measures that had been undertaken by the leaders. She recognized that the next phase of negotiations would require compromise from both sides, and that the Council would need to support and encourage them in bringing the talks to a conclusion. Rice observed that UNFICYP had been in place for a long time, and that it could not stay forever. She urged Downer to seek ways to increase the momentum of the talks, so that the unprecedented opportunity to reach a settlement would not be lost. She reinforced that the United States stood ready to assist the sides in reaching a lasting settlement that reunifies Cyprus into a bizonal and bicommunal federation. ¶7. (SBU) Turkish Ambassador Ilkin also expressed optimism that the current negotiations could be successful. He lamented that former Greek Cypriot President Tassas Papadapoulos had lobbied against Greek Cypriot approval of the UN's reunification plan in 2004, but he thought that current Cypriot President Christofias was sincerely working toward a settlement. Ilkin expressed disappointment at the pace of the negotiations and noted that the first pass through all chapters had been slated to be complete by the beginning of May. He also said he thought Special Advisor Downer "should give more and more guidance" to the talks as they progressed so that they could be completed by December ¶2009. Ilkin said he would go along with the draft PRST, but he thought it was not a balanced text. He said he felt boxed in by the fact that word had already spread that a PRST was under consideration, and that if the Council now did not issue a PRST, it would send the signal that the Council was divided. ¶8. (SBU) France emphasized the need to ensure that the negotiation process remained Cypriot-owned, and that Downer needed to maintain the trust and confidence of both sides. Russia, China and Libya echoed the French call for the process to remain in the hands of the two leaders and also emphasized that the settlement needed to be on the basis of previous Security Council resolutions. Costa Rica recalled Resolution 1251 (1999),pointing to its call on all concerned to hasten the withdrawal of demilitarization of the island and to reduce spending on armaments. Croatia urged that the two leaders begin to prepare their people for an eventual settlement. Some members, including Burkina Faso and Austria, expressed the hope that the results of recent Turkish Cypriot elections would not weaken Talat's negotiating hand. Rice